Summary:
Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday commanded the Third Division of the Army of the Potomac which
included the 107th Pa. Doubleday provides an overview of the battle, mentioning many specific
units.
Washington, D. C.,
December 14, 1863
On the eventful morning of July 1, between 7 and 8 o'clock, General Reynolds sent for me for the purpose of explaining the telegrams received by him in relation to the movements of the rebels and the latest position of our own troops. This information showed that the enemy was reported in force at Cashtown and Mummasburg, and that our cavalry was skirmishing with them on the roads leading from Gettysburg to those places. He told me he had already given orders to Wadsworth's division, with Hall's battery, to move forward, and that he would accompany these troops in person, while I remained to bring up the balance of the corps. Owing to the intervals between the divisions and the necessity of calling in the pickets, from an hour and a half to two hours elapsed before the remaining troops were en route. Wadsworth's division was, therefore, obliged to sustain the brunt of the action alone for this length of time. As soon as I saw that Robinson's and Rowley's divisions, with the remaining batteries, had commenced the march, I rode on in advance of the column.
The sound of rapid cannon firing convinced me that our cavalry was warmly engaged. I pushed forward at full speed, and soon overtook Wadsworth's division, which had left the main road and was filing rapidly through woods and fields toward a ridge which ran north and south, about 400 yards to the west of the seminary, which is itself about a quarter of a mile to the west of Gettysburg, and located on a similar ridge parallel to the first. About 200 yards farther on, the former range of heights sloped down, and ended in a ravine called Willoughby's Run. On the most westerly of these ridges, General Reynolds had directed his line of battle to be formed, and was himself superintending the placing of Cutler's brigade as I rode up. I had previously sent an aide (Lieutenant Marten) to the general for instructions. He returned with orders for me to attend to the Millerstown road, on the left of our line. A small piece of woods cut the line of battle in about two equal parts. These woods possessed all the advantages of a redoubt, strengthening the center of our line, and enfilading the enemy's columns should they advance in the open spaces on either side. I deemed the extremity of the woods, which extended to the summit of the ridge, to be the key of the position, and urged that portion of Meredith's brigade, the Western men assigned to its defense, to hold it to the last extremity. Full of the memory of their past achievements, they replied cheerfully and proudly, "If we can't hold it, where will you find men who can?" General Reynolds' intention appeared to be simply to defend the two roads entering the town from the northwest and southwest, and to occupy and hold the woods between them. The principal effort of the enemy was made on the Cashtown road from the northwest, and was opposed at first by Cutler's brigade and Hall's battery, the former stretching across, the latter posted on, the right of the road.
Immediately on my arrival at the ridge, I rode to the left to examine the ground in that direction, and then was engaged in overseeing the operations of Meredith's brigade, commonly known as the Iron Brigade. These troops were formed in the following order, from right to left: The Second Wisconsin, Seventh Wisconsin, Nineteenth Indiana, and Twenty-fourth Michigan Volunteers. The Sixth Wisconsin, together with the brigade guard, under Lieutenants Harris, of the Sixth Wisconsin, and Showalter, of the Second Wisconsin, had been detached by my order, to remain with me as a reserve. There was no time to be lost, as the enemy was already in the woods, and advancing at double-quick to seize this important central position and hold the ridge. The Iron Brigade, led by the Second Wisconsin in line, and followed by the other regiments, deployed en echelon without a moment's hesitation, charged with the utmost steadiness and fury, hurled the enemy back into the run, captured, after a sharp and desperate conflict, nearly 1,000 prisoners--all from Archer's brigade--and reformed their lines on the high ground beyond the ravine.
The Second Wisconsin, in this contest, under the gallant Colonel Fairchild, was particularly distinguished. It accomplished the difficult task of driving superior numbers of rebel infantry from the shelter of the woods, and to it also belongs the honor of capturing General Archer himself. He was brought in by Private Patrick Maloney, of Company G. It is to be lamented that this brave Irishman was subsequently killed in the action.
