Franklin County: "Lincoln's Influence on the Campaign of 1864," by Col. A. K. McClure, March 12, 1905
Summary: This piece covers the political history of the nominatation of Lincoln for President in 1864 from the viewpoint of A. K. McClure.
The political condition in Pennsylvania at the opening of 1864 was anything but serene. While the Republicans generally accepted and sincerely desired the renomination of President Lincoln, he was very earnest and even bitterly opposed by some of the ablest leaders of the party, and among them Thaddeus Stevens, then the Commoner of the House, who was violent against the policy of the President, while such distinguished leaders as Chase, Wade, Sumner, Chandler, Henry Winter Davis and others, openly proclaimed their purpose to make exhaustive effort to retire Lincoln. The Republicans at that time were in the attitude toward Lincoln that the Democrats were toward Cleveland in 1892. In both cases the people of the party were absolutely and earnestly in support of the candidates, while the leaders of the party were largely against them. The Republican people had absolute faith in Lincoln as the Democrats in 1892 had in Cleveland, and Cameron saw his opportunity to gain power and prestige by taking the lead in an aggressive movement in favor of Lincoln's nomination.
Curtin and his friends were as sincerely in favor of Lincoln as was Cameron, but soon after the Legislature convened in January, Cameron made a quiet combination by which a paper strongly recommending the renomination of Lincoln, was signed by every Republican Senator and Representative at Harrisburg. It was known that the relations between Lincoln and Cameron had been severely strained by Cameron's enforced retirement from the Cabinet in the early part of 1862, and his open advocacy of Lincoln's renomination was not only in accord with the general sentiment of the Republican people, but it had all the marks of a chivalrous act on the part of Cameron. Cameron had not been forced from the Cabinet by Lincoln himself, but by conditions which made it necessary for Lincoln to retire him. He was unfortunate in having a host of friends who were most importunate in demanding official plunder from him, and while his official record in the War Office was free from the stain of corruption on his part, political necessities forced him to give promotion and contracts to men who abused the trust he reposed in them and brought reproach upon his department and the Government.
Cameron knew that the pressure was very strong upon the President to retire him, and whenever the movement assumed some measure of importance he notified the President that his resignation was at the disposal of the President at any time for his acceptance. The culmination came when a committee of financial men found it next to impossible to maintain the credit of the Government, and one of the many grave obstacles in the way was the alleged profligacy and corruption in organizing, equipping and maintaining the army. The committee called upon the President and informed him that it would be impossible to negotiate further loans without a change in the War Department that would hiasize the purpose of the Government to have it administered in severe integrity and economy. Lincoln had Cameron's distinct authority to accept Cameron's resignation at any time and thus retire him from the Cabinet, and without consulting Cameron or Stanton, or any others he wrote a brief letter to Secretary Cameron, simply stating that he had decided to nominate Cameron to the Senate as Minister to Russia, and Edwin M. Stanton to succeed him as Secretary of War.
This letter was given by the President to Secretary Chase with instructions to deliver it to Cameron in person, but Cameron dined with Colonel Forney that evening and Chase did not find him until 10 o'clock that night. Colonel Thomas A. Scott was then Assistant Secretary of War, and I happened to be in Washington that day and spent the evening with Colonel Scott at his office in War Department. About 11 o'clock Secretary Cameron entered Scott's office quite abruptly and betrayed a very unusual measure of excitement for one of Cameron's equable temperament. He came up to the table where Scott and I were sitting and laid down the President's letter. He spoke with great feeling and in a tremulous voice, with tears scalding his cheeks, he said that the President certainly meant to accomplish his destruction. He said to me, that while we had not been political friends, he certainly would not sanction any measure that meant my personal destruction, and he confidently expected that I would not sanction such a measure against him.
Scott, who was wonderfully fertile in invention, told Cameron to sit down and talk the matter over. He said he knew that the President did not intend to offer any personal affront to Cameron, or to destroy him personally or politically, that Lincoln had doubtless written the letter in the curt form it appeared simply because of the terrible pressure that was upon him. He proposed that Lincoln should be seen the next morning and he assured Cameron that Lincoln would permit Cameron to antedate a letter of resignation and Lincoln write a kind acceptance. Scott saw the President early next morning, and Lincoln readily agreed to Scott's suggestion, resulting in the withdrawal of the original letter from Lincoln to Cameron and the substitution of the correspondence embracing Cameron's formal resignation and Lincoln's formal and very kind acceptance. Stanton had no knowledge that he was considered for the Cabinet until he was notified that his nomination had been sent to the Senate for the Secretaryship of War, nor did any member of the Cabinet know of the changes made. Even Chase, who delivered the letter to Cameron, had no knowledge of its contents.
