Summary:
Confederate Cavalry General J. E. B. Stuart reports on his October, 1862, raid
into Pennsylvania and Maryland. He discusses the capture of Chambersburg
including the surrender of the town by prominent local citizens, the capture of
arms and supplies, and the destruction of railroad and storage buildings.
Col. R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant-Gen., Army
Northern Virginia.
HDQRS. CAVALRY DIVISION,
October 14, 1862.
COL.:
I have the honor to report that, on the 9th instant, in compliance with instructions from the commanding general Army of Northern Virginia, I proceeded on an expedition into Pennsylvania with a cavalry force of 1,800 and four pieces of horse artillery, under command of Brig.-Gen. Hampton and Cols. W. H. F. Lee and Jones. This force rendezvoused at Darkesville at 12 m., and marched thence to the vicinity of Hedgesville, where it encamped for the night.
At daylight next morning, October 10, I crossed the Potomac at McCoy's(between Williamsport and Hancock) with some little opposition, capturing two or there horses of enemy's pickets. We were told here by citizens that a large force had encamped the night before at Clear Spring, and were supposed to be en route to Cumberland. We proceeded northward until we reached the turnpike leading from Hagerstown to Hancock (known as the National road). Here a signal station on the mountain and most of the party, with their flags and apparatus, were surprised and captured, and also 8 or 10 prisoners of war, from whom, as well as from citizens, I found that the large force alluded to had crossed but an hour ahead of me toward Cumberland, and consisted of six regiments of Ohio troops and two batteries, under Gen. Cox, and were en route via Cumberland for the Kanawha. I sent back this intelligence at once to the commanding general. Striking directly across the National road, I proceeded in the direction of Mercersburg, Pa., which point was reached about 12m. I was extremely anxious to reach Hagerstown, where large supplies were stored, but was satisfied, from reliable information, the notice the enemy had of my approach and the proximity of his forces would enable him to prevent my capturing it. I therefore turned toward Chambersburg. I did not reach this point until after dark, in a rain. I did not deem it safe to defer the attack until morning, nor was it proper to attack a place full of women and children without summoning it first to surrender. I accordingly sent in a flag of truce, and found no military or civil authority in the place, but some prominent citizens who met the officer were notified that the place would be occupied, and if any resistance were made, the place would be shelled in three minutes. Brig, Gen. Wade Hampton's command, being in advance, took possession of the place, and I appointed him miliary governor of the city. No incident occurred during the night, during which it rained continuously. The officials all fled the town on our approach, and no one could be found who would admit that he held office in the place. About 275 sick and wounded in hospital were paroled. During the day a large number of horses of citizens were seized and brought along. The wires were cut, and railroad obstructed, and Col. Jones' command was sent up the railroad toward Harrisburg to destroy a trestle-work a few miles off. He, however, reported that it was constructed of iron, and he could not destroy it.
