Summary:
In August, 1863, Union cavalry general William Averell advanced through West
Virginia toward Staunton. In this report, Confederate Colonel William L. Jackson
discusses his efforts to oppose Averell's advance.
September 18, 1863.
MAJOR:
I have the honor to report the operations of my command during the recent raid of General Averell, U.S. Army.
On Friday, August 21, at 1 a. m. (my headquarters then at Camp Northwest, near Huntersville, Va.), I received a dispatch from Col. W. W. Arnett, commanding detachment at Hightown, Va., that the enemy in large force were in Monterey the evening before, and that he had fallen back to Slaver's, 5 miles this side. I dispatched the information to the commanding officer of the post at Staunton (the dispatch was received in Staunton at 2 p. m. of that day, a distance of 75 miles), with the request that a copy be forwarded to General Imboden. I also dispatched to the general commanding, and to Col. George S. Patton, commanding First Brigade, at Lewisburg, and expressed the opinion in the several dispatches that a raid was intended upon Staunton, and also my intention to so move as to get in the rear of the invading force, as it was impossible for me then to get to their front. To Colonel Patton I suggested the propriety of sending a force to the Little Levels.
My command at this time was in detachments (rendered necessary to protect the lines I had been ordered to guard), one at Hightown, 35 miles from my headquarters; one at Camp Miller, 14 miles; one on Thorny Creek, near Green Bank, 10 miles distant, and the other at Camp Northwest.
I directed Colonel Arnett, if pressed, to fall back to me in good order, disputing the advance whenever he could, and I proceeded to draw in the other detachments, which was accomplished during the day.
In the morning of that day, I moved Lieutenant-Colonel Evans with a detachment to Gatewood's, on Back Creek, with a view to the protection of my rear if the advance was on me, and to be my advance guard if the enemy proceeded to Staunton. At 3 p. m., receiving a dispatch from Colonel Arnett, that he was being pressed and was falling back down Back Creek toward Gatewood's, I moved my infantry to that point, arriving at 6 p. m. (a distance of 9 miles), leaving my mounted men at Camp Northwest. This movement was dispatched to the general commanding, to Colonel Patton, and to Colonel Nadenbousch, commanding at Staunton, expressing the opinion that Staunton was not the point of attack.
During that night, the mounted men (with train) of Colonel Arnett's detachment arrived at Camp Northwest, reporting the enemy to be within 8 miles of that camp advancing, and that Colonel Arnett, with his infantry, were cut off. I also learned then that Colonel Arnett, after moving down Back Creek a short distance, for the reason mentioned in his report, had returned to Irving's and fell back, skirmishing with the enemy down Knapp's Creek, and had afterward been cut off with his infantry. Upon my arrival at Gatewood's I re-enforced Lieutenant-Colonel Evans by two companies, and moved his detachment 2 miles up Back Creek and posted the residue of my infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, 1 mile in his rear.
On the next morning, the 22d, the enemy advancing on Camp Northwest, I ordered the cavalry to Gatewood's, leaving Captain Hutton, with his company, between Rider's and Camp Northwest, to watch the enemy. To ascertain positively whether an advance was being made on Staunton, I ordered Major Kesler, with 60 mounted men, to McDowell, on the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike, via Jackson's River and Warm Springs. I also ordered a scout to Warm Springs, to watch the route to that place from Back Creek, and also scouted up Back Creek.
In the evening of the 22d, Captain Hutton had a skirmish with the enemy near camp Northwest; was forced to fall back to Rider's, and reported the enemy making a flank movement via the Little Back Creek route, and also an effort to get in my rear. Ascertaining my position at Gatewood's to be not so tenable as I had supposed, I moved my infantry that night to Jackson's River on the Warm Springs road, leaving my cavalry a short distance below Gatewood's.
In the morning of Sunday, the 23d, the enemy not having advanced to Gatewood's, and thinking it probable that they had gone toward Lewisburg by the Little Levels, I ordered my infantry Gatewood's and the cavalry toward Camp Northwest, directing the infantry to follow. By this time I had succeeded in bringing Colonel Arnett, and the infantry cut off with him, to the command, and Colonel Arnett was placed in command of the cavalry. He moved forward, and finding the enemy advancing, he engaged their skirmishers a short distance this side of said camp, and, finding that he was about to be flanked, fell back to Rider's. At this juncture I reached the front, and discovering the condition of affairs, and also learning that the enemy had been re-enforced by a mounted and an infantry regiment and by additional artillery from Beverly, I fell back to Gatewood's and remained there that night.
The next morning, the 24th, the enemy not then advancing and the horses needing forage, I ordered the cavalry under Colonel Arnett, except 30 under Lieut. G. W. Siple, to Jackson's River, Warm Springs road. At 10 a. m. the advance came in sight, and here, after a skirmish, finding them too strong for me, I fell back in good order to Jackson's River Mountain (Lieutenant Siple in the rear skirmishing constantly with the advance of the enemy) and posted my infantry to stay the advance. I ordered Colonel Arnett to dismount and send 100 of the cavalry to the left on top of the mountain to repel any flanking party.
