Summary:
In July, 1861, Union troops under George B. McClellan won a series of victories
in what is now West Virginia. In this dispatch, Major Michael G. Harman,
commanding at Staunton, reports to Robert E. Lee on the strategic situation.
Harman had been recruiting men in the Staunton area to meet the emergency, and
he tells Lee he refuses to accept any volunteers for less than three years.
Harman also expresses the fear that Federals will enter the Valley. According to
Harman, this would prove disastrous due to the large unionist population he
believes to exist in Augusta and other counties.
Maj. Gen. ROBERT E. LEE:
Staunton, Va.,
July 15, 1861.
DEAR SIR:
After your dispatch of to-day, I have informed all that no company would be received as a volunteer company for less than three years or the war, except those companies that were in process of organization before the proclamation.
I would earnestly suggest for your consideration and prompt action the great importance of fortifying Cheat Mountain, and sending forces on the right and left, so as to guard the road from Huttonsville to Huntersville, and prevent the enemy from approaching the Central Railroad, at either Millborough or Jackson's River, and from near Beverly, through Hardy and Pendleton, and thence to Rockingham, in rear of Gen. Johnston. I would call your attention to the fact that there is a very good road down on the eastern base of Cheat Mountain to Huntesville.
Our retreat, in my opinion, to Monterey, is disastrous to us. If not Changed, by marching at once upon Cheat Mountain and taking possession of it and fortifying it, so that we can hold them in check in front, and flank them on the right and left, the retreat to Monterey will have a very demoralizing effect upon our people. And I would urge upon you the great importance of keeping the enemy from ever touching this country, for Union men, in great numbers, would be found here in this county, and other counties in the valley, if the Federal troops were here in force to protect them. It is necessary, to keep all our people loyal, to keep the enemy from having an opportunity to tamper with many of them. Of course, I would not express this opinion where it would be spoken of, as it would have a bad effect; but I assure you it is nevertheless true.
I hope you will not consider me as desiring to press my opinions, but my knowledge of the country induces me to make these suggestions. I feel confident that if Col. Scott had gone to the aid of Col. Pegram we would have gained a victory instead of meeting with a serious defeat. The enemy displayed no courage after defeating us on the top of Rich Mountain, or the whole force at Camp Garnett would have been cut to pieces. If President Davis would take twelve-months' volunteers, the call for the militia could be turned to a good account.
M. G. HARMAN,
Maj., Commanding.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 2, Serial No. 2, Pages 244, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
