Summary:
In November, 1862, General Ambrose E. Burnside replaced George B. McClellan as
commander of the Army of the Potomac. In this dispatch, he outlines plans for an
attack on Fredericksburg. He discusses the need to avoid a Confederate retreat
to Staunton.
Gen. G. W. CULLUM,
Chief of Staff, Washington, D.
C.:
Warrenton, Va.,
November 7, 1862.
GEN.:
In accordance with the order of the Gen.-in-Chief of the 5th instant, I have the honor to make the following report of the movements proposed for this army:
To concentrate all the forces near this place, and impress upon the enemy a belief that we are to attack Culpeper or Gordonsville, and at the same time accumulate a four or five days' supply for the men and animals; then make a rapid move of the whole force to Fredericksburg, with a view to a movement upon Richmond from that point. The following are my reasons for deciding upon this plan:
If we move upon Culpeper and Gordonsville, a fight there and a general engagement, even with results in our favor, the enemy will have many lines of retreat for his defeated army, and will, in all likelihood, be able to reach Richmond with enough of his force to render it necessary to fight another battle at that place; and should he leave even one corps, with cavalry, on our right flank, it would render the pursuit very precarious, owing to the great lack of supplies in this country, and the liability to an interruption of our communication with Washington. Should the enemy retreat in the direction of Richmond upon our approach to Culpeper and Gordonsville, we would simply follow a retreating army, well supplied with provisions at least, at depots in his rear, whilst this army would have to rely upon a long line of communication for its supplies, and, as in the other case, a small portion of the enemy's force on our flank might tend to interrupt our communications. It may be well to add here, while on the subject of interrupted communication, that the enemy's sources for gaining information are far superior to our own. The Gen.-in-Chief will readily understand the reason. The difference is more than usual in their favor at present, from the fact that nearly all the negroes are being run south and kept under strict guard.
Should the enemy retreat before us in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg, the same difficulty would follow, with the certainty that he would also have a small portion of his force on our left flank. In moving by way of Fredericksburg there is no point up to the time when we should reach that place at which we will not be nearer to Washington than the enemy, and we will all the time be on the shortest route to Richmond, the taking of which, I think, should be the great object of the campaign, as the fall of that place would tend more to cripple the rebel cause than almost any other military event, except the absolute breaking up of their army. The presence of a large army on the Fredericksburg line would render it almost impossible for the enemy to make a successful move upon Washington by any road on this side of the Potomac, and I take it that there are forces enough at Washington and on the line of the Potomac, connected with the fortifications about Washington, to repulse any movement of the enemy on the capital, by way of the Upper Potomac; and it is hardly probable that he would attempt any serious invasion of Pennsylvania at this season of the year, and even if he should make a lodgment in that State of any force that he can spare, the destruction of that force would be the result very soon after winter set in, and the destruction of property by him would be small in comparison with the other expenses of the war. Could the army before Richmond be beaten,and their capital taken, the loss of a half a dozen of our towns and cities in the interior of Pennsylvania could well be afforded. A movement of the enemy upon Baltimore I consider altogether improbable, as an attack on that place would render the destruction of the city certain.
In connection with this movement in the direction of Fredericksburg, I would suggest that at least thirty canal-boats and barges be at once loaded with commissary stores and forage, and be towed to the neighborhood of Aquia Creek, from which place they can be brought into Belle Plain after the arrival of our force in that vicinity. These should be followed at once by enough stores and forage to subsist the army for thirty days. A great portion of this, I think, could be towed up the Rappahannock, under convoy of light-draught gunboats; but that is a matter for after-consideration.
It will also be necessary to start at once from Washington or Alexandria by way of Dumfries a quantity of beef cattle and all the wagon-trains that can be spared, filled with small rations, such as bread, salt, coffee, sugar, soap, and candles. This train should be preceded by pontoon trains enough to span the Rappahannock with two tracks; but a small escort of cavalry for this train would be necessary as we would be all the time between the enemy and the train. I will, however, if notified of its departure by telegraph, see that it is protected by my cavalry. During these movements it would be well for Gen. Sigel to remain with his force at Centreville and its neighborhood, holding Manassas Junction, Thoroughfare Gap, Aldie, and Leesburg with forces sufficient to protect them against any light attack, any one of which can fall back on the main body if attacked by too large a force. The main portion of his cavalry can be kept in Loudoun County, where there is an abundance of subsistence and forage. Below Fredericksburg, between the Rappahannock and the Potomac, there must be quite an amount of forage, which could be used for our broken-down animals after we reach Fredericksburg. We will need some fresh horses and mules on our arrival, which can be driven direct from Washington on this side of the Potomac, or from Baltimore direct to Smith's Point, opposite Aquia Creek, from which place they can be brought over in ferry-boats, several of which it would be advisable to send to us. An abundance of horses can also be brought by light-draught vessels from New York and Philadelphia to a point near Belle Plain, where they can be thrown overboard and swim ashore. I cannot impress too strongly upon the Gen.-in-Chief the necessity of furnishing by all these means an abundant supply of horses and mules and beef cattle. These should be sent to Fredericksburg, even at the risk of arriving after we leave.
After reaching Fredericksburg, our wagon-trains can be organized and filled with at least twelve days' provisions; when a rapid movement can be made direct upon Richmond, by way of such roads as are open to us, and as soon as the army arrives in front of the place an attack should be made at once, with a strong hope of success. The detail of the movement from Fredericksburg I will give you hereafter. A great reason for feeling that the Fredericksburg route is the best, is that if we are detained by the elements, it would be much better for us to be on that route. I hope the Gen.-in-Chief will impress upon the Secretary of War the necessity for sanctioning the changes which I now propose to make in this army:
1st. To divide it into three parts-right wing, left wing, and center-under command of the three ranking generals present.
2d. To do away with the very massive and elaborate adjutant-general's office at these headquarters, and require the different commanders of these wings and corps to correspond directly with Washington in reference to all such things as resignations, leaves of absence, discharges, recruiting service, &c., about which they necessarily know more than I do. I would have to be governed by their suggestions at any rate, and the attention to these matters in detail would surround me with a large number of additional staff officials, and embarrass me with a responsibility which I cannot assume.
3d. To make Gen. Seth Williams an inspector of the different staff departments of the command, by which means I will ascertain if these duties are properly performed by the persons to whom they are delegated.
4th. To keep my own adjutant-general, Lieut. Col. L. Richmond, at my headquarters, and to use as far as possible my own staff officers, with promotions necessary to their positions. I shall make as few changes as possible; but I am very anxious to keep my staff as small as may be, and to throw the labor and detail upon the officers immediately in command of the troops.
With an approval of these suggestions, I will endeavor with all my ability to bring this campaign to a successful issue. If they are not approved, I hope specific instructions will be given, and the Gen.-in-Chief may rely upon a cheerful and implicit obedience. The Gen.-in-Chief will readily comprehend the embarrassments which surround me in taking command of this army, at this place, and at this season of the year. Had I been asked to take it, I should have declined; but being ordered, I cheerfully obey.
A telegram from you, approving of my plans, will put us to work at once.
I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,
A. E. BURNSIDE.
Maj.-Gen., Cmdg. Army of the Potomac.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 19, Serial No. 28, Pages 552-554, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
