Summary:
Confederate General Robert Garnett, commanding forces in West Virginia during
July, 1861, writes to Assistant Adjutant George Deas concerning the situation
facing his troops. Garnett reports his dangerous reliance upon Staunton as his
only base of supply. He remarks on the lack of transportation from that
place.
HDQRS. DEP'T OF NORTHWESTERN VIRGINIA,
Lieut. Col. GEORGE DEAS,
Assistant Adjutant and
Inspector Gen.:
Camp at Laurel Hill, Va.,
July 6, 1861.
COLONEL:
In the postscript to a communication which I had the honor to address to you a few days ago, I ventured to suggest the expediency of giving a more northerly direction to Gen. Wise's column, in order to threaten the railroad and county east of Parkersburg, now in possession of the enemy. Some subsequent information has confirmed me in my convictions as to the propriety of such a movement. I learned a day or two since, from sources in my front, that twenty-eight hundred men, who had been put upon light-draught steamers in Pittsburg to operate in the Kanawha Valley, were diverted from that purpose and landed at Parkersburg, from which place they came to Clarksburg and thence to Buckhannon, where, with others from Philippi, to the number, it is said, of three or four thousand, they have now taken up their position, with a supporting force at Weston and at Clarksburg--numbers unknown. This latter point, it is said, they are fortifying, and making of it a place of detention for the secessionists whom they have arrested in the country occupied by their troops, and whom hitherto they have been sending to Ohio. It is my belief that as long as they can be made to apprehend any danger to their possession of the railroad and country in front of me they will not attempt any inroads in the Kanawha Valley, as the movement above reported indicates, and that one of the most effectual means of keeping that valley free of them is to occupy them fully here. I moreover think that if Gen. Wise's column should move from Charleston direct upon Parkersburg, by the road through Jackson, Wirt, and Wood Counties, it would have the effect, not of withdrawing any troops from my front, but of bringing others into Virginia from Ohio and the West, as it could be done with equal facility and rapidity, and greater safety. But if he were to retrace his steps from Charlestown to Summersville, in Nicholas County, and thence go to Bulltown, in Braxton, both of which counties are loyal to our cause, he would be within a day's of Weston, and threaten both it and Buchannon, and the enemy would have to draw from his force in my front to meet him. Communication with me could be had by way of Huttonsville.
The valley of the Kanawha is comparatively loyal to our cause, and the force under Gen. Floyd would be abundant to meet any force which it is probable the enemy will send into that region for the present.
The latest, and I believe the most accurate, information which I have yet received from the front is that the enemy has seven regiments of infantry at Philippi--say between five and six thousand men--and twenty pieces of artillery, two of which are mortars. I scarcely think they have as much artillery as that stated. At Grafton, a few days ago, there were only a few hundred; at Clarksburg they are represented as having about three thousand men; at Weston two thousand, and at Cheat River Bridge from two to three thousand. I cannot learn whether they have artillery at this bridge, or whether they are erecting any defenses about it. Gen. McClellan, at last accounts, was at Grafton. Gen. Morris in command at Philippi. Were these numbers correct it would put their force in Northwestern Virginia at about seventeen thousand men, though I hardly think it can amount to that number. The term of service of one of the Indiana regiments at Philippi expired a few days ago, and I learn that they are now kept there by force. I do not now think it probable that the enemy, notwithstanding his superiority of numbers, will attempt to attack my position unless the necessity for his force elsewhere becomes very imperative, for the simple reason that he has as much of northwestern country as he probably wants. He could have possessed himself of more of the country after Col. Porterfield's retreat, if he had desired it, yet refrained from doing so. The onus is upon us to drive him out the country he already holds, if we can. It is impossible for me or any one else, in my judgment, to say what numbers (within our means) are necessary to effect this. The facilities, on the one hand, which they possess at present, of throwing men in my front from other States, and the numbers they have disposable for this purpose, with, on the other hand, the slow process to which we are subjected in re-enforcing our force, will always enable them to exceed our numbers, whatever they may be, to any degree they may deem necessary; for secrecy in the movements of my re-enforcements in this disaffected country is a thing impossible. It then becomes a question which must be decided by the authorities of the Government, whether the mere paralyzation of a superior force of the enemy, in my front, with the hope of seizing the railroad, if an opportunity should offer itself, is a sufficient object to warrant the maintenance of all our available force in this region; for as I have just said, I do not suppose that this force can ever obtain a strength, relative to that of the enemy, which would warrant us in offering him battle wherever we could meet him. I have by no means relinquished or abated my hope of being able, on some favorable occasion, to get at the road. But this is a contingency. The only certain result we can calculate upon is that our presence here will necessarily occupy a considerable force of the enemy, and, to that extent, relieve other points of the State where they might be employed against us. It is not for me to determine what the value of this very negative result is, but I have deemed it my duty to state the case as it presented itself to my judgment. I can only say I shall watch vigilantly, and strike whenever and wherever I can see a reasonable hope of success.
Col. Starke arrived yesterday, and I am gratified to learn that I am to have an addition to my force, and sufficient supplies to secure the health and efficiency of my command for the present. I am exhausting the country immediately around me of grain and other supplies, and the operation of supplying myself almost exclusively from Staunton is becoming a serious difficulty with me on account of the scarcity of transportation. The corps are backward in this region, and I shall not be able to draw from them earlier than the end of August.
I stated in my letter of the 1st instant that Col. Heck's regiment had been ordered to take up a position on the Saint George road, and that he had been relieved by Lieut.-Col. Hansborough's battalion of five companies. This arrangement was countermanded in consequence of the appearance of the enemy in force at Buckhannon. Lieut.-Col. Hansborough took the positions on the Saint George road assigned to Lieut.-Col. Heck.
I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. S. GARNETT,
Brig.-Gen.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 2, Serial No. 2, Pages 240-243, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
