Augusta County: "Sheridan at Winchester," by Benjamin W. Crowninshield, 1878
Summary: This article provides a detailed account of William Sheridan at Cedar Creek, from the perspective of Crowninshield, who rode with Sheridan and who frames this battle account as part of the larger campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. Crowninshield praises Sheridan and disparages the opposing general, Jubal Early (though the article goes out of its way to praise the marching ability of Confederate troops). The article also offers generous praise to Mosby.
As it has been recently stated that the story of Sheridan's ride at the battle of Cedar Creek is a fiction, and as many other late statements in the newspapers about the Shenandoah Valley campaign of 1864 under Sheridan are incorrect, it seems due to the memory of the brave dead and gallant living officers and men of Sheridan's army that some one should give an authoritative account of the campaign and the man, and especially of the fight at Cedar Creek. I shall therefore relate in brief the facts of the campaign, merely premising that I was on Sheridan's staff and present at all the battles.
During the whole war the Shenandoah Valley offered to the Confederates an easy road north, being supplied with railroads and a macadamized turnpike, probably at that time the best road in the South. The valley itself was very fertile, and, notwithstanding the fighting for three years, in 1864 it has full of supplies, which, on account of the open country, their troops could easily gather and transport. On the west the mountains were difficult to pass, and nobody wanted to go that way. To the northeast lay Washington, and northward the road to Baltimore. Philadelphia was up a valley equally practicable with the Shenandoah itself, and in fact a continuation of it, flanked by the same two ranges of mountains, with the watershed, of course, in an opposite direction. Still the decline in each valley was so slight that the terms up and down were strangely mixed; generally it was called down the Shenandoah towards Staunton (perhaps because we are apt to associate the terms down and south.) Across the Blue Ridge lay the counties of Loudon and Fauquier, a beautiful rolling country, generally open, but well supplied with woods and a network of small roads besides good turnpikes. Here was the home of Mosby's battalion, and in spite of all attempts to drive him away here he remained, during the whole war, master of the situation, ready to harass our lines of communication south by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad and the roads towards Richmond; and by crossing the Blue Ridge he was at once on the flank of our army in the Shenandoah. It probably took, all through the war, in one place and another, twenty thousand men to watch Mosby's command. Seldom remaining to fight, he was ubiquitous, and the amount of property he destroyed and the number of prisoners he captured during the war were something marvelous. No wagon train could move unless strongly guarded, and even then was almost at his mercy.
There seemed to be for our arms something akin to fatality in the Shenandoah Valley. It witnessed during this war many battles and gallant fights, but also for us several sad disasters and retreats. Especially was it expensive to us in the material of war. The captures by the Confederates were so considerable that it could almost be said to be to them an arsenal, besides providing enormous supplies of provisions for their armies.
What happened in 1861, 1862, and 1863 in the valley has frequently been described, with the wonderful doings of Ashby, Ewell, Stonewall Jackson, and others on the Confederate side, and the campaigns of Banks, Shields, Milroy, which surely deserve the term remarkable.
Stonewall Jackson achieved great reputation for his marches, fights, and captures there, and the valley gave more renown to him than to any other general of either army, excepting Sheridan. The avenue to and from Antietam and Gettysburg, for Lee's troops, was by the valley.
In the spring of 1864, General Hunter, with a rather heterogeneous command, marched up to near Lynchburg, for a time having everything his own way, but he met no well-organized Southern troops. Finally, in July, Lee detached Early, who hustled Hunter out in quick time, crossed the Potomac, and advanced through Maryland towards Washington, where he came within a hair's-breadth of taking the city. His advance caused a panic at the North, and gold reached its highest figure, 285, in consequence.
The sixth and nineteenth army corps, the one from Grant in front of Petersburg, the other from the James (being then on ships just front New Orleans), were dispatched in haste to defend the capital, and arrived in the very nick of time. Early pushed back through Maryland, retired only across the Potomac, and from there again menaced Pennsylvania and Maryland. Washington drew a long breath of relief, and the chiefs there now determined to take the valley in hand in earnest. The sixth corps crossed the Blue Ridge at Snicker's Gap, having a lively little affair at the ford across the Shenandoah. Sheridan was summoned from the front of Petersburg, and two of the three divisions of his cavalry joined him in the valley. Making his head-quarters at Harper's Ferry, he quickly assembled his forces, and prepared for the work allotted to him. In one week he was ready, having under him three divisions of the sixth corps (under Wright), two of the nineteenth (Emory), and two of the eighth (Crook); two divisions and a brigade of cavalry under Torbert, and one (Averill) afterwards detached.
