Summary:
Maj. Gen. John G. Parke commanded the Ninth Corps of the Army of The Potomac
which included the 205th Pennsylvania Infantry. Parke details an attack on the
enemy line.
Brig. Gen. GEORGE D. RUGGLES,
Assistant
Adjutant-Gen., Army of the Potomac.
July 10, 1865.
GEN
I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command from March 29 to April 19, 1865:
After the capture and recapture of Fort Stedman, on the 25th of March, the usual state of affairs continual on the line held by this corps, with the exception that the enemy was more than ordinarily active in strengthening his intrenchments. His works from the Appomattox to in front of Fort Sedgwick were part of the old interior line of defenses, which had been so often unsuccessfully attempted by us. At a point in front of Fort Sedgwick an outer line, a kind of spur, struck off from his main line and swept down toward Hatcher's Run in front of the left of our advance. The line held by this corps fronted the whole of this main line and about two miles of the spur. By the orders from headquarters Army of the Potomac, of March 14 and 28, ordering a grand movement of the army on March 29, I was directed to send all surplus baggage and artillery to the rear, and to be prepared to hold with this corps the then line as far as Fort Davis and the rear line from that point. This was accordingly done. I at once placed the Third Division, Brevet Maj.-Gen. Hartranft commanding, at work repairing the rear line, which was much out of order. Under the skillful direction of Gen. Hartranft this line was put in excellent condition.
At--p.m. on the 30th of March orders were received from army headquarters directing me to make an assault upon the enemy's position in my front at 4 o'clock the following morning. The point of attack was left to my decision. I had already decided that the position in front of Ford Sedgwick, on the Jerusalem plank road, was the best one for assault on the front held my this corps. This portion of the line was held by the Second Division, Potter's, and I accordingly concentrated in rear of Fort Sedgwick all of Potter's division, with the exception of pickets and the garrison of the forts, and all of Hartranft's division. But at -- p.m. orders were received from army headquarters suspending the assault, and the troops were returned to their camps. No further movements occurred during March 31 and April 1.
At 4.50 p.m. April 1 I received orders from army headquarters, through Capt. Worth, directing me to assault together, and, after fully examining the grounds, substantially the same arrangements for the assault were made as had been previously made for the assault ordered for the morning of the 31st. At 9.50 p.m. orders were received by telegraph from Gen. Meade directing me to at once open with all the artillery in my front, push forward skirmishers, and follow them with columns of assault. While arrangements were being made to carry out these orders they were modified by further instructions withdrawing the orders for instant attack, and making assault contingent on developments of weakness on the part of the enemy. We opened artillery and threw forward a strong skirmish line along the whole front. The enemy was found prepared and in full force with the exception of in front of the Second Brigade, Second Division, Brig. Gen. S. G. Griffin's, between Forts Hays and Howard, when Gen. Griffin, by a well-planned rush, succeeded in surprising and capturing about half a mile of the enemy's picket-line, taking prisoners 8 officers and 241 men, but further movements disclosed the enemy's main line well manned and on the alert. The demonstration developed no apparent change in the force in our front either of artillery or infantry.
