Summary:
Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell commanded the Third Corps of the Army of Virginia, which included
the 107th Pa. McDowell reports that the unit held a position and protected the retreat before
falling back.
Maj. Gen. JOHN POPE, Commander of the late Army of Virginia.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
November 6, 1862.
On the morning of Saturday, the 30th, Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter's corps came on the ground by the same road that had been taken by the divisions of King and Ricketts--the Sudley Springs road--and turned up the Warrenton turnpike, following the course of King's division. The order you first gave was that we should hold the center and left and mass our troops on the right, to attack the enemy's left; and as you ordered me to make this attack with the Third Corps; added to the corps of Porter and Heintzelman, I asked to make a reconnaissance in person before sending the troops in, and requested Gen. Heintzelman to accompany me.
The Sudley Springs road is nearly north and south, and the Warrenton turnpike is nearly east and west, crossing each other near where your established your headquarters. I found the enemy had the day before occupied nearly the half of a circle, commencing at a point beyond Bull Run, on the northeast angle made by those roads and sweeping around irregularly through Sudley Springs to the west, and then south to a point in the southwest angle. Our line opposing them had on the right Heintzelman's corps; in the center, first Reno's and then Sigel's corps, and on the left King's division and Bayard's cavalry; Ricketts, in an interior position, in reserve. Porter's corps, which on the day before had been detached and been on the extreme left, hanging on the enemy's right and rear, was now on the left, up the Warrenton road.
On going with Gen. Heintzelman over to the position held by his troops we found all the points held by the enemy the day before beyond Bull Run abandoned, and in going over to the Sudley Springs road and west of it was saw no evidence of the enemy in force, some skirmishers and advanced posts or rear guards, as the case might, be being all that we found. On returning to headquarters and reporting these facts we found that word had been sent in from the front that the enemy was moving back on the road to Gainesville. Similar word was given by Gen. Patrick. On the supposition that the enemy was falling back I received your orders[1] to take command of the corps above named and pursue the enemy. I accordingly gave orders that Ricketts' division should report to Gen. Heintzelman, who was to have charge of the right of the advance, and was to move on the enemy by the road from Sudley Springs to Hay Market--a road running west nearly parallel with the Warrenton turnpike and the north side of it--and paled the other division, Reynold's and King's, which were to the front on the Warrenton turnpike and near Gen. Porter's corps, under that general, to support him in his advance on that road; but just as these orders[2] were issued Gen. Reynolds rode up to my headquarters and reported, of his own personal knowledge, that the enemy were not falling back; on the contrary, that he was passing his troops to the south of Warrenton turnpike, and massing them behind the woods, to turn our left and make an attack on the southwest angle of the two roads and thence across the Sudley Springs road to the southeast angles. It may be well to state here--what, however, is well known to you--that the country around the field of battle is much of it thickly wooded, and that the march of large bodies on the side of the enemy could only be seen at intervals and can be easily hidden from view.
On Gen. Reynolds' information, seeing no time was to be lost and that instant measures were to be taken to meet this unexpected movement, I gave him orders to take his division immediately over to provide for this threatened attack and occupy the hill south of the turnpike, he knowing the ground well, having been over it in the course of the battle the day before. You at the same time gave orders that some of Gen. Sigel's corps should also move to the south of the turnpike on the Bald Hill, so called, near Groveton. I immediately wrote to Gen. Porter that he must exercise his discretion as to the use of King's division in the movement, he suggested, in his front, that I had been obliged to take Reynold's division from him to guard the left, and had to go there in person to see to it; that you said if he should need more force you would send him Gen. Sigel. I sent word also to Gen. Heintzelman of the change, and that I was obliged to take from him two brigades and two batteries of artillery of Ricketts' division to aid in improvising the defense of the left, south of the turnpike, where I immediately repaired, and remained throughout the battle, having no further communication either with Gen. Ricketts' division, under Gen. Heintzelman, or Gen. King's division, under Gen. Porter.
The Warrenton turnpike goes west up the valley of the little rivulet of Young's Branch, and through the battle-field is mostly closed to the stream. The ground rises from the stream on both sides, in some places quite into hills. The Sudley Springs road, in crossing the stream at right angles, passes directly over one of these hills, just south of the stretching back away from it some hundreds of yards to the forest. This is the hill on which the Henry house stood. To the west of it is another hill--the Bald Hill, so called--which is, in fact, a ridge lying between the roads, and making about the same angle with each, and running back to the forest. Between the two hills is a small stream--a tributary, I think, of Young's Branch.