On his taking command of the army in the valley the Middle Military Division was created for General Sheridan,-a large command, including generally all the Middle States, and Virginia north of the James. Orders were issued from General Grant to General Sheridan carefully to watch the valley and Early's army, but to avoid a general engagement, unless forced into it. Consequently our army advanced to Battletown (Berryville), and up the valley to Newtown and Middletown; then retreated to Charlestown and Harper's Ferry, closely followed by Early, who was reinforced by a large body of cavalry and Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps, fighting meanwhile only skirmishes, which were almost always to our advantage. Several of these were worthy of especial mention, as entire infantry regiments were charged and captured by our cavalry on two occasions.
Early now retreated via Charlestown across the Opequan, and with headquarters between Winchester and Martinsburg he occupied the line of the Opequan Creek. Sheridan continually engaged Early's attention by reconnoissances, and advanced up the valley to near Battletown. Early was equally active, and threatened attacks frequently. But Early's game was essentially one of bluff. He was attempting, with an inferior force, to occupy too much ground, and September 19th found him spread out from Winchester nearly to Martinsburg, with Sheridan's army well concentrated at Battletown, only ten miles from Winchester, and with the Opequan Creek between. General Sheridan had repeatedly and in vain requested leave to attack, and General Grant finally came up from Petersburg to Charlestown, where Sheridan met him, and demonstrated to him the state of affairs and the good chance to fight and defeat Early. Grant at last gave the coveted permission, arrangements were made, and in two days the battle of Winchester was fought. Early not only did not "force the battle," as is stated in some papers, but was surprised, and came very near total destruction.
Our army marched at two A. M., September 19th. The march to Opequan Creek was soon made, and before daylight the sixth corps was across. The passage was difficult, as the descent to the creek from the east towards Winchester is steep; the creek had to be forded; and on the west side is a defile, heavily wooded, of about two miles before ground is reached where a line of battle can be formed. About noon the sixth and nineteenth corps deployed, and advanced without waiting for the eighth corps, and the battle of Winchester commenced. The sixth corps, on the left and centre, was carrying all before it, but the second division of the nineteenth corps (the first being in reserve) was taken in flank by the Confederates and very roughly handled, and had to retreat, the enemy not advancing. A long lull followed until the eighth corps came up. Meanwhile our cavalry, crossing several miles down the Opequan, advanced against the Confederate cavalry, and driving it in pursued it towards Winchester. At about one hour before sunset our three corps advanced, and the cavalry came in on then enemy just outside Winchester. Our two attacks were consequently at right angles. The cavalry rode over an infantry division (Wheaton), while our infantry swept the enemy before them in wild confusion. Nightfall alone saved Early, who took to flight, leaving in our hands three thousand prisoners, five guns, and seven colors. Winchester was full of his wounded, who, deserted by their surgeons, were left to our care.
The next day, by marching all night, Early took up his position at Fisher's Hill (the strongest one in the valley, and one considered impregnable). It is a hill just beyond Strasburg, running across the valley, and so steep towards the south as to be almost a precipice for about a mile each side of the turnpike road. Towards the west the elevation is less and the slope more gradual. Following close upon Early's heels, our troops came up and posted themselves in his front. Sheridan at once carefully reconnoitred his position, and on the 22d, making little attacks on Early's front, he sent Crook with the eighth corps round his left flank to feel of him. Early, not relying on the natural strength of the position, had thrown up considerable works and dug rifle-pits. His guns were placed behind breastworks, and even embrasures were constructed. Our cavalry were sent up the little valley (Luray), and only the infantry and artillery were opposite Early.