In accordance with instructions to carry out the original orders to assault at 4 a.m. on April 2 the captured line was abandoned. By 1 a.m. the firing had all quieted down, and the concentration of troops for the attack was well under way. To the right of the Jerusalem plank road running through Fort Sedgwick, Hartranft's division was massed in rear of the fort--Willcox's First Brigade, his left one, Col. Samuel Harriman commanding, was massed on Hartranft's right. The Fifty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers being left in the works to hold the brigade line, Col. Harriman was ordered to report to Gen. Hartranft. Potter's (Second) division was massed on Hartranft's left, to the left of the plank road. At 3 a.m. I established my headquarters at Fort Rice, and at the same time Gen.'s Potter and Hartranft formed the assaulting column between our main line and picket-line without alarming the enemy, whose picket-line was in close proximity. The assaulting force was in column of regiments in the following order: On the right of the Jerusalem plank road with left resting on the road, the Third Division, the advance regiments being the Two hundred and seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, Col. Cox commanding; followed by the Two hundred and fifth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Maj. Morrow commanding; the Two hundred and eleventh Pennsylvania, Col. Dodd commanding, and the Two hundred and eighth Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Col. Heintzelman commanding; the two remaining regiments of the division, the Two hundred and Two hundred and ninth Pennsylvania, were held as reserve behind the works. On the right of this column was Harriman's brigade of the First Division in the following order: Thirty-eighth Wisconsin, Col. Bintliff commanding; One hundred and ninth New York, Lieut.-Col. Pier commanding, and the Eighth Michigan Volunteers, Maj. Doyle commanding. The remaining regiments of the brigade, the Twenty-seventh Michigan and Thirty-seventh Wisconsin, remained in reserve in rear of the right with Hartranft's division, Potter's division, was formed, Griffin's brigade in the advance, supported by Curtin's brigade. Six regiments from the division were left to garrison the forts on its line. Storming parties, accompanied by pioneers provided with axes to clear away the abatis and chevaux-de-frise, preceded each column. Details of artillery-men to work any guns that might be captured were also in readiness.
With the view of leading the enemy astray as to the real point of attack I directed Gen. Willcox to make a strong demonstration on his front at 4 a.m. I judged this demonstration would most certainly deceive the enemy from the fact learned from deserters, that our main assault was expected on the Fort Stedman front. Accordingly, about 4 a.m., the artillery opened vigorously along the whole line firing for some minutes. Gen. Willcox then promptly pushed out his skirmishers along his whole front, and was very successful in the object proposed. Col. Bolton, commanding Fifty-first Pennsylvania Volunteers, left to hold Harriman's brigade front, captured some of the enemy's skirmishers near the Crater, and Col. Ely, commanding the brigade next the river, not only carried their picket-line, but even about 200 yards of the main line, but the enemy concentrating upon him he was forced to retire after holding the position some little time. At about 4.30 a.m. the signal was given for the main attack in front of Fort Sedgwick, and the column moved swiftly and steadily forward. In a moment the enemy's picket-line was carried. The stormers and pioneers rushed on and under a most galling fire cut away and made openings in the enemy's abatis and chevaux-de-frise. They, now closely followed by the assaulting columns, which, undeterred by an exceedingly severe fire of cannon, mortar, and musketry from the now aroused main line, pressed gallantly on, capturing the enemy's works in their front with 12 guns,--colors, and 800 prisoners. Col. Harriman's column re-enforced by the two reserve regiments swept up to the right until the whole of what was called by the enemy "Miller's Salient" was in our possession. Potter's column swept down to the left. This part of the enemy's line was heavily traversed, affording him a strong foothold, and he fought from traverse to traverse with great tenacity. We drove him slowly back for about a quarter of a mile when, being re-enforced, and aided by strong positions in the rear, he checked our farther progress in that direction. A most gallant but unsuccessful attempt was made to carry his rear line. The captured guns were at once turned upon the enemy, served at first by infantry volunteers, and them by details from the First Connecticut Heavy Artillery Volunteers from the batteries in the rear.
Just after we broke through he enemy's lines, and at a most critical time, I was deprived of the valuable services of Brevet Maj.-Gen. Potter, who was severely and dangerously wounded. I directed Brig. Gen. S. G. Griffin to assume command of his division, and by him the division was ably and gallantly commanded during the rest of the day. It being by this time fully daylight no further attempt was made to advance, but attention was turned to securing what we had gained, and restoring the organization of the troops, unavoidably much shattered by the heavy fighting and the advance over broken ground in the darkness. This was rendered the more difficult by the great loss we had sustained in officers, especially field officers, and by my very exposed position occupied by our troops. The captured line was promptly recovered and made tenable as possible, the difficulty being increased by the forts and batteries on that line being open in the rear.
The other officers were active in the discharge of the duties of their respective departments.
A tabular statement of losses is annexed.
I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. G. PARKE,
Maj.-Gen., Cmdg.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I., Volume 46. Part I, Reports, Serial No. 95, Pages 1015, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
