Summary:
Confederate General Sam Jones reports to Adjutant General Samuel Cooper in
February, 1864, on actions in East Tennessee and western Virginia. Jones
mentions one regiment that engaged in a long march from Staunton, leaving the
men's shoes and clothes in tatters.
Gen. S. COOPER,
Adjt. and Insp. Gen., C. S. Army,
Richmond, Va.
Dublin,
February 6, 1864.
GEN.:
Having been relieved from the temporary command of the Department of East Tennessee, I think it proper to state the circumstances under which I went there, and the military operations that followed until Lieut.-Gen. Longstreet assumed the direction of affairs in that department.
On my way to this place. after the affair of August 26 and 27 last with the enemy near White Sulphur Springs, I received a telegram from Maj.-Gen. Buckner, asking me to take charge of Southwest Virginia for him, and informing me that he had ordered Brig. Gen. A. E. Jackson, with whom I could communicate at Jonesborough, Tenn., to report to me for orders. At the same time I received a dispatch from Brig.-Gen. Jackson, informing me that he had fallen back to Bristol, and desiring to know if he should destroy the railroad bridges over the Watauga and Holston. I directed him not to destroy the bridges unless it was absolutely necessary; to hold his position as long as possible, and informed him that I would send forward re-enforcements.
On September 1, I ordered Brig. Gen. John S. Williams, who was organizing a small brigade of mounted men at Saltville, to go with all the troops he could collect to Bristol and assume command in that vicinity. The Forty-fifth Virginia Regt. (infantry), one of the best regiments that had fought at White Sulphur Springs, was moved forward rapidly and joined Brig.-Gen. Williams, and Wharton's brigade, with two field batteries, which were then on the march from Orange Court-House via Warm Springs, Va., were ordered to proceed without delay to the vicinity of Bristol.
On my arrival at this place, I ascertained what I had not known before, that Maj.-Gen. Buckner had gone with nearly all of his troops, including those in Soutwest Virginia, under Brig.-Gen. Preston, to join Gen. Bragg near Chattanooga, and that Gen. Burnside, with a force estimated at two corps (30,000 strong), had entered East Tennessee, occupied Knoxville, and was advancing toward Virginia.
Deeming it important that there should be a general officer in that section of country superior in rank to the three brigadiers then there, to command the scattered fragments of troops left in the Department of East Tennessee, and such re-enforcements as I could send from my own department, I went immediately to Abingdon without awaiting orders, and subsequently, under orders from the War Department, assumed command of the District of Soutwest Virginia and all troops in Tennessee east of Knoxville. Two brigades, or what were called brides, had been left in East Tennessee-one, about 2,000 strong, under Brig.-Gen. Frazer, at Cumberland Gap; the other, composed of parts of Thomas' Legion, a battalion of Georgia cavalry, a field battery, and parts of two dismounted batteries, acting as bridge guards, numbering about 900 men, under Brig. Gen. A. E. Jackson, was on the railroad from Carter's Depot to Bristol. Col. Giltner's regiment of Kentucky cavalry had been left in Soutwest Virginia, and there were besides two small battalions of mounted men on the borders of Southeast Kentucky.
Immediately on my arrival at Abingdon, I dispatched a courier to Cumberland Gap with a letter addressed to Brig.-Gen. Frazer, informing him that I had assumed command of Southwest Virginia and all troops in East Tennessee, asking him to inform me of the strength of his command and the condition of his commissariat, telling him that re-enforcements were on the way to East Tennessee, and directing him to hold Cumberland Gap as long as he possibly could, and not to abandon it without the most determined resistance of which he was capable. A few hours after I had dispatched that letter I received a telegram from Maj.-Gen. Buckner requesting me to send an order to Brig.-Gen. Frazer directing him to evacuate Cumberland Gap, destroying all the stores and public property that he could not remove, and fall back to Abingdon. Buckner added, "This is Gen. Bragg's order." I did not send the order to Frazer as requested, but telegraphed the Secretary of War, informing him of what I had done, and of the telegram from Gen. Buckner, and urged that Cumberland Gap be not abandoned. The War Department replied, directing me to hold Cumberland Gap and all other strong points that I could in East Tennessee.
In the meantime, the enemy had advanced along the line of the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad to Carter's Depot, where they were checked by the gallantry and good conduct of Capt. H. L. W. McClung and his small bridge guard of some 150 men. Brig.-Gen. Jackson and Col. Giltner moved beyond Jonesborough, and in a handsome affair at Limestone Depot captured some 300 prisoners.
