Summary:
Confederate General John Imboden reports from Staunton to Robert Chilton, Lee's
Chief of Staff, on November, 1863, efforts to oppose a raid in West Virginia and
the Valley by Union cavalry under William Averell. At one point, Imboden felt
that Staunton was threatened, and he reports calling out the Augusta Home
Guards.
STAUNTON,
November 14, 1863.
COLONEL:
On the evening of the 4th instant, I received a note from Lieutenant Byrd, commanding detachment at Hightown, in Highland County, that the enemy had appeared over 5,000 strong at Camp Barrow, on the east side of Cheat Mountain, and a few hours later another dispatch that he had moved toward Huntersville.
At daybreak on the 5th, I left my camp, 4 miles from Bridgewater, and moved to Buffalo Gap and encamped. I ordered six days' rations (hard bread and bacon) to be sent on the cars to Goshen Depot, and on the 6th I left Buffalo Gap with my best mounted men (about 600 men) and a section of artillery, without baggage. Halted at Goshen, issued provisions to the men, and encamped at Bratton's, in Bath County.
Started at dawn on the 7th, and passed the Warm Springs at 1 p. m. on the Huntersville road. There heard that a battle was fought on the 6th between the forces of General Echols and Colonel Jackson and the enemy at Mill Point, in Pocahontas. I resolved to fall upon the enemy's rear if possible and pushed on. At the foot of Back Creek Mountain a courier from Covington brought me a dispatch from Captain Skeen that Echols was badly defeated; had retreated through Lewisburg toward Monroe; that a large column of the enemy had arrived at Lewisburg from Kanawha, making the entire hostile force at that point 15,000 strong. Believing it impossible to cross by Huntersville and do any good, I changed my course down Jackson's River toward Covington. That night I received a telegram from General Samuel Jones in cipher, which I could not read, never having been furnished the key.
On Sunday, the 8th, I pressed on to Covington, where I found more than 100 panic-stricken refugees from Colonel Jackson's command, and that night more came in. I placed a company on picket at Callaghan's. A little after dark my picket was attacked. Had one horse shot, but repelled the enemy and held the post.
When I changed my course down Jackson's River on Saturday I sent an order to the Rockbridge Home Guards and Cadets, who were at Millborough, to go to Clifton Forge, which they did on Sunday, and encamped only 13 miles from me. They numbered about 800 men and had two 6-pounder guns.
On Monday, the 9th, at dawn, the enemy appeared in force at Callaghan's and attacked my picket. It came in slowly. One and a half miles west of Covington I took position on the crest of a mountain to give battle. The force that drove in my picket was about 400 cavalry. When the head of the column came within about 1,200 yards I opened on it with my artillery, and by a few shots repulsed and scattered it, when two companies of my cavalry charged and drove the whole force back at full run to Callaghan's, where they joined the main column, over 3,000 strong, and moved off on the Warm Springs road. As soon as apprised of this fact, and that the enemy had seven pieces of artillery along, I felt sure he intended to get in my rear, if possible, by a country road, which I knew was entirely practicable. I at once withdrew to a hill 1 mile east of Covington, and sent to hurry up the Rockbridge forces, intending to give battle at that point (a very strong position) to whatever force might appear. In the meanwhile a part of my cavalry, under Colonel Imboden, were thrown out about 4 or 5 miles to watch the enemy's movements.
Early in the afternoon it was ascertained that Averell had left the Warm Springs road and gone off toward Huntersville. As it was possible this might be a ruse, and that he would sweep around by the Warm Springs and reach Millborough, I resolved to move, via Clifton Forge, to Goshen as quick as possible, sending scouts to watch Averell and report to me at Goshen. I commenced my march at once, and in a little over twenty-four hours made Goshen, a distance of 40 miles, on the 10th. Hearing from my scouts I dismissed the Rockbridge forces. My scouts reported Averell as making for Monterey, up Back Creek, and moving very rapidly.
On the 11th, I came to Buffalo Gap, where I ascertained beyond a doubt that Mulligan, with a fresh force of 800 men from Petersburg, would form a junction that evening with Averell at Monterey. I then deemed a raid on Staunton highly probable, and to repel it (tired as were my men) I ordered up l50 men to top of Shenandoah Mountain (16 miles distant) that night, and followed in the morning with 750 more and four pieces of artillery, and called out the Augusta Home Guards. Mulligan and Averell did form a junction, making their united force near 4,000 men, but made no effort to reach Staunton. They went on toward Hardy.
Having sent Captain McNeill into Hardy two weeks ago with 200 men, who are still there, I immediately dispatched three couriers to his party to obstruct the roads about and north of Franklin, and take position in the cliffs and bushwhack the enemy as he passed. I also sent 40 fresh cavalry to harass him at different points in the mountains. I expect to hear good accounts from both these parties. The force that accompanied me was much jaded, having marched nearly 200 miles in six days through the mountains and over bad roads. Although I inflicted no appreciable damage on the enemy, I am certain I saved all the furnaces (six or eight in full blast) on the west side of Rockbridge and Botetourt Counties. I have information that leaves no doubt that the column I repulsed at Covington were furnished with several days' rations and ordered to proceed down Jackson's River, burn the depots and bridges, destroy the furnaces, and retreat by Millborough and Warm Springs to the main body.
I will rest two days, and on Monday move down into the lower end of Rockingham or Shenandoah, and see what further can be done before winter sets in. I am satisfied Averell will seek to winter his cavalry at Moore field. Forage and other supplies are abundant in that rich valley. He has over 3,000 men, Mulligan over 1,000--a force too large for me to drive out. I will harass them all winter, but that is all I can do. To-morrow I start Captain Hill with a company to Barbour County to try and capture a train from Grafton to Beverly. There are but about 500 men left at Beverly.
I beg leave to add my testimony to the admirable spirit displayed by the people of Rockbridge in coming to my assistance. At 7 p. m. on Thursday, the 6th, the news reached Lexington of this raid. By 7 p. m. the next day 800 men were 12 miles on their march to support me. My thanks are especially due Col. J. W. Massie, commanding home guards, and. General F. H. Smith, commanding cadets, for the energy and zeal they manifested and the skill with which they moved their commands so rapidly through the mountains.
I regret to have to add that of nearly 200 stragglers from Colonel Jackson's--whom I found at Covington and supplied with funds to subsist themselves, and supplied with arms, where they had lost their own, out of some Virginia State arms I found at Covington--a large number ran off to the woods and mountains as soon as my artillery opened on the enemy, although I had organized them into two companies and ordered them to take part in the fight I then expected would occur. A part remained and were willing to fight, but a large number fled most shamefully before the enemy was nearer than 2 miles of where I left them to await orders.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. D. IMBODEN,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 29, Serial No. 48, Pages 547-549, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
