Summary:
Edward Johnson commanded Confederate forces in western Virginia during the early spring of
1862. In this March dispatch, Johnson reports to Robert E. Lee, then advisor to Jefferson Davis
in Richmond, on the situation facing his troops. He reports difficulty in recruiting disloyal
mountain dwellers, and discusses enemy plans to move on Staunton, and his attempts to place
defenses to prevent this.
Gen. R. E. Lee,
Commander-in-Chief, P. A. C. S., Richmond:
Camp Alleghany,
March 18, 1862.
In reply to your communication received this day I have the honor herewith to transmit a statement of the strength of this command and the positions occupied by the several detachments composing it.
The prospect of calling to my aid volunteers from the country in which I am operating is by no means flattering. The people of this country are many of them, if not disloyal, at least indifferent as to which cause triumphs, and are willing to range themselves on the stronger side. The population is sparse, the country very mountainous.
The principal portion of my command is at this point, which has been fortified and is defended by ten pieces of artillery. My position has been considerably strengthened since the battle for the 13th December.
I have a force at Huntersville to protect that line. It is weak, and the position you are well acquainted with. Another force at Crab Bottom, about 9 miles in my rear, on the Parkersburg turnpike. This position is not at all fortified. The troops were ordered there by Gen. Loring and hunted themselves in November last. This force is 6 miles from Monterey. A small cavalry force at Franklin, to scout in that direction and watch for any movement of the enemy from that direction; one or two companies of cavalry at Monterey, and one of Tennessee Cavalry at the Warm Springs. This last was ordered from Huntersville, it being difficult to procure forage at Huntersville for any but a small cavalry force.
The force for the enemy opposed to me I have reason to believe does not exceed 3,000; are posted at Cheat, Huttonsville, Beverly, Crouch's, and in the valley. This is the latest and most reliable intelligence from that country. As to the plan of operations for the ensuing campaign, it is evident what with my present force little can be done save hold the enemy in check, and scarcely that, if he advances with a very superior force. The road via Huntersville and into the turnpike in rear is familiar to you. In order to check the advance of the enemy in that direction a larger force should be stationed at Huntersville or some point in that line.
The enemy might gain my rear via Romney, Moorefield, and Franklin to Monterey by a road practicable for artillery. Three thousand of the enemy advanced as far as Moorefield this winter from Gen. Lander's forces. The enemy also advanced upon Huntersville in January, destroying a portion of the stores at that place. I hardly deem it probable that the enemy will attempt to force a passage to Staunton by this point (top Allegheny.) There is a road by Grenbrier from Cheat Mountain, or from Greenbrier (Camp Barton) by which they might reach Huntersville, but this road at this time is very bad, and will remain so, like most of the roads in this country, for some time to come. I have been informed that the enemy have had great difficulty in getting supplies to Cheat Mountain and its dependencies in consequence of the condition of the roads on that side; hence I think he will not attempt an advance in that direction during the early spring.
The enemy, it is reported, speak of advancing on Staunton in this direction from Gauley and by Winchester; also of sending a force by Huntersville. I know not what reliance to place on these reports, but their present numbers do not indicate any such intention. There is but one point beyond this toward Staunton which I regard as defensible-Shenandoah Mountain, 26 miles from Staunton and about 19 from Monterey. This is a strong position, but I am not sufficiently acquainted with the position to speak positively as to the facilities of water, &c., for a military encampment; but I believe there is water, &c., in abundance.
I deem it probable that the enemy have thrown more of their forces from Northwestern Virginia to Winchester and expect to make us evacuate this position by advancing in that direction.
I submit these views with much diffidence, feeling confident that your superior judgement will enable you at a glance to see and decide upon what is most expedient and proper.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. JOHNSON,
Brig.-Gen., Cmdg.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 12, Serial No. 18, Pages 827-828, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