Next morning it was ascertained that a large number of small-arms and munitions of war were stored about the railroad buildings, all of which that could not be easily brought away were destroyed, consisting of about 5,000 new muskets, pistols, sabers, ammunition; also a large assortment of army clothing. The extensive machine-shops and depot buildings of the railroad and several trains of loaded cars were entirely destroyed. From Chambersburg, I decided, after mature consideration, to strike for the vicinity of Leesburg as the best route of return, particularly as Cox's command would have rendered the direction of Cumberland, full of mountain gorges, particularly hazardous. The route selected was through an open country. Of course I left nothing undone to prevent the inhabitants from detecting my real route and object. I started directly toward Gettysburg, but, having passed the Blue Ridge, turned back toward Hagerstown for 6 or 8 miles, and then crossed to Maryland, by Emmittsburg, where, as we passed, we were hailed by the inhabitants with the most enthusiastic demonstrations of joy. A scouting party of 150 lancers had just passed toward Gettysburg, and I regretted exceedingly that my march did not admit of the delay necessary to catch them. Taking the road toward Frederick, we intercepted dispatches from Col. Rush (lancers) to the commander of the scout, which satisfied me that our whereabouts was still a problem to the enemy. Before reaching Frederick I crossed the Monocacy, continued the march through the night, via Liberty, New Market, Monrovia, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, where we cut the telegraph wires and obstructed the railroad. We reached, at daylight, Hyattstown, on McClellan's line of wagon communication with Washington, but we found only a few wagons to capture, and pushed on to Barnesville, which we found just vacated by a company of the enemy's cavalry. We had here corroborated what we had heard before, that Stoneman had between 4,000 and 5,000 troops about Poolesville and guarding the river fords. I started directly for Poolesville, but, instead of marching upon that point, avoided it by a march through the woods, leaving it 2 or 3 miles to my left, and getting into the road from Poolesville to the mouth of the Monocacy. Guarding well my flanks and rear, I pushed boldly forward, meeting the head of the enemy's column going toward Poolesville. I ordered the charge, which was responded to in handsome style by the advance squadron (Irving's), of Lee's brigade, which drove back the enemy's cavalry upon the column of infantry advancing to occupy the crest from which the cavalry were driven. Quick as thought, Lee's sharpshooters sprung to the ground, and, engaging the infantry skirmishers, held them in check until the artillery in advance came up, which, under the gallant Pelham, drove back the enemy's force to his batteries beyond the Monocacy, between which and our solitary gun quite a spirited fire continued for some time. This answered, in confection with the high crest occupied by our piece, to screen entirely my real movement quickly to the left, making a bold and rapid strike for White's Ford, to force my way across before the enemy at Poolesville and Monocacy could be aware of my design. Although delayed somewhat by about 200 infantry strongly posted in the cliffs over the ford, yet they yielded to the moral effect of a few shells before engaging our sharpshooters, and the crossing of the canal (now dry) and river was effected with all the precision of passing a defile on drill, a section of artillery being sent with the advance, and placed in position on the Loudoun side, another piece on the Maryland height, while Pelham continued to occupy the attention of the enemy with the other, withdrawing from position to position until his piece was ordered to cross. The enemy was marching from Poolesville, in the mean time, but came up in line of battle on the Maryland bank only to receive a thundering salutation, with evident effect, from our guns on this side.
I lost not a man killed on the expedition, and only a few slight wounds.The enemy's loss is not known, but Pelham's one gun compelled the enemy's battery to change it position three times. The remainder of the march was destitute of interest. The conduct of the command and their behavior toward the inhabitants is worthy of the highest praise; a few individual cases only were exceptions in this particular.
Brig.-Gen. Hampton and Col.'s Lee, Jones, Wickham, and Butler, and the officers and men under their command, are entitled to my lasting gratitude for their coolness in danger and cheerful obedience to orders. Unoffending persons were treated with civility, and the inhabitants were generous in proffers of provisions on the march. We seized and brought over a large number of horses, the property of citizens of the United States. The valuable information obtained in this reconnaissance as to the distribution of the enemy's force communicated orally to the commanding general, and need not be here repeated. A number of public functionaries and prominent citizens were taken captives and brought over as hostages for our own unoffending citizens, whom the enemy has form from their homes and confined in dungeons in the North. One or two of my men lost their way, and are probably in the hands of the enemy.
The results of this expedition, in a moral and political point of view, can hardly be estimated, and the consternation among property holders in Pennsylvania beggars description.
I am specially indebted to Capt. B. S. White (C. S. Cavalry) and to Messrs. Hugh Logan and Harbaugh, whose skillful guidance was of immense service to me. My staff are entitled to my thanks for untiring energy in the discharge of their duties.
I inclose a map to appear in Atlas of the expedition, drawn by Capt. William W. Blackford, to accompany this report: also a copy of orders enforced during the march.
Believing that the hand of God was clearly manifested in the signal deliverance of my command from danger, and the crowning success attending it, I ascribe to Him the praise, the honor, and the glory.
I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. E. B. STUART,
Maj.-Gen., Cmdg. Cavalry.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 19, Serial No. 28, Pages 52-54, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
