Augusta County: "When Gen. Lee Lost Hope of Success," by A. S. Colyar, 1893
Summary: This account from a member of the Confederate Congress describes the secret committee to decide whether to continue the war in 1864. Lee's testimony was that there was no point to further battles and that he could not defend Richmond for long because of a lack of supplies. It also describes the process that led to the appointment of the Southern commissioners who met with Lincoln at Hampton Roads in 1865.
Hon. Washington Gardner, of Michigan, who carried a gun in battle for the Union, and was severely wounded at Resaca, Ga., spent a few days in Nashville recently en route from Chickamauga, where he went as commissioner to locate points in the battleground. Although a private in the war, has been elevated to Department Commander of the Grand Army in Michigan. Mr. Gardner is an able minister, an astute lawyer, and a thrilling lecturer. While in Nashville his friend, Dr. Fred Dunn, invited him, Hon. A. S. Colyar, and the editor of the VETERAN, to Belle Meade, the magnificent farm of Gen. W. H. Jackson. Mr. Colyar was a member of the Confederate Congress, and is an active lawyer of ability. On the pleasant journey Mr. Gardner was entertained by a story that is now being made of record. Mr. Colyar has written about it as follows:
S. A. Cunningham-Dear Sir: In answer to your request I give you what, in substance, I related to you and Mr. Gardner the other day. The Hampton Roads effort at settlement, in which Messrs. Hunter, Stephens, and Campbell acted as commissioners, came about in the following manner: John B. Baldwin, of Virginia, member of the House of Representatives, and who was a Colonel under Gen. Lee during the first year of the war, said to me one night in December, 1864, that he was greatly depressed, as Gen. Lee had that day informed him that the cause for which he was fighting had to fail-that he would be compelled to give up Richmond and disband his army for the want of supplies. Mr. Baldwin said he hardly felt that he had the courage to say what ought to be said in the House, as he knew Mr. Davis and many members of the House still believed the war could be prosecuted to a successful termination. Before we separated it was agreed that he, Mr. Baldwin, should introduce into the House a resolution for the appointment of a committee to inquire into our ability to carry on the war. This Mr. Baldwin did the next day in secret session. The resolution was promptly passed and the commit-tee appointed. Mr. Baldwin, perhaps the ablest man in the House, was made chairman. I, with several other members, was put on the committee. The first thing the committee did was to take the deposition of Gen. Lee. Then the evidence of other general officers was taken. Gen. Lee said in his evidence that he would be compelled to give up Richmond and disband his army for the want of supplies, and in answer to a direct question put by the chairman, he said he could devise no means of carrying on the war. The other general officers sustained him.
The taking of this proof lasted some time; I can not now remember how long, but we were waiting on some witnesses. This evidence created in the committee a profound impression. The feeling was that another battle ought not to be fought-that the further shedding of blood was useless. The report made to the House produced a discussion that was by no means free of acrimony. It was hoped and believed that Mr. Davis would at once take some steps looking to a settlement. This was not done, and after consulting Gen. Atkins and others, and after conferring with Mr. Stephens, who was Vice-President, and getting his consent to act, I wrote the resolutions-which Mr. Stephens himself rewrote and reformed-and afterward introduced them in secret session, asking the President to appoint Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell to confer with Mr. Lincoln on the subject of bringing the war to a close. While the debate was progressing, and before a vote was taken, a member, Mr. Barksdale, of Mississippi, intimated that the commission would be created if the debate was stopped, and that no vote need be taken. Thereupon Mr. Davis appointed Mr. Hunter, of Virginia, Mr. Campbell, of Louisiana, and Mr. Stephens. But as Mr. Stephens informed me when he came back, and I think he substantially states it in his book, the conditions of the authority forbade any settlement except on the basis of independence.
Mr. Stephens was of opinion when he returned that Mr. Lincoln was willing-the Union being restored, slavery having already been abolished-that the war should end, and all Federal troops be withdrawn from the Southern States, and leaving the Southern State governments intact just as they were before the war. In other words, trusting the Southern people to keep the agreement without force, or coercion through territorial government. The specific instructions given the commissioners were not known to Congress, certainly not to the House of representatives, and when the commissioners returned and reported a failure a great effort was made by public meetings to intensify the war feeling. One great meeting was held in Richmond, where Mr. Benjamin was the principal speaker.
Mr. Colyar does not report all of this conversation. Mr. Gardner asked him about Mr. Davis, raising the question of his faith in final success, and he replied that Mr. Davis evidently believed that Providence would eventually overrule for the Confederacy, as was the result of Washington's struggle for American independence.
Bibliographic Information: Source copy consulted: Confederate Veteran, Vol. 1, 1893, p. 324-325