After sending Crook out on the right, General Sheridan, with a few of his staff, sat on his horse, about the centre of our line, eagerly watching the enemy to note the effect of Crook's attack. The opening guns were fired late in the afternoon, when suddenly the enemy were seen to falter and retreat. Sheridan exclaimed, "By God, Crook is driving them!" and immediately ordered a general advance. Our troops rushed forward down one side, up the steep hill, across the rebel works, and in a moment, as it were, the position was taken, and Early's army, two days after Winchester, again defeated, with a loss of twenty-one guns and some twelve hundred prisoners. The general and officers of the staff with him dashed forward with the troops, and entered the works with them. Captain Martin, of the staff, captured a gun with his own hands; and an infantry soldier, not having his gun loaded, in the excitement knocked the driver of a cannon, who was trying to get it away, off his horse with a stone, and took the piece. Sheridan personally urged on the troops, and kept with the advanced guard all night. In a late newspaper article it is even stated that Sheridan was unequal to handling an army; that in fact he blundered on his success; and one is left to believe that he was a coarse, swearing trooper, fit only to command a company, or at most a regiment, of cavalry. Probably during the whole war no general made a better disposition of his troops in a battle, or a better plan for a battle or campaign. In one respect Sheridan was especially remarkable: that was in himself watching the troops in battle, seeing for himself what was done, and taking instant advantage of the chances that offered. Darkness and our want of cavalry saved Early from utter ruin. Our army followed Early all night, a constant skirmish going on between our advance and his rear, and no halt was made until Woodstock was reached. Early's army, in sadly demoralized condition, managed to get away, pursued by our army as far as Staunton. Every day we captured stragglers in large numbers; the whole country about was full of them, and quantities got away across the mountains to the east and west, joining Early further up the valley. Our main army halted at Harrisonburg, the cavalry going to Staunton. While we were here came the order from Washington to destroy all the mills, forage, and provisions, and to retreat, leaving behind us a country incapable of supporting an army. Nobody who was one of that army will ever forget the scenes of our retreat. By day the smoke obscured the sun; by night a lurid sky reflected the glare of burning barns and stacks of grain and hay for twice twenty-four hours. Early's army was supposed to be ruined, if not annihilated. But on the 8th of October, towards evening, came the familiar sound of artillery, and again appeared the Confederate cavalry (this time commanded by Rosser), sharply following up our army. Next morning about four A. M., at head-quarters at Strasburg, General Torbert, in command of all our cavalry, rode up on his beautiful gray horse, with large staff, colors, and escort. Dismounting in front of the log fire, he found Sheridan impatiently pacing up and down in front of his tent. Torbert advanced with "Good morning, general." Sheridan drew himself up, faced Torbert, and said, "General Torbert, get upon your horse, and don't let me see you again until either you have beaten the rebel cavalry, or they have beaten you!" Torbert got on his horse, and rode rapidly off without saying a word. The noise of artillery soon told of the opening attack. Just outside Strasburg is a hill thickly wooded. In a line running north and south the trees were felled, forming a notch between the dark spruces. The rebels had made this for a signal station. Our signal corps occupied it. Soon the flag waved down, "three guns captured;" again, "five guns captured." The firing grew more distant, and finally became inaudible. But the little flag waved down to us at head-quarters the welcome news, growing successively more welcome and glorious, until the captures by our cavalry grew to eleven guns, wagons, prisoners, etc.; or, in the language of the report, "all the rebels had on wheels."
That fight was known to our men as the "Woodstock races," as our cavalry pursued Rosser ("the saviour of the valley") twenty-six miles, through Woodstock, capturing from him all his artillery, and his head-quarter wagons among the rest. Next day General Custer, who, as always, was conspicuous in the fight, and who captured Rosser's luggage, appeared at head-quarters in a new suit of his, as a Confederate general. After this it was long before the Confederate cavalry was seen again.
