Summary:
Confederate Cavalry Colonel William L. Jackson reports to Assistant Adjutant R.
H. Catlett on his efforts to oppose Union General William Averell's late 1863
raid in West Virginia and the Shenandoah Valley. Jackson reports attempting to
prevent Averell's advance on Staunton. He also reports that General Jubal Early
commanded part of the operations from Staunton.
Capt. R. H. CATLETT,
Assistant
Adjutant-General.
Warm Springs, Va.,
December 28, 1863.
CAPTAIN:
I have the honor to report my operations during the third Averell raid.
On the evening of the 11th instant, the enemy appeared in my front at Marling's Bottom Bridge, driving in my pickets and scouts, with a force variously estimated from 900 to 3,000.
At 4 a. m. of the 12th instant, I learned from General Echols' dispatch of the 11th instant that a large force of infantry and cavalry had made their appearance on Sewell Mountain, 18 miles from him. On the 12th instant, becoming satisfied that the enemy at Marling's Bottom had gone on toward Lewisburg, via Little Levels, and apprehending that a force would come from the direction of New Creek, via Monterey or Hightown, my scouts were instructed to keep a sharp lookout in that direction, and I ordered Captain Marshall to fall back to Back Creek. My dispatch reached him beyond Huntersville blockading roads. During the night I learned that General Echols was falling back from Lewisburg to a position on this side of the Greenbrier River.
On the 13th instant, at 2 p. m., I received information that a force of the enemy was moving on the Staunton and Parkersburg turnpike toward Staunton, and the opinion was expressed that they were going down the Bull Pasture River to get in my rear.
About the same time I learned that a large mounted force was moving down Back Creek. I had previously given to the Niter Cave on Back Creek all the information I had received. The last courier was fired upon by the enemy at 5 p. m. at the cave. He, however, escaped, reporting the destruction of the cave, and that Captain Marshall was fighting and was evidently cut off. Captain M. did not fall back immediately upon receiving my order, waiting to gather in men sent to blockade roads, or he would not have been cut off. Thus at least 150 effective men were cut off from my subsequent operations. Captain Marshall, after being cut off, annoyed the enemy as much as he could, and blockaded the road toward Valley Mountain and other routes (these were, however, cut out by the infantry on their falling back), and took position on Back Creek, to annoy and obstruct the enemy if they fell back on that route.
At sundown I moved my infantry, artillery, and train to Hot Springs, remaining here myself until the next morning with some mounted men. On account of scarcity of forage, I had, previous to all this, sent my cavalry horses to be subsisted under charge of detailed men, and only retained about 150 mounted men. Some of these were with the cut off detachments.
At 1 a. m. of the 14th instant, Lieut. Col. William P. Thompson, who had been at Mill Point with two companies (McNeel's and Jarvis'), joined me with 25 men (having been compelled to come through the woods), the rest either cut off (some captured), or moving to join me at Healing Springs. During the day Captain Jarvis joined me at the springs with 20 men. Thus again I lost for my subsequent operations about 100 more men.
Finding the enemy in large force in my front, and learning that they were also moving on my right as if to make to my rear, at 4 a. m. of the 14th instant, leaving cavalry here to await my orders (they were ordered on at sundown), I proceeded to Hot Springs, intending if the river could be crossed to proceed to Callaghan's, via Morris Hill. On my route I met couriers returning with dispatches I had sent to General Echols, who reported my communication cut off from him, and that Jackson's River was not fordable by the route in contemplation. I then determined to take the McGraw's Gap route, which would lead me to Callaghan's by Jackson's River Depot and Covington, and if the enemy moved through the latter place toward Buchanan, would throw me on his front.
On this route I received a dispatch from General Imboden, dated the 13th instant, informing me that he expected to be attacked on Shenandoah Mountain, and requesting me to join him. Regarding the movement of the enemy as a mere feint on General Imboden, I moved on and reached Jackson's River Depot at 11 a. m. of the 15th instant, crossing my artillery and train by hand on the railroad bridge. Here I received your dispatch of the 14th instant from Pickaway Plains, and a dispatch from Maj. Gen. Samuel Jones of the 13th instant, telegraphed to Millborough, directing me, if I had received no contrary order from General Echols, to collect my command at Callaghan's and there await further orders.