On September 10, I received information that Cumberland Gap had been surrounded on the 6th by six or eight regiments of the enemy's cavalry. From the best information I could gather at this time, I believe Gen. Burnside had carried or sent the greater part of his force to Gen. Rosecrans, leaving a division or two to capture Cumberland Gap and drive out the few troops left in East Tennessee and Southwest Virginia. I determined to endeavor to hold as much of East Tennessee as possible and relieve Cumberland Gap, and was preparing an expedition for this latter purpose when, on the 11th, I received information that Brig.-Gen. Frazer had capitulated on the evening of the 9th; that he and his brigade were prisoners, and the enemy in possession of the gap. The courier whom I had dispatched on the 6th delivered my letter to Brig.-Gen. Frazer some hours before he capitulated.
The loss of Cumberland Gap rendered available nearly all the force that had invested that place, and it was immediately thrown on the line of the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad and moved toward Virginia. Under all the circumstances of the case I thought the best service I could render with the small force under my command would be to check and detain the superior force in my front until the battle which I supposed was impending near Chattanooga should be decided.
I had been detained at Abingdon five or six days by an attack of diphtheria.
On the 14th, I went to Jonesborough, where the troops were concentrated under Brig.-Gen. Williams. The country about Jonesborough is not well adapted to the purpose I proposed to myself, namely, to check and detain a greatly superior with an inferior force. The cavalry had been skirmishing for several days, and was greatly exhausted. There were two railroad bridges in my rear, over the Watauga and Holston, which the enemy could easily destroy with his large cavalry force, and having little or no field transportation. I was dependent on the railroad for supplies. I therefore directed Brig.-Gen. Williams to fall back to Carter's Depot, which he did in the night of the 16th, and Corse's brigade, which had been ordered to me from Richmond, was ordered to halt at Zollicoffer.
On the 18th, 2,000 or 3,000 of the enemy's cavalry passed to my rear, by way of Kingsport, driving off the First Tennessee Cavalry(of Frazer's command, which had escaped from Cumberland Gap), and pursued it beyond Bristol. They damaged the railroad some distance on both sides of Bristol, and returned to Blountsville, 6 miles west of Zollicoffer, on the evening of the 19th.
Corse's brigade having reached Zollicoffer the day before, I determined to attack the enemy at Blountsville before daylight the next morning, and ordered up Williams, with the Forty-fifth Virginia Infantry and the dismounted battalion of Peters' regiment, to aid in the attack. They did not arrive, however, until long after sunrise on the 20th. Apprehending that they might not arrive in time to make the attack before daylight, I directed Col. C. H. Tyler, who had reached my headquarters a day or two before, to take the Sixteenth Georgia Battalion of cavalry and two companies of the First Tennessee Cavalry that had been cut off from their regiment at Kingsport, and feel the enemy at Blountsville early in the morning and endeavor to draw them on to attack us at Zollicoffer. Corse's brigade, with a field battery, was placed in a strong position to receive them. Col. Tyler and his men performed the duty assigned them handsomely, and drew the enemy on. Our battery opened somewhat too soon and checked the enemy. They felt Corse cautiously, and finding him strongly posted endeavored to turn his left, but the Forty-fifth and Peters' battalion had come up and were in line on the left to receive them. The skirmishing continued several hours, when the enemy fell back to Blountsville and moved off toward Carter's Depot.
In the meantime, Gen. Burnside had been moving forward by the railroad, and there was some skirmishing at Carter's Depot on the 21st. Williams and his men were hurried back to that place, and on the 22d Gen. Burnside felt at Carter's Depot a part of the troops that confronted him at Zollicoffer on the 20th.
These movements of the enemy were only for the purpose of ascertaining my position. Having accomplished that purpose, I had no doubt that Gen. Burnside designed engaging my attention at Zollicoffer with his cavalry until he could with a superior force surround and capture the troops at Carter's Depot.
On the 22d, he addressed me a letter, which I received early in the night, requesting me to warn non-combatants to retire from the villages along the line of railroad, as, in the course of military operations, he would probably fire on the villages. He added that he would not fire on any village before 5 o'clock that evening. His letter was received at my advanced picket about 4.30 p. m., and before that time the enemy had, in an artillery duel with one of my batteries at Blountsville, fired upon and burned the best part of that village.
My force being altogether too small to enable me to hold both Carter's Depot and Zollicoffer, I withdrew Gen. Williams to the latter place in the night of the 22d, bringing away all stores and property.