The sixth corps now went towards the army of the Potomac at Petersburg, and it was thought that Early's army would not again attempt to move down the valley; but they had got no further than the crossing of the Shenandoah River by White Post, on their way to Alexandria, before Early became demonstrative, and the sixth corps rejoined Sheridan at the line of Cedar Creek, near Middletown, taking position upon the right of the line. Sheridan posted his army across the turnpike on the north side of Cedar Creek, in a position unassailable on the front: the nineteenth corps in the center, the sixth, on the right, and, the eighth on the left. The land was higher at Middletown and upon the left of the turnpike to Cedar Creek than upon the right; and it was also high along the creek, with a defile in front and a steep descent to the rear. On this ridge was placed the artillery of the nineteenth corps, with the infantry in camp in the low land to the rear. A wide plain extended from there, parallel to the creek, to the road, and for about a mile to the rear. The eighth corps was in camp on the heights on the left of the road, between Middletown and Cedar Creek, on barren hills overlooking the wooded valley to our left and front, and also looking to the right down across the plain in the rear of the nineteenth corps position. The cavalry was on our right and rear, guarding the back road and all the approaches from the right. Evidently, then, our left was the only assailable part of our position, and here the pickets were well out in front and to the left on the creek, and the position a commanding one. The army lay in this place about a week, getting up supplies, and resting after the severe marches of the past month. As our force outnumbered Early's, and was moreover in admirable condition after its victories, it might well feel secure in its strong position. The question now was how to hold on to the valley and yet send away the sixth corps to the army of the Potomac. It was proposed to fortify the line of Front Royal and Cedar Creek, and supply an intrenched camp from Alexandria by opening the Manassas Gap Railroad through Loudon County by way of Manassas Gap to Front Royal. General Augur was sent from Washington with troops along the line of the railroad into the heart of what was known as Mosby's Confederacy (where his command now consisted of nearly sixteen hundred men and a battery of guns), to open the railroad. General Sheridan was ordered to cross the mountains, meet Augur, and proceed to Washington, to arrange a plan for holding the valley on the line proposed. Taking a few members of his staff, he went across the Blue Ridge to Washington, and was on his way back, having got as far as Winchester, on the 19th of October.
Early displayed considerable activity about the 16th of October, moving his men about, and sending some infantry almost up to our cavalry pickets on the right. On the 18th, Gordon's division moved to our left, and at night made the march with great caution,-even dispensing with canteens on account of noise,-through the woods, to a point across the creek near our picket line, on our extreme left; Early, meantime, moving up the balance of his army close to our lines in front, ready to cross the bridge over the creek at the turnpike.
On the morning of the 19th, an hour before dawn, Gordon attacked our pickets with his main force, and immediately followed them into our positions, allowing no time for an alarm. The attack was a perfect success, Crook's troops being surprised in their camps and in their tents. Sleeping men were killed, and in half an hour the eighth corps became a disorganized mob, fleeing wildly down the valley pike through Middletown. For the rest of the 19th of October, the eighth corps was hors de combat. Gordon captured many prisoners and several guns in his attack, cleared the bridge across the creek, and allowed the balance of Early's army to cross unopposed. From the position of the eighth corps, and from the turnpike where Early now was, the Confederate army could look down upon Sheridan's head-quarters across the plain, in rear of the nineteenth corps artillery, and he could enfilade all our position with the fire of his guns. General Crook dashed off to try to rally his corps. General Wright rode to Sheridan's head-quarters, and, seeing the condition of things, at once marched his corps to the left and formed a new line. But Early had already captured eighteen guns, the entire camp of the eighth corps, and much equipage, etc., from the nineteenth corps, who were obliged to leave their camp in haste. Here Early's troops failed. So far their attack had been bold, well planned, and perfectly successful. But now came a disastrous halt to plunder the captured camps.
The nineteenth and sixth corps had not lost a man, and marched out to the fight in perfect order. The sixth corps in advance commenced the fight just to the right of Middletown, and held the enemy in check, the first division being principally engaged. The nineteenth corps was on our right. The cavalry under Torbert crossed to our extreme left, and occupied the pike. The army was not well handled, though, and General Torbert for a long time received no orders, marching to the pike on his own responsibility. The troops were steady, and all expected orders to advance; but instead our line gradually fell back, followed slowly by the enemy. At about three P. M., on General Emory's front was open, descending ground for more than a mile, nearly to where the sixth corps had been encamped. He marched sullenly to the rear, to the crest of a hill looking down on Early's troops slowly advancing in line of battle. As they approached, the artillery threw shot up the long hill. The writer of this article was at this time with Emory. He looked at the advancing enemy, and at his troops, who had hardly fired a shot all day. Then he said, uttering the thoughts of the entire army, "What will Sheridan