On the night of the 14th instant, Col. James Cochran (to whom my thanks are due), of the Fourteenth Virginia Cavalry (who was with me, endeavoring to make his way to his regiment), volunteered to scout to Covington I furnished him with 50 men. He reported that a force had been there during the night, but on the morning of the 15th had fallen back toward Callaghan's.
After arriving at Jackson's River Depot on the 15th instant, I sent Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson with a few men to Callaghan's. He started about 1 p. m. Soon afterward I learned reliably that General Averell had gone up Dunlap's Creek toward Sweet Springs. I then ordered all my mounted men to report to Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, and that night I encamped at Covington with my infantry.
On the 16th instant, in the morning, arriving at Ogle's Creek, one half mile from Callaghan's, I took position there, ordering Lieutenant Colonel Thompson with 100 mounted men to scout toward Sweet Springs and communicate with General Echols. This Lieutenant Colonel Thompson accomplished, and General Echols retained him with about 30 men, returning the residue to me.
At 2 a. m. of the 17th instant, I received an order from Maj. Gen. Samuel Jones to return at once to some good position near Clifton Forge, and there await further orders, and as soon as it was light I moved in obedience to that order. Discovering the Rich Patch route, I took position near Jackson's River Depot, so that I could watch both the Clifton Forge and Rich Patch routes, throwing out my scouts toward Buchanan and on the Rich Patch route as far as the high water permitted.
About this time Maj. Gen. J. A. Early opened communication with me by dispatches from Staunton first, and afterward from Millborough. I gave him from time to time all my information, and endeavored on several occasions to communicate with Maj. Gen. Fitz. Lee and General Echols, but fear all my dispatches were not received, as some of my couriers were captured. It would make this report too voluminous to mention all the dispatches forwarded and received, and I now omit any further mention of them, and send with this report copies of the important ones received.
In the afternoon of the 19th instant, a scout reported having seen 3 of the enemy this side of Craig's Creek. I immediately ordered Capt. John S. Spriggs, with the mounted men then present, to proceed up the Rich Patch road until he saw and felt the enemy. Afterward Maj. J. B. Lady came up with more, and he was directed to re-enforce Captain Spriggs, and take command.
I then moved Captain McAllister, with his home guards, to the Island Ford Bridge, with instructions to have everything prepared, and to destroy the bridge when he found the enemy advancing, telling him that I would endeavor to inform him, if possible, but, to guard against any contingency, that he must scout, so as to ascertain any advance. He so moved, and made every preparation to burn the bridge. All this before I became satisfied that they were moving on the Rich Patch route. Indeed, the information about that time was that the enemy were moving via Potts Creek to Dunlap's Creek, and would either turn up at Sweet Springs or at Callaghan's, and I was preparing to move to Callaghan's. About 5 p. m., however, I became satisfied that they were moving down the Rich Patch road, and Lieutenant Boyd, of the Engineer Corps, who was with me, was directed to ride rapidly to the bridge to insure its certain destruction.
In the meantime (it had become dark), I moved my whole command to the point of intersection of the Rich Patch and Covington roads. I also dispatched several different couriers and aides to the bridge to order its destruction. A considerable force of the enemy, by some route that had never been explained to me--although I sought information from every source, and was assured that I was guarding every possible approach--threw themselves between me and the bridge, cut off Lieutenant Boyd, fired into or captured my messengers, and, as it now appears, rushed upon the bridge, surprising and scattering the home guards before they set fire to the bridge. While all this was occurring Capt. George Downs, commanding detachment of the Nineteenth, under my orders, was endeavoring to get to the bridge, so as to be in front of the enemy. I also moved Colonel Arnett (Major Lady was then fighting) up the Rich Patch road to the point where the enemy turned off, or was turning, directing him to hold that position, prevent any more passing, and, if the enemy had passed, to close in on their rear.
Although dark, conceiving that a movement could be made by which all that portion of the enemy on this side of the bridge could be cut off and eventually captured, and deeming the movement one of the greatest importance, I undertook the personal superintendence of the same, having, as I conceived, given all the necessary orders for the corresponding movements. The movement was a success. The commander Averell was divided, one portion across the bridge and the other on this side. I could not ascertain then the extent of the division. When this was accomplished, I still had communication with Colonel Arnett, in the rear, but soon afterward I received a verbal dispatch from him that he was being pressed and was falling back. I directed Capt. James McGuffin to communicate to Colonel Arnett my order to hold his ground, prevent the passing of the enemy, or, if he failed in that, to press his rear.