Instead of pressing on toward Zollicoffer, the enemy burned the bridge at Carter's and fell back toward Knoxville, leaving, however, a force superior to mine in my front. I had no doubt that this move was caused by the result of the battle of Chickamauga, news of which reached me (and I presume Burnside also) in the evening of the 22d. As soon as the necessary transportation could be provided. My infantry and artillery were moved to Carter's Depot, and the cavalry, with a battery of artillery, under Brig.-Gen. Williams, to Jonesborough.
Under an urgent appeal from Gen. Lee, I returned Corse's brigade to him. This so weakened my force that I was not able to press the enemy successfully. Numerous reports had reached me of movements of the enemy against my own department, and Maj. Gen. R. Ransom, jr., having reported to me for duty, in obedience to orders from the War Department, I directed him to assume the immediate command of all the troops in the Department of East Tennessee and report directly to me. He was directed to move his infantry and artillery beyond Jonesborough, and push forward the cavalry as far as he could toward Bull's Gap, the chief object being to harass the enemy and break up the organizations of disloyal East Tennesseeans. As the salt-works and lead mines in Southwest Virginia were entirely unguarded against raids either from Kentucky or the Kanawha, he was directed to move Wharton's brigade of infantry back near Abingdon, and to make the move so as to produce the impression that he was moving to Cumberland Gap. I then returned to my own department.
For information as to the subsequent operations of Brig.-Gen. Williams, I refer you to his report, forwarded by me on the 25th ultimo. By October 13 he had been driven by superior forces back to Abingdon, where I joined him on the 15th.
Affairs at that time had again assumed a threatening aspect in that section of country. The battle of Chickamauga had not been as decisive as I had at first supposed, and I apprehended that the enemy had left in Northeast Tennessee a sufficient force to invade Southwest Virginia successfully. I called on the department for re-enforcements, and Corse's brigade was again sent to me, and I ordered forward one regiment and three battalions of my own cavalry. The enemy did not follow up their advantage, as I apprehended they would, but after coming within 5 or 6 miles of Abingdon fell back, destroying the railroad and committing other depredations, indicating that it was not their purpose to attempt to hold any part of Southwest Virginia.
The troops then at Abingdon were in no condition to enter immediately on offensive operations. The cavalry had been continuously and actively engaged for six or seven weeks, and had been twice driven by the enemy. Men and horses were without shoes and greatly exhausted. Wharton's brigade had been marching more than three months from Staunton to Winchester, and thence by Orange Court-House and Warm Springs, Va., to Jonesborough, Tenn., and back to Abingdon. His men were badly clad; scarcely one third of them were shod. Corse's brigade was but little better provided for, and was without transportation. Every effort was made to procure clothing, shoes, and transportation, and as soon as the troops could march they were moved into East Tennessee, Maj.-Gen. Ransom in immediate command.
On November 6, the cavalry, under Brig. Gen. W. E. Jones and Col. Giltner, successfully attacked the enemy at Rogersville, Tenn., capturing between 700 and 800 of the enemy's cavalry, a field battery of 4 pieces, 60 wagons, and about 1,000 horses and mules.
While I was in East Tennessee I received information that the enemy was moving in force from the Kanawha and Beverly on Lewisburg, and I hurried to join my troops on that part of my line.
Before I could return to Tennessee, Lieut.-Gen. Longstreet came with his command east of Knoxville, and by authority, as he informed me, of the President assumed command of all the troops I had carried into East Tennessee, and I was relieved from any further control in that department. This necessarily threw additional labor on my staff officers, which they performed cheerfully and to my entire satisfaction.
The energies of my chief quartermaster (Maj. Edward McMahon) and chief commissary (Maj. H. W. King) were especially taxed, and they performed their duties with commendable intelligence and success.
During the time I was cut off from my department by the enemy my senior assistant adjutant-general (Maj. C. S. Stringfellow), whom I had left at the headquarters of the department, performed the responsible duties devolved upon him most intelligently and successfully.
Gen. George B. Crittenden (colonel, C. S. Army) commanded the cavalry from September 10 to the 23d with judgment, boldness, and success.
When Brig.-Gen. Williams fell back to Zollicoffer on the 12th, Brig. Gen. W. E. Jones, who was in southwest Virginia awaiting orders, volunteered to command the cavalry, and did it with his accustomed energy and intelligence.
During these operations a portion of the home guards of East Tennessee turned out and rendered efficient service.
Col. George R. McClellan and Col. McLin, commanding the home guards, were especially active and energetic and rendered very valuable service.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
SAM. JONES,
Maj.-Gen.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 30, Serial No. 51, Pages 602-607, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