The two brigades under Brig.-Gen. Tower and the two batteries from Ricketts' division were taken from north of the Warrenton turnpike on the Sudley Springs road to the hill first above mentioned to the farther side of the first woods. Whilst reconnoitering in advance of these woods--the positions which the enemy would be likely to occupy in the direction indicated by Gen. Reynolds--I was joined by that officer, and, seeing no evidence at that time of the enemy to the left, I accompanied him across to the Bald Hill ridge, on which, next to the main woods, his division was taking up its position, and on which, next to Gen. Reynolds, Gen. Schenck was coming up from the Warrenton road. Whilst these troops were forming on this ridge, which commanded a view of the enemy in the northwest angle of the two roads before mentioned, and which overlooked the Warrenton road, we saw the effects of the attack which had been made by Maj.-Gen. Porter in front with his own troops and King's division of my corps. Seeing that it was resulting disastrously for us, and that our troops were falling back, I returned immediately to the Henry House Hill to see to the placing of Tower's two brigades and the two batteries. On my way I met one of your staff with your message, asking if in ordering over this force I had not taken too much from the right. But soon after meeting you, as you came up the Henry House Hill from the right, and representing the state of affairs in front, with your sanction I sent Tower's command over to the Bald Hill, to the right of Gen. Schenck. The line thus formed, in connection with that on the north of the turnpike, held by Reno, Sigel, and other, commanded the Warrenton road and protected the retreat of Porter's command, then moving down from the front.
The line had not been formed any too soon, for the enemy, after our troops in front had retreated, made the expected attack, and assailed the troops on the ridge both in front and on their left flank. Those of the enemy who had passed to the south of the Warrenton turnpike, as represented by Gen. Reynolds, soon after opened a severe fire from the southwest of the Henry House Hill on the Bald Ridge, and at the same time prepared to move down to take the woods on the Henry House Hill itself. The next step was to provide in some way for the defense of this hill, and as at this time some battalions of regulars, of Sykes' division, came up the hill, they were sent to the left to occupy the woods which covered it. The Rhode Island battery, under Capt. Monroe, and some time after two brigades of Reynolds' division, under Gens. Meade and Seymour, which had been withdrawn from the extreme left of the front to form a line across the road behind which Gen. Porter's troops might rally, were brought over from the right and relieved the regular battalions. The latter rejoined their division, which formed another line on the hill to the east, in rear of the Henry House Hill and at a few hundred yards distant from it. Reno's corps was also withdrawn by your order from the north of the turnpike to the Henry House Hill.
The attack on the Bald Ridge line had been too severe for the troops to hold it long under the hot fire the enemy maintained upon it. Jackson's brigade, of Reynolds' division; McLean's, of Schenck's, and Tower's two brigades, of Ricketts' division, were, after heavy losses, little by little compelled to yield it, Gen. Schenck and Gen. Tower receiving severe wounds, the former in the arm, the latter in the left knee, as they were encouraging and leading on their men. Col. Fletcher Webster, Twelfth Massachusetts, and Capt. Fessenden, aide to Gen. Tower, were mortally wounded.
Though we lost this position, it had been held long enough to aid in protecting the retreat of our men from the front, who as they came in, either formed behind it or in rear of the line on the north of the turnpike. It was the only position on the left from which we were forced, and its loss reflects no discredit on those who held it, for they yielded to the overwhelming force of the whole right of the enemy's army, which was concentrated on them after our advance had been driven back. The troops immediately north of the Warrenton turnpike the commenced falling back.
On going to the turnpike where it ascends from the bridge over Young's Branch to the top of the hill to the right and rear of the Henry House Hill, to see to the placing of some troops which I thought might be of King's division, of my corps, coming there from the front, I found Brig. Gen. Carl Schurz with some of Gen. Sigel's corps drawn up by the road. The general spoke to me concerning the posting of a battery then out of position, which I caused to be placed so as to be of use in case we should be forced from the Henry House Hill as we had been from the Bald Hill, but with warning they were not fire till after our men should have left the position in front. Seeing them commence loading, I sent a captain on my staff to warn the battery not to fire except on the contingency mentioned. I refer to this incident, as it may have served as a foundation for one of the strange stories that soon after became prevalent as to this battle.
I annex hereto an extract of Gen. Schurz' report and a correspondence which grew out of it, from which it will be seen that the general says "he did not mean what he seems to have said." [See Appendix B.] Leaving Gen. Schurz drawn up on the hill, I went to the left, where the corps of Gen. Porter, or the larger part of it that came out of the fight in front, had been formed in double line, and when near Sykes' division of regulars Brig.-Gen. Milroy--a gallant officer, of Gen. Sigel's corps--came riding up a state of absolute frenzy, with his sword drawn, and gesticulating at some distance off, shouting to send forward re-enforcements, to save the day, to save the country, & His manner, his dealing in generalities, which gave no information whatever, and which, in the way he uttered them, only showed him as being in a state of mind as unfit to judge of events as to command men and as being away from his command, caused me to receive him coldly.
It was a question with me whether we could hold the Henry House Hill--whether to break the line of reserve at this time or hold the position they then occupied. It was a question of importance, on which I should have liked to consult you, the general-in-chief, before deciding--the more so as I had reason to think this line had been established under your own orders, given direct. But you were farther over to the left, and the case had to be determined at once.