It is only just to Cameron to say that when a resolution of censure on his administration of the War Department was adopted by a Republican House, President Lincoln sent a brief special message to the House stating that the censure of Cameron was not wholly just, as in many things for which he was censured the President himself was equally responsible, and a few years later the resolution of censure was rescinded by the House and expunged from its record.
While the relations between Cameron and Lincoln were somewhat strained by Lincoln's method of retiring Cameron from the Cabinet, Cameron did not hesitate to take advantage of the opportunity presented in the early part of 1864 to throw himself into the breach and become the ostensible leader of the movement to sustain Lincoln in Pennsylvania. The action of the Legislature that was inspired by Cameron, brought out a very hearty and generally cordial response from the Republicans of the State in favor of Lincoln, and from that time until the meeting of the State Convention there was practically no Lincoln issue in the Republican politics of the State. I was then enjoying at home a season of relief from public care, and trying to give some attention to private affairs. My devotion to Lincoln made me desirous to go as a delegate to the National Convention from my own congressional district, and I was chosen by the unanimous action of the different countries without the formality of a conference. A few weeks before the meeting of the convention the President telegraphed me to come to Washington, and notwithstanding the fact that at that time more than a majority of all the delegaes to the National Convention were positively instructed to him, without serious opposition to him in any of the States, I was surprised to find Lincoln apprehensive that he might not be renominated. He knew that a considerable number of very able men were earnestly against him and when I told him that it was not possible to be defeated with a majority of the delegates instructed for him, and nearly all of the remainder pledged to him, his answer was: "But I don't forget that I was nominated for President in a convention that was two-thirds for the other fellow."
He surprised me by saying that he had sent for me for the purpose of having me made one of the delegates-at-large from Pennsylvania. Considering that I was already a member of the delegation, in which a man's usefulness was measured entirely by his ability and influence and not by the distinction of a delegate-at-large over a district delegate, I could not but regard the proposition as absurd, besides being, as I then believed it to be, entirely impossible. I told the President that I could not, with any decency, appeal to the State Convention to elect me a delegate-at-large when I was already unanimously chosen a delegate from my district; but Lincoln was persistent to an extent that I could not understand and I finally asked him what he meant by asking me to do so ungracious and, to my mind, impossible thing. He informed me that he had a letter from General Cameron who said he would be a delegate-at-large from Pennsylvania, and he added that while he had no question of Cameron's fidelity, he thought that it was most desirable that if Cameron was a delegate-at-large I should be one with him. He was most importunate on the subject, and finally said: "I think you can accomplish it, and I want you to try." I told him that if opportunity offered I would accomplish it, but that I had not the remotest idea that it was within the range of possibility.
I knew enough of Lincoln at that time, to know that he had a settled purpose in view, but what it was I could not conceive, nor would he explain. He knew that my election as delegate-at-large could not, in any way, influence the action of Cameron, but he made it a command and I told him that I would see if it could be accomplished. On my return from Washington I stopped over at Harrisburg without any definite purpose, and dropped in to see George Bergner who, while a warm personal friend of mine, was a devoted follower of Cameron. Cameron was anxious to be a delegate-at-large and could not have been defeated, but his desire was to be elected by an overwhelming vote, and he knew that that could be accomplished only by the concurrence of the Curtin people. After a few minutes' conversation with Bergner he remarked that we were now all for Lincoln, and there ought not to be any division in the party at the next State Convention; that there was no State ticket to nominate and only electors and delegates-at-large to be chosen. He then broke the ice by stating that "the old man," meaning Cameron, wanted to be a delegate-at-large and hoped there would be harmony it his selection. For the first time I saw the glimpse of an opening to accomplish what I had been instructed to do, and I answered Bergner by saying that certainly there should be no division in the convention as we were all for Lincoln, and that Cameron and Curtin should be made delegates-at-large by a unanimous vote. I knew that Cameron would object to Curtin as they were not on speaking terms, and Bergner promptly answered that "the old man" and Curtin couldn't get along together, but he added: "We'll take you and Cameron." I asked him what assurance he had that Cameron would assent to the arrangement and he informed me that if I would wait twenty minutes he would see Cameron in person and bring he his assurance. He was delighted, of course, at the prospect of getting Cameron the support of the Curtin element....