The troops were now withdrawn to the eastern side of the run by my order, and reformed on a line with the Second Wisconsin, the Seventh Wisconsin taking the right of the new line and the Nineteenth Indiana the left. Immediately after this, I took my position behind the left wing. I had hardly done so when I learned, with deep sorrow, that our brave and lamented commander, Major-General Reynolds, had just been shot, and was no more. This melancholy event occurred in the beginning of the attack referred to, about 10.15 a. m. The whole burden of the battle was thus suddenly thrown upon me.
The death of General Reynolds was followed by other disasters. A column of the enemy's infantry had succeeded in approaching Hall's battery to within a distance of 60 yards by charging up the ravine on his right, and had poured in a terrible and destructive fire at that short range. At the same time a vastly superior force advanced in two lines against Cutler, in front and on his right flank. General Wadsworth directed this brigade to fall back to the shelter of the woods on Seminary Ridge. This left Captain Hall without any supports to his battery, and, as he received no orders to withdraw, his situation soon became a precarious one.
The One hundred and forty-seventh New York Volunteers, of Cutler's brigade, did not receive the order to retire; Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, its commander, having been wounded, was unable to communicate his instructions to his successor, Major Harney. The latter bravely held the regiment to its position until the enemy was in possession of the railroad cut on his left, thus intercepting his line of retreat. During the half hour which elapsed before he could be relieved, his loss was 207 killed and wounded out of 380.
The dispositions made by Captain Hall to meet the emergency and save his battery were both able and resolute. He broke the force of the charge against him by firing canister, and then ordered his battery to retire by sections. The right section, while falling back, was charged upon by the enemy's skirmishers, and 4 of the horses of one piece shot. The cannoneers, however, drew off the piece by hand. In reference to this period of the action, Captain Hall says, in his official report:
As the last piece of the battery was coming away, all of its horses were shot, and I was about to return for it myself, when General Wadsworth gave me a peremptory order to lose no time, but get my battery in position near the barn on the heights, to cover the retiring of the troops. I sent a sergeant and 5 men after the piece, all of whom were wounded or taken prisoners.
Captain Hall was now withdrawn behind Seminary Ridge by way of the railroad grading, which runs nearly parallel to the Cashtown road, and is about 100 yards from it--an unfortunate route to take, as it was swept by the enemy's guns. He was soon afterward assigned to a new and more advanced position by an aide-de-camp of the division commander, but, in attempting to occupy it, he was fired upon by the rebel advance, who already held possession of the ground, and he again withdrew.
The whole of these events had occurred on the right so soon after my arrival, that there was no opportunity for me to interpose, issue orders, or regulate the retreat. The moment was a critical one, involving the defeat, perhaps the utter rout, of our forces. I immediately sent for one of Meredith's regiments (the Sixth Wisconsin), a gallant body of men, whom I knew could be relied upon. Forming them rapidly perpendicular to the line of battle on the enemy's flank, I directed them to attack immediately. Lieutenant-Colonel Dawes, their commander, ordered a charge, which was gallantly executed. The enemy made a hurried attempt to change front to meet the attack, and flung his troops into the railroad cut for safety. The Ninety-fifth New York Volunteers, Colonel Biddle, and the Fourteenth Brooklyn, under Colonel Fowler, joined in the charge; the cut was carried at the point of the bayonet, and two regiments of Davis' (rebel) brigade were taken prisoners.
The results of this maneuver were the capture of the two rebel regiments referred to, with their battle-flags, the release of the One hundred and forty-seventh New York Volunteers, which had been cut off, and the recapture of one of Hall's pieces, which had been left, in consequence of all the horses having been shot down and men wounded or killed. I immediately directed the original line of battle to be resumed, which was done. All this was accomplished in less than half an hour, and before General Howard had arrived on the field or assumed command. Tidball's horse battery was now ordered up by General Wadsworth, to replace Hall's battery, which had been very much cut up. Tidball was soon hotly engaged with a battery in his front. Soon after, Captain Reynolds was sent to relieve him.
