Summary:
Union cavalry general William Averell reports to Assistant Adjutant T. Melvin on
Averell's late 1863 raid in West Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley. A
demonstration against Staunton was part of the plan for the raid.
Capt. T. MELVIN, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Martinsburg, W. Va.,
December 31, 1863.
CAPTAIN:
I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade since the date of its arrival at New Creek, W. Va., November 18:
Having been notified by the brigadier-general commanding the department that active service would be expected of me very soon, measures were at once taken to place the command in as good condition as possible, but owing to the meager supplies of horse-shoes, nails, coal, and forges furnished, and the shortness of the time allowed, the mounted forces of the brigade were but poorly prepared to make a long march on the 6th of December, when I received orders to move on the 8th. A copy of my instructions is appended to this report. My orders did not contemplate the movement of any co-operative forces, excepting a small force under Colonel Thoburn, but after representing to the department commander the importance of such movements, and my desire that they should be made, he kindly invited me to accompany him to his headquarters at Cumberland, and arrange a plan for them. I went with him to Cumberland on the evening of the 6th, and drew up a plan which was, briefly, as follows, viz:
Brigadier Scammon, commanding forces in the Kanawha Valley, to be at Lewisburg on Saturday, December 12; to look out northward and endeavor to intercept the enemy from that direction; to remain until 18th, taking advantage of any opportunity to strike the enemy in the direction of Union or elsewhere. Colonel Moor to be at Marling's Bottom, Friday, December 11; to feel the enemy in the direction of Lewisburg on the 12th and 13th; to remain near Frankford until the 18th, and on his return to bring off the wounded left after the battle of Droop Mountain. Brigadier-General Sullivan, commanding forces in the Shenandoah Valley, to be at Woodstock on Friday, December 11; to make careful demonstrations until the 18th, when he was to move toward Staunton, and threaten the same boldly on the 20th and 21st. The command of Colonel Thoburn was to turn off at Monterey, and, moving toward Staunton, keep the attention of the enemy fixed upon the Parkersburg pike.
A copy of the above plan was given to the department commander, and I received his promise that his orders should be given in accordance with it, with the exception of Moor's and Thoburn's commands, which were to receive orders from me. It was thought that between the two demonstrations of the Kanawha and Shenandoah forces, I might pass the enemy's lines without delay, and that the threatening of Staunton on the 20th and 21st, with the operations in the direction of Union, would divert the enemy from offering any great resistance to the return of my fatigued command.
The Second West Virginia Mounted Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Scott; Third West Virginia Mounted Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson; Eighth West Virginia Mounted Infantry, Colonel Oley; Fourteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Blakely; Major Gibson's battalion of cavalry, and Ewing's battery set out from New Creek on the morning of the 8th of December, with fair weather, but with many misgivings on account of our poor condition to overcome the weary distances and confront the perils incident to such an expedition.
During the march of two days to Petersburg, constant exertions were made to complete the shoeing of the horses, but lack of means and material rendered it impracticable to attain the desired object. At Petersburg, on the 10th, the command of Colonel Thoburn, about 700 strong, joined mine, and together we proceeded southward, arriving nearly at Monterey on the 11th. The most of my train was placed in charge of Colonel Thoburn, and, on the morning of the 12th, my command and his started in a severe and discouraging rain-storm, Thoburn toward McDowell and my command down Back Creek.
The secluded road which runs along and across this now swollen stream was pursued the ensuing day without any incident worthy of note until our arrival at Gatewood's, where the rear guard of Jackson's forces, flying from the advance of Moor, was encountered and dispersed, and 4 wagons destroyed, loaded with ammunition and stores.
The storm continued on the 14th, and Jackson's River was found hardly fordable. Upon arriving at Callaghan's, reports reached us that Scammon had advanced and occupied Lewisburg, and that the rebel forces, commanded by General Echols, had retired toward Union, under orders from Maj. Gen. Sam. Jones. We halted a few hours to rest and feed the animals, and to make a false advance in the direction of Covington.
At 2 a. m., December 15, the column was in motion upon a dark and difficult road, which runs up Dunlap Creek to the pike, connecting the White with the Sweet Sulphur Springs. We reached the beautiful valley of the Sweet Sulphur about 10 a. m., and halted two hours, availing ourselves of the plentiful forage found there.
It may not be unimportant to note that all the springs in Western Virginia are excellently well suited for quartering troops; the buildings are numerous, spacious, and symmetrical; the main roads approaching them are reliable at all seasons. At each of the springs I have visited (Warm Springs, Hot Springs, White Sulphur, Red Sulphur, and Sweet Springs), at least 5,000 troops may find comfortable, even elegant quarters. The grade upon the Virginia Central Railroad is nearly finished from Millborough to the Greenbrier River. When rails are laid upon that portion, and a few small bridges built, forces at the springs could be easily and conveniently supplied via Charlottesville.