But while Gen. Milroy gave me nothing whatever on which I could be justified in acting, and while in double for the moment in view of the circumstances as to the course to be taken, I received a clear message from that intelligent as well as gallant officer Brig.-Gen. Meade, through one of his aides-de-camp, to the effect that if he could have some re-enforcements sent to him in the woods on the Henry House Hill could not only hold them, but drive out the enemy, who were not then there in great force. Relieved from all doubly by this message, I exclaimed, "Meade shall have re-enforcements," and immediately gave Gen. Porter orders to send them forward.
I send herewith an extract[3] from Gen. Milroy's report, to which I regret I have to refer to say that his statement that I refused to send re-enforcements to Gen. Sigel is without foundation in anything that I said or thought. I had just come from a large part of Gen. Sigel's corps. I had received no intimation from Gen. Sigel that he needed re-enforcements. He was in reserve, and mostly in a different part of the field than that in which I had been operating. On Friday I had re-enforced him with Reynolds' whole division, and on Saturday the only part of his corps with which I had had anything to do up to the time of my seeing Gen. Schurz was Gen. Scheneck's division, which I had re-enforced, without being asked, with every man I had at the time under my control.
I send herewith a copy of my correspondence with Col. Buchanan, commanding the brigade of regulars sent forward at the time in question,[4] and with other officers present on the occasion, from which you see the condition of mind Gen. Milroy was in, and how little his impressions at the time are to be relied on, either as to what he did or what I said.
To Gen. Sigel personally I bore no ill-will, but had he been my enemy, and had I desired to see him harmed--Gen. Sigel here represented several thousand men, many of them from my own State, and aside from the great question of the loss of the battle, the fate of the campaign and the ruin of the country, which might all have been involved--I could not be so stupidly bad, so utterly false to the simplest form of duty, as to refuse aid to my brother soldiers when I had the power to give it only because they were under an officer I did not like. As it seems to have been the impression not only that I was unfriendly to Gen. Sigel, but that we had bitter altercations and even personal conflicts on the field itself, I take the occasion to state that during the whole course of the operations from Thursday morning at Buckland Mills to the next Monday evening at Fairfax Court-House not only I did not exchange a word with Gen. Sigel, but I did not see him, and I do not think he saw me. The re-enforcements taken forward by Col. Buchanan and the troops brought by your orders from the north of the turnpike held the position on the Henry House Hill until they were withdrawn long after dark.
It was about 7 o'clock when I received your order to take such portions of my corps as I might find intact and proceed with them to take a position covering the bridges over Bull Run and Cub Run. Proceeding to the place where I had left Gen. Schurz I found he had withdrawn, but Gen. Gibbon's brigade, of King's division, was just coming up the hill, and seeing it would not be well to leave the position as unsupported as it then was, I told Gen. Gibbon to take post there and hold it till everything should have passed him. He remained there, I am told by one of the colones of his brigade, till some two hours after dark, when he withdrew.
Learning at this place that Patrick's brigade, of King's division, had just passed toward the bridge I followed it there. Seeing the road much blocked up with wagons I endeavored to find the ford, a couple of hundred yards below the bridge, but it was so dark I could not see the way, and returned to the road and crossed over. I left here two officers of my staff and a guard of the Pennsylvania Bucktail Battalion, belonging to the Third Corps, under the gallant Col. Kane, and directed some pieces of artillery that were passing by to be placed in position on the left bank. All contest, however, save a short now and then from one of our pieces on the Henry House Hill, had ceased for some time. This brave little battalion remained here until everybody had passed, when they destroyed the bridge and brought up the rear. The troops in passing over the bridges and in moving to the rear did so in good order. Stragglers there were, of course--a march, either in advance or retreat, is seldom without them--but the mass of the men preserved their organization and moved by battalions and batteries. At Cub Run Bridge I left, with Maj. Houston, U.S. Engineers, who had constructed the bridge over Bull Run, and rendered valuable service throughout the campaign, a regiment to keep the troops in the proper order in passing to the rear.
I have no reports from King's division, and, as its operations were under direction of another commander, I am unable to speak as I would like to do concerning it. It was, I know, driven back in the engagement in front, but I know it to be one of the finest, best-drilled, best-disciplined bodies of troops in the service, and in the main ably commanded, and if it could not accomplish its task it must have been an excessively had one it was called on to perform.
The two brigades of Rickett's division, engaged over in the extreme right, under Gen. Heintzelman, were under Gen. Ricketts, whose report is herewith.
On the morning of the 31st the corps was reunited, and by your order placed in reserve behind Centreville, the cavalry, under Bayard, being detached and operating to the right of that place.
[1]See No. 6, Appendix C.
[2] See Nos.7 and 8, Appendix C.
[3] See No. 9, Appendix C.
[4] See Nos. 10 and 11, Appendix C.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
IRVIN McDOWELL,
Maj. Gen., Commanding Third Corps, Army of Virginia.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I. Vol. 12. Part II, Reports. Serial No. 16, Page 339, Broadfoot Publishing Company, , .