Upon taking a retrospect of the field, it might seem, in view of the fact that we were finally forced to retreat, that this would have been a proper time to retire; but to fall back without orders from the commanding general might have inflicted lasting disgrace upon the corps, and as General Reynolds, who was high in the confidence of General Meade, had formed his lines to resist the entrance of the enemy into Gettysburg, I naturally supposed that it was the intention to defend the place.
There were abundant reasons for holding it, for it is the junction of seven great roads leading to Hagerstown, Chambersburg, Carlisle, York, Baltimore, Taneytown, and Washington, and is also an important railroad terminus. The places above mentioned are o n the circumference of a circle of which it is the center. It was, therefore, a strategic point of no ordinary importance. Its possession would have been invaluable to Lee, shortening and strengthening his line to Williamsport, and serving as a base of maneuvers for future operations. I knew that Slocum's and Sickles' corps were within striking distance when we left Marsh Creek; that Howard's corps was already passing through the streets of the town, and that the remaining divisions of the First Corps were almost up. A retreat without hard fighting has a tendency to demoralize the troops who retire, and would, in the present instance, in my opinion, have dispirited the whole army and injured its morale, while it encouraged the enemy in the same proportion. There never was an occasion in which the result could have been more momentous upon our national destiny. Final success in this war can only be attained by desperate fighting, and the infliction of heavy loss upon the enemy; nor could I have retreated without the full knowledge and approbation of Gen. Howard, who was my superior officer, and who had now arrived on the field. Had I done so, it would have uncovered the left flank of his corps. If circumstances required it, it was his place, not mine, to issue the order. Gen. Howard, from his commanding position on Cemetery Hill, could overlook all the enemy's movements as well as our own, and I therefore relied much upon his superior facilities for observation to give me timely warning of any unusual danger.
I sent word to him shortly after this that, in addition to the forces opposed to me, Ewell's corps was coming down on my right flank, and requested him to protect that portion of the line with the Eleventh Corps. Almost at the same time he sent me the same information, together with instructions to hold Seminary Hill at all hazards, if driven back. Just previous to this, the remainder of the First Corps, consisting of Robinson's and Rowley's divisions, came up. I immediately directed Gen. Robinson to station his division in reserve at the seminary, and to throw up some slight intrenchments, to aid me in holding that point in case I should be driven back. I divided Rowley's division, sending Stone's brigade to the open space on the right of the wood, to close the interval between Cutler and Meredith. The other brigade, under Col. Biddle, One hundred and twenty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, was posted on the left and rear of the Iron Brigade, toward the Millerstown road. Gen. Rowley had charge of this part of the line. Later in the day he intrusted the extreme left to Col. Gates, Twentieth New York State Militia, who, with his own regiment and the One hundred and fifty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, under Lieut.-Col. McFarland, stubbornly maintained it to the last. He was greatly aided in this by two companies of skirmishers from his regiment, who occupied a house and barn in advance of our left, on the other side of the ravine. I relied greatly on Stone's brigade to hold the post assigned them, as I soon saw I would be obliged to change front with a portion of my line to face the northwest, and his brigade held the pivot of the movement. My confidence in this noble body of men was not misplaced, as will be shown hereafter. They repulsed the repeated attacks of vastly superior numbers at close quarters, and maintained their position until the final retreat of the whole line. Stone himself was shot down, battling to the last. The gallant Col. Wister, who succeeded him in command, was also wounded, and the command devolved upon Col. Dana, of the One hundred and forty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers. This brigade, in common with almost every regiment in the Third Division, were Pennsylvanians, and were actuated by a heroic desire to avenge the invasion of their native State.
Gen. Howard now formed his lines to resist the advance of Ewell's corps, which came from the northeast. The corps of A. P. Hill, opposite us, at once made a junction with the new-comers. This compelled me also to change front, with Wadsworth's division on Stone's brigade as a pivot, so that the two branches of my line of battle were facing, the one west, the other northwest. I relied upon the woods and ridges to partially shield the troops from an enfilading fire. In consequence of Ewell's new line of battle, Wadsworth threw back Cutler's brigade to Seminary Ridge, to avoid a battery upon his flank. Both Tidball's and Reynolds' batteries were obliged to retire, as they were exposed to a cross-fire from two directions. Capt. Reynolds was badly wounded in the eye, but for a long time refused to leave the field.