At this point I prevented the enemy from advancing in front for one hour, but observing that they were surrounding me, I fell back in time, for ten minutes afterward they surrounded the position I had occupied, and, discovering my retreat, rushed after me. As the country between Jackson's River and Warm Springs Mountain gave their large force of cavalry the advantage, and as I knew there was a route to my left to Warm Springs which they could take and reach there before I could with my train (which was then but a short distance in my front), I fell back to Warm Springs Mountain, and placed my command in position for defense. Here I remained for an hour before the enemy appeared, and he came the route I did, and the route by the left aforesaid. I soon saw that the effort of the enemy was merely to amuse me in front while he moved a force equal to mine in my rear and also on my right flank. After skirmishing I fell back about 4 miles, and went into camp about 10 p. m. My pickets that night were beyond Bath Alum, toward the Warm Springs.
In the morning of the 25th, I ordered my infantry to the opposite bank of Cow Pasture River, and I proceeded in person to my cavalry camp, near Bath Alum, and to my outer pickets. I then ordered Colonel Arnett to send foot scouts to top of Warm Springs Mountain, if possible, to ascertain the movements of the enemy, and to hold his detachment prepared to move at any moment. Finding that owing to a misunderstanding of my order my infantry had been moved near Old Millborough (2 miles this side of Millborough Depot), I directed it to go into camp at that place. My determination was, if the enemy advanced on me, to get to Panther Gap, near Goshen Depot, and endeavor to hold that position until I could be re-enforced from Lexington by the cadets and artillery of the institute, who, with Colonel Edmondson's provost-guard, under General F. H. Smith, the superintendent, was, coming to re-enforce me.
In the evening of this day, Major Kesler returned from his scout, reporting no advance of the enemy upon Staunton, and the road between Monterey and McDowell blockaded.
During this evening I received information from my scouts that the cavalry of the enemy had moved from Warm Springs on the Hot Springs route, and that their infantry was near Warm Springs.
Ascertaining that the enemy, from a point near Hot Springs, could move to my rear at Old Millborough, I guarded against surprise from that point. That night I went in person to my cavalry camp, and directed Colonel Arnett to occupy Warm Springs next morning, if possible.
On the morning of the 26th, I ordered Major Kesler to take his detachment of cavalry to Covington, and, if possible, to Lewisburg, to ascertain and report the movements of the cavalry that had left Warm Springs.
By 12 m. of this day. Colonel Arnett arrived at and occupied Warm Springs, reporting that all the cavalry of the enemy, with six pieces of artillery, had taken the Hot Springs route toward Covington or Lewisburg, and that their infantry had fallen back to Gatewood's, and under my orders he proceeded to scout after the enemy.
I did not move my infantry this day, as I had no reliable information of the movement of the enemy. The most reliable at this time, from courier who met Major Kesler, was that the enemy were moving through McGraw's Gap to Jordan's Furnace.
During this evening Colonel Edmondson, from Lexington, with 40 mounted men, arrived, and I received a dispatch from General Smith that he had arrived at Goshen. Then ascertaining that there was no movement of the enemy through McGraw's Gap, I dispatched to General Smith my opinion that the enemy were making their way to Lewisburg; that I was most anxious to make a diversion in favor of our forces there, and requesting him to co-operate with me, and if he could do no more to lend me his artillery. This he declined to do for reasons satisfactory to himself, and accordingly the general and Colonel Edmondson moved back to Rockbridge Alum.
On the next morning, the 27th, I ordered my infantry to Warm Springs and rode forward myself to that point. On my arrival there rumors of fighting near Lewisburg reached me, and reports that our force there was falling back before the enemy. I ordered Lieutenant Stifle to take the Hot Springs route, and proceed until he saw and felt the enemy. Captain Lewis, with a detachment of 20 men, moved toward Gatewood's.
At 3 a. m., Friday (the 28th), I received a dispatch from Major Kesler that the enemy were falling back toward Warm Springs, and for me to be on the lookout.
About this time William McClintoc, esq., surveyor of Bath County, a reliable gentleman, informed me that the citizens were effectually blockading the Jackson's River road (Boiler's, or Indian Draft}. I requested him to return (which he did) and see that the blockade was made complete. I ordered Colonel Arnett to have the road to Hot Springs, and the road leading from the Jackson's River road into the Warm Springs road, near Richards' Mill, blockaded. This was being accomplished when the report arrived that the enemy were near Gatewood's, on the Indian Draft route, and to that place I moved my force as rapidly as possible, overcoming the blockades of the enemy between Jackson's River and Gatewood's.