say! It is a d-----d shame to retreat until we are beaten, and I'll be d-----d if I retreat any further!" He ordered his men to make a breastwork of rails along the crest of the hill, and was giving directions to defend it, when orders came from General Wright to retreat, and almost immediately to the left could be seen, coming out of some woods, the head of two columns with the colors of the first and second divisions of the sixth corps. I rode for a while with General Wheaton at the head of the first division, sixth corps, talking of the sad event of the day, until the valley pike came into view across some fields. It was at once noticed that men in considerable numbers were going up the pike to the front, and others were galloping about in excitement. I rode across at full speed, and coming up to an infantry soldier asked what was the matter. He said, "Sheridan has just ridden up the pike. I guess there'll be no more retreat today." In at few minutes I met Thony Forsythe, Sheridan's chief of staff, who told me to go as quick as I could to Newtown, form a guard, and bring up every man I could. All along the road were abundant signs of panic,-guns without caissons, abandoned wagons, and stragglers by hundreds. In about two hours I brought up nearly three thousand men, all disorganized, but ready to join their colors now. Sheridan, once up with the troops, stopped the retreat, re-formed his line of battle, rode along the lines saying at few words here and there, and about half an hour before sundown made a general attack, furious and successful at all points. Early's men made a fierce resistance, but were charged by infantry and cavalry, and were soon in complete rout, followed by our cavalry, who pursued them as far as Fisher's Hill, capturing a great quantity of prisoners and material of all sorts. Three times (in the three large battles of this campaign) the critical point of the battle came just at sundown, and night came to Early's aid. It is a fact that on each occasion his army was demoralized, and at the mercy of Sheridan had daylight lasted. At Winchester, Fisher's Hill, and Cedar Creek the final attack was of so impetuous a nature, that Early's men were literally "whirled up the valley." Here, too, the excellent roads, flanked com-monly by open fields, helped his retreat. Such defeats in Eastern Virginia would have meant annihilation. Early's troops, admirable at all points, were especially strong in marching; the same could be said of the Confederate army generally. They marched habitually with no stragglers and with great rapidity; and they subsisted on food which would have demoralized a Union army, and could fight like heroes on an empty stomach. Fisher's Hill and darkness as usual saved Early's army. Early's generals all were brave men, but one deserves especial mention,-General Ramseur, of North Carolina, who commanded a division in this campaign. On several occasions he was very conspicuous; but this evening, when the final attack was made, and his troops became unsteady, he rode out alone a distance in front of them between the lines, encouraging his men by word and example. It was not the only time he had been seen to do the same thing, but here it cost him his life. He fell mortally wounded, and later was brought to Sheridan's head-quarters, where everything was done that was possible to render him comfortable, General Custer, a classmate at West Point, being especially attentive. He died during the night. General Sheridan that night slept where his heads-quarters had been in the morning. The old Hite House was full of wounded and dying men, friends and foes, and slippery with blood, and the dead lay thick around.
The next few days the trophies were collected on the plain in front of head-quarters: forty-nine guns, fifty-two caissons, many thousand of small-arms, with a great quantity of army wagons and ambulances, and about eleven hundred prisoners and five or six stand of colors. The number of prisoners was but a small part of all captured, as hundreds escaped in the darkness.
This battle ended the campaign, and soon after, on the plan of fortification being abandoned, the army withdrew to Winchester, and the sixth corps went to Petersburg. Numerous engagements also took place besides those mentioned. Our cavalry were almost always marching and fighting, and distinguished themselves greatly. In fact, during this campaign the Confederate cavalry maybe said to have received their death blow. Towards the last they were quite unable to stand up before our horsemen. Even Mosby lost his artillery.
In the eleven weeks front the date of Sheridan's taking command to the battle of Cedar Creek he fought three battles, and almost daily some smaller affair, capturing during that time eighty-nine cannon and over nine thousand prisoners from the Confederate army, defeating them in every engagement, except that morning at Cedar Creek. Sheridan's army was numerically largely superior to Early's, but the campaign would have been otherwise impossible. Mosby, with sixteen hundred men and guns, was always on his flank, besides other guerrilla bands. As he advanced he was obliged to garrison the larger towns, and his wagon trains had to be very strongly guarded to keep up his line of communication and supply, which at times extended from Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg to Staunton.
Until "Winchester" he kept strictly on the defensive, according to instructions, merely marching up and down to keep Early's attention occupied; but when the word was given to take the offensive he displayed a wonderful activity. At head-quarters it was always a wonder how he could do his work; apparently he never slept, and during a battle or march he never had a tent or head-quarters established except where occasion called him. His staff passed a score of nights in the saddle, the only opportunity to lie down being in the dust or mud of a road during, a temporary halt.