Col. Stone, who had been contending with very little shelter against the rebel infantry and two batteries on the other side of the run, suffered some loss from the same enfilading battery which had rendered a change of front necessary on the part of Wadsworth. Leaving Col. Wister's regiment, the One hundred and fiftieth Pennsylvania Volunteers, still facing the west, he threw successively Lieut.-Col. Dwight, with the One hundred and forty-ninth Pennsylvania, and Col. Dana, with the One hundred and forty-third Pennsylvania, into the Cashtown road, facing a little east of north. As this left an open space of some 200 yards between the right of Stone and the left of Cutler, and as the rebels at this time were not making any strong demonstrations against our left, Cooper's battery fired through the interval, and Biddle's brigade changed front to support it.
Shortly after this, Lieut. Wilber, of Battery L, First New York Artillery, was sent, in answer to a request from Gen. Wadsworth for a battery, and posted in an orchard on the south side of the Cashtown road, where the right flank was sheltered by a house and barn. The remaining two sections were posted on the open crest, also to the south of the road.
I had hoped Gen. Howard would have been able to connect with the right of my line, but after Gen. Schurz had formed his division, there was a wide interval between the two corps. This gap might have been filled by my falling back to the Seminary Ridge, but unfortunately that ridge is open ground, and could have been, as it was afterward, enfiladed by Ewell's batteries throughout its whole extent. Finding it necessary to stop this gap at all hazards, I directed Gen. Robinson, whose division I had kept in reserve, to send one of his brigades there. He detailed Gen. Baxter for that purpose. This brigade moved forward and formed on the right of Wadsworth's division, but an interval still existed of nearly 400 yards between Baxter's right and the Eleventh Corps. The enemy attacked in this interval, and were driven back by a change of front. They then assailed the left flank of the brigade, obliging Baxter again to change front. He drove the rebels before him in handsome style, but was constantly outflanked and enfiladed. Nevertheless, the brigade behaved nobly, capturing a great number of prisoners, the Eighty-eighth Pennsylvania taking two battle-flags and the Ninety-seventh New York one. They were greatly aided in this by a galling fire poured in on the flanks of the enemy by the Twelfth Massachusetts.
Finding Baxter was in danger of being overpowered, I directed Gen. Robinson to go in person to his assistance with the remainder of his division (Paul's brigade). Stewart's battery, of the Fourth U. S. Artillery, was also sent to report to Gen. Robinson. Part of Paul's brigade was posted by Gen. Robinson as a support to Baxter against an enemy advancing on our front, and part was posted perpendicular to our line to protect the right flank. Gen. Robinson says:
The enemy now made repeated attacks on the division, in all of which he was handsomely repulsed, with the loss of three flags and about 1,000 prisoners. In one of these attacks I was deprived of the services of the veteran commander of the First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Paul, who fell, severely wounded, while gallantly directing and encouraging his command. The division held this position on the right, receiving and repelling the fierce attacks of a greatly superior number, not only in front, but on the flanks, and, when the enemy's ranks were broken, charging upon him, and capturing his colors and his men, from about noon until nearly 5 p. m., when I received orders to withdraw. These orders not being received until all the other troops, except Stewart's battery, had commenced moving to the rear, the division held its ground until outflanked right and left, and retired, fighting. From the nature of the enemy's attacks, frequent changes were rendered necessary, and they were made promptly, under a galling fire. Soldiers never fought better or inflicted severer blows upon the enemy. When out of ammunition, their boxes were replenished from those of their killed or wounded comrades.