Captain McGuffin not returning, with the members of my staff, I attempted to get to the rear, so as to communicate with and direct Colonel Arnett's movements, but was compelled to abandon the effort by the demonstrations of the enemy. Finding Major Lady, with 50 men, I moved with him to a position near the bridge, and directed him to resist all efforts of the enemy on the same side to get to the bridge. Three times during the night did this little band successfully repel attempts to reach the bridge by the enemy on the same side, and they held this position until 8 a. m. of the 20th instant.
I omitted to mention that when I first arrived near the bridge, believing that a considerable force had not yet crossed, I attempted to burn the bridge, but was compelled to desist by the overwhelming force guarding it. Soon after daylight the bridge was burned by the force on the opposite side, General Averell evidently giving up that portion of his command cut off from him as lost.
The enemy, thus cut off as it seemed (there appeared to be about two regiments), then made a show of attack on Colonel Arnett, and throwing out large flanking and surrounding parties (by this time they have ascertained how small the force was with me), compelled me to fall back to the top of the mountain with the small detachment under Major Lady, and, not being pressed in the rear, took the position I had occupied. Colonel Arnett was at least 3 miles from me. Captain Downs could not support me, nor could I communicate with him. I made every effort to communicate with both, but could not do so for the enemy. They thought I was captured, or otherwise disposed of, as I had been seen in the midst of the enemy. Citizens who had known the river all their lives had assured me (Colonel Arnett knew this) that it was not possible to cross it at any ford in the county for two more days of dry, cold weather. The result shows that I committed an error in placing any reliance upon their representations, or upon the efforts of the home guards.
Colonel Arnett, therefore, conceiving that the bridge being burned, the river not fordable, the enemy would be compelled to fall back on him, took position to prevent their reaching the railroad bridge and the taking of the McGraw's Gap route; but instead of doing that they made but a feint to do so, and, burning their train, (some 30 wagons) they took the railroad track to a ford 2 miles above the bridge, and there succeeded in crossing--not, however, without drowning a number of men and horses in the effort--before Colonel Arnett could get up to prevent them. Seeing that my infantry could not cross or catch the enemy, mounted as they were, I ordered Captain Spriggs in pursuit with my mounted men, and halted my infantry.
The raiders thus escaped, not, however, without damage or loss. The destruction of their train; the capture during my night attack of 150 prisoners, including Lieutenant-Colonel Polsley, of the Eighth Virginia (bogus) Mounted Infantry; several lieutenants; 1 of General Averell s acting assistant adjutant-generals, and his chaplain; 6 ambulances complete, with their horses, and about 200 horses. This last is but conjecture.
I am instituting rigid inquiry, with a view to ascertain the number of horses captured, and will know in a few days. I fear, however, that many will not be reported, as I regret to say that all in my command do not properly report captured property. Quite a number of the horses have been proven to belong to citizens, from whom they had been taken by the enemy, and these I have restored. There was also recaptured a number of slaves, all of whom but a few have been restored to their owners. The others are in jail at Covington. We also released a number of prisoners they had taken, among them Captain Porteaux, assistant quartermaster, captured at Salem.
The fighting during the night seemed to be severe, but, as the result proves, the firing was not effective.
The enemy lost (as well as I can ascertain) 23 in killed and wounded, and my loss was 1 man killed and 7 wounded. Thirty of my men are missing; some of them known to be captured.
On the 21st instant, about 10 a. m., Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, with Brigadier-General Imboden, crossed the river in pursuit. The enemy had gone on to Callaghan's, and from thence, by Antony's Creek and Spice Run, to the Little Levels and to Beverly, arriving at the latter place on the 25th instant, having stopped to recruit, &c., on Valley Mountain one or two days.
I inclose Col. W. W. Arnett's report without comment.
The conduct of Lieut. Charles Boyd, of the Engineer Corps, injured by the fall of his horse: Cadet R. D. Chaffin, severely wounded; Maj. J. B. Lady; Capts. John S. Spriggs and William P. O'Brien, deserves special notice for gallantry.
Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
WM. L. JACKSON,
Colonel.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 29, Serial No. 48, Pages 950-954, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
