Summary:
Union General William Chesebrough writes General Benjamin Kelley on January,
1863, actions in the Shenandoah Valley. He states the opinion that D. H. Hill's
Confederates are not in the Valley, and there are few troops in Staunton.
Brig.-Gen. KELLEY,
Cmdg. Defenses of Upper Potomac,
Harper's Ferry, W. Va.,:
Baltimore, Md.,
January 7, 1863
SIR:
Your telegram of the 6th instant, communicating Maj. Russell's report, was received. The general commanding agrees with you in believing that A. P. Hill, with his division of the rebel army, is not in the valley. He has heard, and believes that the information may be considered in some degree reliable, that when Lee detaches a force for the valley it will be Ewell's division, now under the command of Early, Ewell himself being wounded. He thinks, however, that there is probably, at this time, no considerable force of the enemy's at Staunton, or, perhaps, anywhere in the valley, above or below. If a large detachment be not sent from Lee's army, it is probable that whatever is at Staunton may be kept in check by apprehension of Cox from the west.
The general has just been assured, by a party who has had recent communication with the valley, that the rebel Gen. Jones attaches the strongest importance to cavalry, and that his 2,500 men consist, in fact, not of that number of infantry, but only about 800 infantry and 1,700 cavalry. Do you suppose this can be so? We are apt to overestimate the number of the enemy's forces.
Besides the six companies of the Sixth Regt. New York Artillery sent you last, making that regiment with you now complete, there cannot be spared to you at any time more than one regiment of infantry from here, and one battery. They will not be sent now to Gen. Milroy, as you suggest, but reserved to re-enforce you or him in some actual emergency.
As to holding Winchester, the Gen.-in-Chief, at Washington, has indicated the policy to be pursued. It will be, in case of an attack by the enemy in great force, not to send re-enforcements from Harper's Ferry, but to fall back and concentrate at the Ferry.
The general commanding, however, does not wish it to be understood that resistance at Winchester is to be given up, except it should ever become necessary to yield to an overwhelming force.
In pursuance of his policy for covering and protecting the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad by a chain of advanced posts, he does not propose to depend upon keeping up, with the limited force he has, such points as Petersburg and Moorefield, but to rely rather upon the line of positions across from New Creek, Romney, Winchester, and Leesburg. He hopes that Gen. Heintzelman will be directed to take care of Leesburg as a part of this system.
I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. H. CHESEBROUGH,
Assistant Adjutant-Gen.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 21, Serial No. 31, Pages 955-956, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