Ewell's forces advanced about 1.30 p. m. in two deployed lines, supported by a third line of battalions en masse. A portion of these made the attack already referred to against Baxter's left, in which they were repulsed. Their defeat was partly owing to the fact that they became separated from their main line, and swung around in such a manner as to expose their flank to Col. Stone's troops in the road, who took advantage of the opportunity to pour in a destructive fire at long range.
Having thus failed in their assault upon Robinson's division, they next made a determined advance against the two regiments in the road. To meet this, Col. Stone sent one of these regiments, the One hundred and forty-ninth Pennsylvania, under Lieut.-Col. Dwight, forward to the railroad cut. This formed en echelon about 100 yards to the front and left of Col. Dana's regiment (One hundred and forty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers). In spite of two most effective volleys of musketry, the enemy struggled on to within 30 yards of the cut. Here, however, they were driven back in confusion by a spirited bayonet charge ordered by Lieut.-Col. Dwight. Dana was at the same time warmly engaged in protecting the flank of the advanced regiment. The enemy, immediately after this, brought a battery to enfilade the cut, and Dwight was forced to fall back to his first position, on Dana's left.
It was in this affair that Col. Stone was severely wounded, and Col. Wister assumed command of the brigade.
The rebels now advanced from the northwest to flank the two regiments in the road, but the One hundred and fiftieth Regt., under Lieut.-Col. Huidekoper, changed front forward and met the enemy precisely as Dwight had met them, with two volleys of musketry and a gallant bayonet charge, led by Col. Wister in person; this dispersed them. Another desperate onslaught came from the north, passed the railroad cut, and almost reached the road, only,
however, to encounter another defeat from the irresistible bayonets of our men. The next attack came from the west, but was again repulsed by the indomitable One hundred and fiftieth Regt.
Col. Wister was now severely wounded in the face. Col. Dana, who assumed command, contested the position with varying fortunes until the close of the battle. Just previous to this, the brave and resolute Lieut.-Col. Huidekoper had faced four companies of his regiment to contend with the opposing forces from the west, while six companies kept of an entire brigade from the north. Lieut.-Col. Huidekoper lost his arm at this point, and as Maj. Chamberlain was also wounded, the command devolved upon Capt. Widdis.
Lieut.-Col. Dwight was left upon the field wounded in three places, and fell temporarily into the hands of the enemy. Every regiment of Stone's brigade changed front forward, and two regiments changed front to the rear while closely engaged. The most eminent military writers regard the first movement as difficult, and the last as almost impossible, to be executed under fire.
About 4 p. m. the enemy, having been strongly re-enforced, advanced in large numbers, everywhere deploying into double and triple lines, overlapping our left for a third of a mile, pressing heavily upon our right, and overwhelming our center. It was evident Lee's whole army was approaching. Our tired troops had been fighting desperately, some of them for six hours. They were thoroughly exhausted, and Gen. Howard had no re-enforcements to give me. It became necessary to retreat. All my reserves had been thrown in, and the First Corps was now fighting in a single line.
It is stated by Gen. Wadsworth in his official report that the portion of the Eleventh Corps nearest to us, unable to stand the pressure, had fallen back some time before this, and that our right flank was thus uncovered, so far as that corps was concerned. Biddle's brigade about this time again changed front to meet the strong lines advancing from the west. I now gave orders to fall back, this and Meredith's brigades covering the movement by occupying the intrenchments in front of the seminary, which I had directed to be thrown up as a precautionary measure to assist in holding the new position. Cooper's battery was assigned by the chief of artillery on the north, and Stevens' battery (Fifth Maine) on the south of the seminary, and the shattered remnants of the Iron Brigade also fell into line. From behind the feeble barricade of rails these brave men stemmed the fierce tide which pressed upon them incessantly, and held the rebel lines, which encircled them on three sides, at bay until the greater portion of the corps had retired. The One hundred and fifty-first, One hundred and forty-second, One hundred and twenty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, and Twentieth New York State Militia, of Biddle's command (the last two under Col. Gates, of the Twentieth New York State Militia), and the Second and Seventh Wisconsin and Nineteenth Indiana, of the Iron Brigade, here made their final stand. Capt. [Hollon] Richardson, acting assistant inspector-general, of Meredith's staff, rode up and down the lines, waving a regimental flag and encouraging the men to do their duty.