At the Sweet Springs it was learned that Echols' forces were encamped 4 miles from Union, to the northward, and that General Scammon had retired from Lewisburg. The road to New Castle was taken at 1 p. m., and near the summit of the Sweet Springs Mountain a rebel quartermaster met us and was captured, which assured me that our advance was unknown as yet to the enemy.
From the top of this mountain a sublime spectacle was presented to us. Seventy miles to the eastward the Peaks of Otter reared their summits above the Blue Ridge, and all the space between was filled with a billowing ocean of hills and mountains, while behind us the great Alleghanies, coming from the north with the grandeur of innumerable tints, swept past and faded in the southern horizon.
When within 12 miles of New Castle another halt was made to feed and rest, while a squadron advanced toward Fincastle, conveying to the enemy a false impression, and bringing to us 60 horses and some prisoners. New Castle was passed during the night, and efforts were made to reach Salem by daylight in the morning. A party of rebels, under Captain Chapman, reconnoitered our advance during the night, and all were captured except their leader, who, declining to surrender, was killed.
The head of my column was preceded by vigilant scouts, armed with repeating rifles, mounted upon fleet horses, who permitted no one to go ahead of them. We approached Salem unheralded, and the whistling of locomotives could be heard from that point long before it was reached by us.
Four miles from Salem, a party of rebels from the town, in quest of information concerning the Yankees, met us. From some of these it was learned that the division of General Fitzhugh Lee had left Charlottesville on the 14th to intercept my command, and that a train loaded with troops was momentarily expected at Salem to guard the stores at that point. I hastened with my advance, consisting of about 350 men and two 3-inch guns, through the town to the depot. The telegraph wires were first cut--the operator was not to be found, the railroad track torn up in the vicinity of the depot, one gun placed in battery, and the advance dismounted and placed in readiness for the expected train of troops. An inspection and estimate of the stores contained in the depot and two large buildings adjacent were made, and upon a subsequent comparison of notes taken, found to be as follows:
Two thousand barrels of flour, 10,000 bushels of wheat, 100,000 bushels of shelled corn, 50,000 bushels of oats, 2,000 barrels of meat, several cords of leather, 1,000 sacks of salt, 31 boxes of clothing, 20 bales of cotton, a large amount of harness, shoes, saddles, equipments, tools, oil, tar, and various other stores, and 100 wagons.
A train from Lynchburg, loaded with troops, soon approached. My main body was not yet in sight, and it was necessary to stop the train; a shot was fired at it from one of the guns, which missed; a second went through the train diagonally, which caused it to retire, and a third and last shot hastened its movements. My main body arrived, and parties were sent 4 miles to the eastward and 12 miles to the westward, to destroy the road.
The depots with their contents were burned; three cars standing upon the track, the water-station, turn-table, and a large pile of bridge timber and repairing material destroyed. Five bridges were burned, and the track torn up and destroyed as much as possible in six hours. The "yanks" with which we had provided ourselves proved too weak to twist the U-rails, and efforts were made to bend them, by heating the centers, with but partial success. A few small storehouses, containing leather and other valuable articles, were destroyed in the vicinity. The telegraph wires were cut, coiled, and burned for over half a mile.
Private property was untouched by my command, and the citizens received us with politeness. It was intimated to some inquisitive ones that we were going back by Buchanan, but about 4 p. m. my command quitted the work of destruction and returned upon the road it came some 7 miles, when it halted for the night. The last 80 miles had been marched in about thirty hours. Little sleep had been enjoyed by my men during five days and nights; it was necessary to pause and collect our energies for the return. During the night of the 16th it rained heavily, and also the ensuing day and night. My column was caught in the many windings of Craig's Creek, which was now swollen to a dangerous torrent, which uprooted trees and carried them away. Heavy caissons were swept down the stream, and great exertion and skill were required to save them. In the river and in the rain forty-eight hours, it was impracticable to keep our ammunition dry, and my command, drenched, muddy, and hungry, arrived at New Castle about sundown on the 18th, in miserable condition to make the march before us.
Information that Fitzhugh Lee was at Fincastle reached me at New Castle, and that Jones was between me and the Sweet Springs. At 9 p. m., while a false advance was made toward Fincastle, my column took the road to the Sweet Springs. We soon encountered and drove the enemy's pickets about 12 miles to the junction of the road with the Fincastle pike to the Sweet Springs. The command halted and built camp fires.
The condition of my ammunition made it prudent for me to avoid a fight. It was evident from a survey of the enemy's positions that I could not get to the Sweet Springs without a contest, and that with Lee only a few miles to my right and rear. Two ways were left, both difficult and obscure; one to the southwest, leading around Jones' right, through Monroe and Greenbrier Counties; the other, northeast to the Covington and Fincastle pike, which I took, as it was the most direct and dangerous, consequently the safest, if I could only make the march.