Colonel Arnett arrived at Gatewood's in time to fire on the pickets and see the rear of the enemy in rapid retreat, and following them to Little Back Creek he turned to the right across the mountain to blockade the Knapp's Creek road; Arriving at Little Back Creek, and ascertaining Colonel Arnett s movements, and being satisfied that the enemy would not take the Knapp's Creek road, I ordered him back and to the pursuit of the enemy on the Huntersville road. Directing the infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Evans, to follow as rapidly as possible, I moved on with the cavalry.
Between Rider's and Camp Northwest, about 6 p. m. of the 28th, I received the dispatch of the general commanding, dated the 27th and headed via Union and Dublin, announcing the victory at White Sulphur Springs, and intimating that the enemy were retreating toward Warm Springs, and that his force was in pursuit, and directing me to push and destroy them, if possible. Pushing on, my advance ran in the pickets at Huntersville, and discovered the enemy there apparently intending to make a stand in supporting distance of the infantry regiment which had been left in their rear. That regiment, I have since learned, was then at Marling's Bottom, 6 1/2 miles from Huntersville.
As it was now dark, and as no re-enforcement arrived to assist in the pursuit, I halted at and near Camp Northwest, with a view not then to press the pursuit until I could move a force by the Clover Lick route in ahead of the enemy at Big Spring; to blockade the road and hold the enemy until we could get up to their rear (it was entirely practicable to so move), and then, with any re-enforcement that might arrive, attack. Accordingly, I directed Colonel Arnett, with the cavalry at his disposal, after resting a few hours, to make that movement during the night.
At 10 p. m. I received a dispatch from Colonel Corns, commanding the Eighth Virginia, Cavalry and Dunn's battalion, that he had arrived at Gatewood's. I requested him to come on as soon as possible.
At 2 a. m. on the 29th, Colonel Arnett started up Knapp's Creek to take the Clover Lick route, and as soon as it was light I directed the infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Evans, to move toward Huntersville. Arriving at that place--having to overcome a blockade-- I found that the enemy had gone on toward Marling's Bottom, and to that point I directed my infantry. Stopping to write a dispatch, Colonel Corns arrived, and I requested him to send 200 men to re-enforce Colonel Arnett, who had gone the Clover Lick route, offering to furnish guides, and expressing the opinion that there was yet time to make the movement. After counseling with several officers he decided that his horses could not make the trip in their then condition. I then requested him to come on to Marling's Bottom, to which he assented and moved accordingly. Arriving at Marling's Bottom, the rear of the enemy in retreat was reported as not being far from the bridge.
I requested Colonel Corns to move his command rapidly up the bottom, cross the river, and endeavor to cut off some of the rear of the enemy. He replied that his horses could not raise a trot. On arriving at the bridge and riding forward with Colonel Corns, we concluded the rear of the enemy was about 1 mile distant. He afterward moved toward Lewisburg.
By this time Major Kesler's detachment arrived, and I ordered him to pursue as rapidly as he could in the then condition of his horses, and the infantry to follow. Arriving at Edray, and finding that my infantry could go no farther and could not catch the enemy, I halted them. Major Kesler had gone on. Here I dispatched to Colonel Wharton at Warm Springs, who had informed me that he was coming on, that it was useless for him to do so.
Colonel Arnett on that day did get in ahead of the enemy at Big Spring; blockaded the road beyond; posted some of his men; delayed and fired upon the enemy, but with his small force could do nothing more. His report is here with inclosed. I think his conduct throughout is praiseworthy. Major Kesler, owing to the blockades of the enemy and the condition of his horses, could not get up in time. His report accompanies this.
When General Averell arrived at Monterey his force was not less than 3,000 men. He was afterward re-enforced by two regiments. He had in addition eight pieces of artillery. This whole force came up after me to Warm Springs. At no time when I had all together had I more than 1,000 effective men. Throughout the whole affair I had no artillery. The government cattle within my lines were saved. My train was safely brought out.
My loss in wounded and missing will not exceed 20; and only a few guns and saddles, which could not be brought out, were destroyed by the enemy.
I recaptured a number of cattle and horses belonging to citizens, and captured a number of horses from the enemy. These I will report as soon as I can get them together.
The loss of the enemy in the various skirmishes with my command is believed to be about 25 killed, a number wounded, and 20 prisoners. I have no means of ascertaining the number wounded. General Averell's command suffered severely during his whole advance, the fight at White Sulphur, and throughout his whole retreat.
My command throughout, officers and men, behaved well, enduring patiently great hardships, and conducted themselves as well as any new recruits under the same circumstances.
Regretting that I did not accomplish more, but respectfully submitting that, with all the means and information before me, I accomplished all that was possible,
I am, very respectfully, your Obedient servant,
WM. L. JACKSON,
Colonel, Commanding Huntersville Line.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 29, Serial No. 48, Pages 46-52, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