The troops, with the assistance of part of Stewart's battery, under Lieut. Davison, poured in so deadly a fire as to wholly break up and disable the first line of the enemy approaching from the west; but the other lines pressed on, and soon commenced a flank attack, which it was no longer possible to answer. When all the troops at this point were overpowered, Capt. Glenn, of the One hundred and forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, in command of my headquarters guard, defended the building for fully twenty minutes against a whole brigade of the enemy, enabling the few remaining troops, the ambulances, artillery, &, to retreat in comparative safety.
The batteries had all been brought back from their advanced positions and posted on Seminary Hill. They greatly assisted the orderly retreat, retarding the enemy by their fire. They lost heavily in men and horses at this point, and, as they retired to the town, were subjected to so heavy a fire that the last gun was left, the horses being all shot down by the enemy's skirmishers, who had formed line within 50 yards of the road by which the artillery was obliged to pass.
The First Corps only consisted of about 8,200 men when it entered the battle. It was reduced at the close of the engagement to about 2,450. It must be remembered that A. P. Hill's corps alone, which fought us on the west, was estimated at 35,000 men, of which 25,000, under Heth and Pender, were in line opposed to us, and that Ewell's corps, which attacked us on the north, was said to amount to 30,000 more. Its two divisions with which we contended, under Rodes and Early, contained about 20,000 men. Reserves amounting to 20,000 additional men, belonging to the two corps, and backed by the whole rebel army, were within a few hours' march. When that part of the Eleventh Corps adjacent to us fell back, a force of 30,000 men was thrown upon the First Corps, which in the beginning only contained about 8,200.
I remained at the seminary superintending the final movement until thousands of hostile bayonets made their appearance around the sides of the building. I then rode back and rejoined my command, nearly all of whom were filing through the town. As we passed through the streets, the pale and frightened inhabitants came out of their houses, offering us food and drink and the expression of their deep sorrow and sympathy. The written statements of the division commanders in regard to the details of this p riod are slightly conflicting. I therefore present extracts from the reports themselves. Gen. Robinson has already been quoted.
The operations of the day were of necessity accompanied by severe losses in killed, wounded, and missing, on account of the great disparity in numbers and the prolonged nature of the contest. This preliminary battle, however, had the most important bearing on the results of the next two days, as it enabled the whole army to come up and re-enforce the admirable position to which we had retreated. Had we retired earlier in the day, without co-operation with the other parts of the army, the enemy by a vigorous pursuit might have penetrated between the corps of Sickles and Slocum, and have either crushed them in detail or flung them off in eccentric directions. The whole retreat from the commencement was most creditable to the troops engaged. There was no hurry and no confusion, but the regiments fell back calmly, turning from time to time to check the enemy's advance by volleys of musketry, and again retreating. From the admixture of so many different regiments at the seminary, it became impossible to reorganize them in good order without a delay which would have exposed the men to certain destruction. I saw, however, no running or undue haste. All the troops passed tranquilly on, although the enemy was firing into the m from the side streets, and all reformed promptly on their arrival at Cemetery Hill, and in a very short time were again ready for service. The Sixth Wisconsin marched through the streets in a body, stopping from time to time to return the fire of the enemy, and giving hearty cheers for the good old cause and the Sixth Wisconsin Volunteers.
I have said the losses were exceedingly heavy. More than half of those who went into the battle were killed or wounded. In the Second Wisconsin, 69 came back out of 302; in the Nineteenth Indiana, 78 returned out of 288; the One hundred and fiftieth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Col. Wister's regiment, out of about 400 men and 17 officers, lost, in killed, wounded, and missing, 16 officers and about 316 men; the One hundred and and forty-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers lost in the same proportion.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
A. DOUBLEDAY, Maj.-Gen. of Volunteers.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Volume 27. Part I. Reports, Serial No. 43, Page 244, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