We left our camp fires burning and went forward in the darkest and coldest night we had yet experienced. Thirty miles through the forest and frost brought us to the Fincastle pike about noon of the 19th. It was yet 15 miles to the bridge. The river was reported unfordable on account of the depth of the water and the obstructions formed by the ice. I had carefully calculated the possible marches of the enemy, and felt certain that we could make the march through the points they deemed most secure, but no halt could be made.
When 8 miles from the river a force of 300 mounted rebels opposed our advance. As soon as they were broken they were closely pursued at a gallop to the first bridge, 5 miles below Covington, and thence to the bridge at Covington, both of which were saved from destruction, although faggots had been piled upon them ready to burn. The head of my column reached the first bridge about 9 p. m., and 3 officers and 6 orderlies were sent back to keep it closed up.
The approach to the river is through a gorge which opens to the stream a mile below the first bridge. There the pike from Covington passes along the right bank to Clifton Forge and Jackson's River Depot, where Jackson was supposed to be with about 1,000 men. I sent a company upon the road to Clifton Forge, with orders to dismount and move out three-fourths of a mile, and hold the road until the column had passed.
A captured dispatch from Maj. Gen. Sam. Jones to Major-General Early, at Millborough, confirmed my opinion with regard to the position of the enemy, and gave me the information that General Early's division had been added to the forces opposed to my return.
The dispatch is as follows:
ON TOP OF THE SWEET SPRINGS MOUNTAIN,
December 19, 1863---7 a. m.
GENERAL:
The enemy drove in the pickets about 12 miles from here, near Mrs. Scott's, in the direction of New Castle, about 2 o'clock this morning General Echols has a strong position here, and I think can effectually block this way to them. To avoid him, I think it probable that the enemy may attempt to escape by Covington or by Clifton Forge. Colonel Jackson's troops are at Clifton Forge. I would suggest, instead of keeping any force at the Warm Springs, you would place it at Morns Hill, and picket at Callaghan's. I presume that you are in communication with Colonel Jackson, and he may be able to give you information of the enemy's movements. I expect to ascertain the enemy's movements in the course of the morning. If he attempts to avoid Echols here, and escape by Callaghan's, we can reach Callaghan's before he can. Echols will hold this place here until he ascertains the enemy's movements. It is possible that they will attempt to pass Echols' right by Gap Mills, by passing one of the many gorges in these mountains to the south of this position between Echols and McCausland, who is at Newport, in Giles County. If he does that, he will pass out by the western portion of Monroe and Greenbrier; if he does so, you cannot touch him.
Under all the circumstances of the case, as I see them now, I think that you
should have a force at Morris Hill and a strong picket at Callaghan's. The enemy
were certainly at New Castle at sundown yesterday. They cannot pass Echols here.
They may escape by Clifton Forge or by Covington, if you do not prevent them.
Echols will give you all the aid that he can. We are closer to the enemy than
you are, and will be more likely to know their movements. I will endeavor to
keep you informed. A portion of our small mounted force has been directed, if
the enemy attempts to pass from New Castle direct to Covington or by Clifton
Forge, to fall back in front of them, so as to give to Colonel Jackson and you
the earliest information.
SAM. JONES,
Major-General.
The operator at Jackson's River will use every effort to get the above to General
Early and a copy to Colonel Jackson. Colonel Jackson must have a copy of
it.
SAM. JONES,
Major-General.
I relied somewhat upon the demonstration which was to be made against Staunton on the next day. I also thought that General Scammon might divert the force under Echols from interfering with mine. In both these trusts I was at fault. From all the information I have been able to collect, I believe the Kanawha force retired from Lewisburg on the 13th, without waiting until the 18th, as prearranged, and without making an effort in the direction of Union. The detachment sent from the command of General Sullivan was too feeble to make the threat upon Staunton of sufficient avail to keep Early from besetting my command upon its return. Instead of approaching Staunton on the 20th and 21st, it was retiring through New Market on the 20th.
The dispositions of the rebels had been prompt and skillful; Rosser's brigade had crossed the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, on the 14th, made some demonstrations upon the Orange and Alexandria Railroad near Bull Run; thence passed the Blue Ridge through Ashby's Gap; were stopped by the high water in the Shenandoah, and moved up by Front Royal to cut off the detachment from Harper's Ferry. The division of Early left Hanover Junction on the 15th; arrived at Staunton the same night; marched to Buffalo Gap the ensuing day, and thence to the Warm Springs and Millborough. Fitzhugh Lee's division, leaving Charlottesville on the 14th, came diverted by the detachment from Sullivan's command, for a day or two, when it set out for Buchanan.