... there are yet enough living in Pennsylvania to establish the fact that Lincoln nominated Johnson over Hamlin for Vice-President in 1864, outside my own testimony. Mr. Armstrong was with Cameron on his mission to Butler, sent by Lincoln to arrange for the nomination of a War Democrat. Judge Stewart, who succeeded me as district delegate, and knew all that transpired at Baltimore, is also cognizant of the fact that both Cameron and myself obeyed Lincoln in the matter. Ex-Congressman J. Rankin Young, still living in Philadelphia, some years after the war, prepared an interview with General Cameron on the subject that was carefully revised by Cameron himself, and published in the New York "Herald," telling how he had co-operated with Lincoln in the early part of the year in a movement for the nomination of Johnson.
Lincoln was nominated on the first ballot, receiving the full vote of every State but Missouri, whose delegation was instructed for Grant, but it promptly changed to Lincoln before the vote was announced, making his nomination unanimous. On the roll call for Vice-President, Johnson received 200 votes, Hamlin 150, Dickinson 108 with 61 scattering, but before the vote was announced Pennsylvania changed from Hamlin to Johnson and other changes followed rapidly, making the final announcement of the first ballot 494 for Johnson, 17 for Dickinson and 9 for Hamlin.
Lincoln was not influenced by prejudice or resentment in opposing the nomination of Hamlin. The reasons he gave me in support of the nomination of Johnson were so logical and conclusive that I would have voted for Johnson as a matter of duty to the party and to the country, regardless of my willingness to accede to the wishes of the President. They were: First, that the nomination and election of a Vice-President from a reconstructed State in the heart of the Confederacy, who was a distinctly representative man, and had filled every office in the gift of the State, would add more strength to the friends of the Union in England and France, who were struggling against the recognition of the Confederacy, than could be accomplished in any other way, save by the complete overthrow of the Confederate military power. Second, the strong political necessity for nominating a distinctive War Democrat not then connected to the Republican party , to bring to the support of the Administration the many thousands of War Democrats who were followers of men like Johnson, Dickinson, Butler, Dix, Holt and others; and, third, the nomination of Johnson would desectionalize the Republican party. Recognition of the Confederacy was yet a fearful peril to the Union cause, and the nomination of Johnson demonstrated that substantial progress was being made in the restoration of the Union by the accomplished reconstruction of the State in the inner circle of rebellion.
The convention met in Baltimore on the 7th of June, and I never saw a more hearty welcome given to any man in a public assembly than was given the Rev. Robert J. Breckenridge, of Kentucky, when he was made temporary president of the body. It was a brave act for any man for any man from the South to confess himself a Republican, but when a man of the high character and intellectual and moral attitude of Dr. Breckinridge took the chair in the Republican National Convention, it gave courage and hope to scores of thousands in the Southern States. Governor Dennison of Ohio, was made permanent president, but the controlling mind of the convention was that of Henry J. Raymond, who acted in closest confidence with Lincoln. He not only withdrew his State from the support of Hamlin, but was compelled to sacrifice Dickinson, another War Democrat, whose friends felt that he should be preferred to Johnson. He wrote the platform, became chairman of the National Committee, wrote the campaign life of Lincoln, and he was, in fact, the "leader of leaders" of that great contest.
There were many inharmonious elements in the convention. All felt that we were then approaching the period when the military power of the Confederacy would be overthrown, and the grave problem of reconstruction would be presented for solution. On that question there could have been no common ground of agreement in the National Convention of 1864. There were many who, like Stevens, demanded the severest punishment of the officials who engaged in rebellion, the confiscation of property, and the absolute denial of citizenship, while a majority were in favor of various shades of generous methods to accomplish reconciliation and reunion. While there was a general feeling of confidence in the re-election of Lincoln, the more intelligent of the leaders knew that they had a severe battle before them and most careful methods were developed to guard against disaster in November.
It was known that General McClellan would be the opposing candidate; that he had many sincere supporters in the army and that the conservative elements of the country had absolute confidence in him, while all the shades of the entire anti-war elements would be certain to support any candidate nominated by the Democrats. The Republican leaders did not assume that their victory was assured, and many grave conferences were held on the various subjects which might have a bearing on the conflict. It was a convention of great force, and it was most judiciously guided by wise leadership to place the party in the best attiture for a desperate conflict. The student of to-day, who looks over the history of that campaign will naturally assume that Lincoln was re-elected without a struggle, as the vote appears to be overwhelming; but all who were at the Baltimore convention, and all who actively participated in the struggle, will remember the gloom that hung over the Republican party during the Summer months, and how triumph was finally decided by the victories of Sherman in Atlanta, and Sheridan in the valley.
Bibliographic Information: Source copy consulted: "Lincoln's Influence in the Campaign of 1864," by Col. A. K. McClure, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, The Philadelphia Press, March 12, 1905