In a battle he was everywhere, and saw everything for himself. At Fisher's Hill victory would have been otherwise impossible. At Cedar Creek it was his personal presence that turned that disaster into so brilliant a victory. Usually retired and reticent, he would, during a battle, become ablaze with enthusiasm. He was always affable, and would hear what one had to say; but woe to the officer who displeased him. Doing his own full duty, he expected the same from all under him, and he got it too; and therein lay his strength. He had no favorites but the men who best carried out his orders. His orders to Torbert on the morning of the Woodstock races were characteristic, and what happened at Five Forks in putting Griffin in command of the fifth corps was to be expected of him.
He became as thin as a greyhound during the campaign. He always wore his major-general's uniform, and with it the dignity of the position. He was the beau ideal of a general. He rode two horses, a gray and a black; both very large, powerful, and fleet animals. The former was said to have belonged to General Breckenridge, and to have been captured in one of the Western battles. Both horses had a peculiar Kentucky gait,-something between a walk and a trot,-which caused no little anguish to, and frequent strong language in quiet from, his staff, who to keep up were obliged to take that exasperating gait, a jog-trot. When this was continued nearly all day, the effect, good perhaps for the digestion, was anything but soothing to the physique and temper. On the 19th of October the black was the horse ridden, and the popular chromo, Sheridan's Ride, gives an excellent idea of the horse, except that the horse, in proportion to his rider, was really far larger.
Much has been said in the newspapers about Sheridan's profanity, and one might really suppose he had studied in some Falstaffian school. I can only say I did not notice it. When the emergency required it (and sometimes strong language was felt to be not only a relief but a necessity) he could, like many men in all callings of life, rise to the occasion in language as in deed; but I never observed any peculiar profanity in the man, while usually he was not only moderate in the quality but particularly so in the quantity of his language.
It is but fair to say that some officers of the sixth corps staff state that before (and it is only claimed that it was just before) Sheridan came up General Wright had issued orders for the army to advance. But it is certain that it had not advanced, and that it was in retreat when Sheridan rode up the pike.
The eighth corps took no part worth mentioning in the battle of Cedar Creek after the surprise of the morning. What fighting was done up to the final attack was by the first and second divisions (the first especially) of the sixth corps (the whole corps handled with great ability by General Getty), which had had a very severe fight just to the right of Middletown early in the day. All the rest of the fighting until Sheridan gave the order for the final attack was desultory, our troops slowly giving ground, and obliquing towards the pike and our rear.
The surprise of the morning gave Early the command of the pike. Why he did not force his troops down that fine road, which for two miles, being on a ridge, commanded all the country round it, is a mystery. It was worse than folly. Not a man in blue for over an hour was on that road; it led to our rear, and would have cut us off from our base and from reinforcements, and compelled our troops to retreat by the bark road.
Some rebel cavalry were for a time in Middletown. With a guard of thirteen of our scouts in rebel uniform, about an hour after the surprise, I rode into the town, and sat watching the men in gray, expecting to see the head of a column of Early's men each minute. Just afterwards Wheaton's division came up, and opened his fight with the enemy. Riding towards our right, away from the pike, I came upon our cavalry, Torbert in command, who rode rapidly towards me, awaiting orders. He said he had his men all ready, but did not know what had taken place, and had revived no orders whatever all the morning from any one. I briefly gave him the news, and advised him to lose no time in gaining the pike and holding it, which he at once did. In the final attack and victory our cavalry held the left along the pike. The fields were open and fenced with stone-wall, and Kershaw's division of Longstreet's corps defended the line. It is needless to say the fighting was desperate while it lasted. Our cavalry mounted, and charged the choicest infantry of the Confederate army in open country across stone-walls, and did it successfully. Here fell, mortally wounded, General Charles R. Lowell (then Colonel Lowell, commanding reserve brigade of cavalry), who died the next morning in Middletown. No man ever distinguished himself more in a short time than this brave and accomplished officer.
All the battles in the valley were in an open country, with few fences and good roads. It was a frequent remark with officers that they "never saw a battle before." Here the whole field lay before them like the stage of a theatre. The scenery was wonderfully beautiful, the weather perfect, and the whole campaign exciting and full of incident. I think those who went through it will always recall it with pleasure (if war can ever be called pleasant). Certainly, if not the most successful, it was the most brilliant campaign of the war.
The Battle of Winchester caused gold to fall from 230 to 191.
In closing I wish to state that this article has been written entirely without consulting General Sheridan, and without his knowledge.
Bibliographic Information: Source copy consulted: Atlantic Monthly, Volume XLII, p. 683-691