At Jackson's River, though trusting in the co-operation of the Kanawha and Shenandoah forces, I acted as though they would be of no assistance to me, which was indeed the case. My column, nearly 4 miles long, was hastened across the first bridge. When all had passed but my ambulances, a few wagons, and a regiment in the rear, an attack was made by Jackson's force.
The company on the Clifton Forge road was driven away; three ambulances were captured, and an effort was made to take the bridge, which was unsuccessful. A night attack is always appalling, even to experienced troops. Unavailing efforts were made to open communication with the regiment cut off until morning, when it appeared that the enemy was determined to maintain his position upon the high cliffs which overlooked the bridge.
During the night the balance of my command had been concentrated at Callaghan's, and an efficient defense established upon all the roads approaching that point. Finding it impossible to dislodge the enemy as long as the bridges remained, I directed them to be destroyed. The enemy at once left the cliffs and endeavored to reach the flank and rear of the regiment which remained on that side.
Orders were sent to the regiment to swim the river or come to me over the mountain, around the bend; and, after destroying the train, it swam the river, with the loss of 4 men drowned. When nearly across, a formal demand from General Early was received by the officer commanding the rear guard to surrender, addressed to the commanding officer of the United States forces. As my column was then in motion over the Alleghanies, no formal reply was returned to the demand.
During the night attack, 5 officers and 119 men were lost by being captured. It was thought that had the regiment in rear been advanced steadily forward, these captures might have been mostly prevented, and we should not have been obliged to destroy our wagons and ambulances the following day.
The road over the Alleghanies led us to Antony's Creek, between the White Sulphur Springs and Huntersville.
A force of the enemy was reported at Gatewood's, which is 12 miles east of Huntersville. My command was yet 30 miles from that point. If I could cross the Greenbrier and reach Marling's Bottom before the enemy, my command would be safe. By a very obscure road the Greenbrier was reached and crossed on the 21st opposite Hillsborough, and we encamped for the night at the northern base of Droop Mountain. My scouts thrown out kept me informed of the enemy's movements and positions. For thirty hours after my column left Callaghan's, the enemy made great efforts to intercept my force, but they generally took wrong roads. The citizens who knew the country best regarded our capture as unavoidable. It was expected, as may be seen from the orders given Colonel Moor by me, that he would remain near Droop Mountain until the 18th, but owing to orders he received from the general commanding the department, subsequent to the reception of mine, he also retired on the 14th, thus leaving no co-operative forces, except Colonel Thoburn's, in the positions I had reason to expect them to be on the 20th and 21st. Unaided, with a weary command of 2,500 men, I had marched through a difficult country, in which not less than 12,000 rebels were maneuvered to effect my capture.
On the way to Edray my rear guard experienced some trifling attacks on the 22d. The road thence to Beverly was a glacier, which was traversed with great difficulty and peril. The artillery was drawn almost entirely by dismounted men during the 23d and 24th.
Couriers had been sent forward to Beverly to bring out subsistence and forage, which we succeeded, after extreme hardships, in meeting on the 24th.
The officers and men undertook all that was required of them, and endured all the sufferings from fatigue, hunger, and cold with extraordinary fortitude, even with cheerfulness. The march of 400 miles, which was concluded at Beverly, was the most difficult I have ever seen performed. The endurance of the men and horses was taxed to the utmost, yet there was no rest for them.
Believing that some retaliatory operations would be at once inaugurated by the enemy, I telegraphed to the general commanding department that I thought it advisable to get my command into the valley as soon as possible, and set out for Webster, whence, by means of the railroad, I arrived at Martinsburg just in time to confront the enemy, who was advancing toward this place.
I desire to mention the names of my staff officers, to whom I am greatly indebted for their thoughtful and untiring aid to me throughout this expedition: Capt. Will. Rumsey, assistant adjutant-general and aide-de-camp; Lieut. L. Markbriet, acting assistant adjutant general; Capt. W. H. Brown, assistant quartermaster; Lieut. H. N. Harrison, acting assistant engineer; Capt. L. A. Myers, provost marshal; Lieut. H. Koenigsberger, acting commissary of subsistence; Lieut. G. H. North, ordnance officer, and Surg. W. D. Stewart, medical director. The services of Lieut. J. R. Meigs, Engineers, and of his assistant, Henry Topping, esq., were invaluable to me.
In concluding my report, I beg leave to thank the honorable Secretary of War for his kindness in directing the Quartermaster's payment to furnish the men of my command, engaged in the recent expedition, with a suit of clothing gratis. No necessity was ever more pressing, or more promptly supplied; no charity more timely, or more gratefully received.
I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. W. AVERELL,
Brigadier-General.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 29, Serial No. 48, Pages 926-932, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
