Summary:
Union Cavalry General William Averell reports on the actions of his command since
leaving Chambersburg in this August, 1864, dispatch. He discusses his pursuit of
Confederates raiding north of the Potomac.
Capt. T. MELVIN,
Assistant Adjutant-Gen.
Hancock, Md.,
August 3, 1864.
SIR:
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of yesterday, inclosing a dispatch from Brig.-Gen. Kelley. This is the first communication I have received from your headquarters since the 28th July, I sent to you last night a report of my operations since that date. When I left Chambersburg I requested Gen. Couch to notify Gen. Kelley of the threatened movement of the enemy upon Cumberland and at McConnellsburg. On the morning of the 31st I notified Gen. Kelley that I was driving the enemy in the direction of Hancock, and I had reason to hope when I attacked him at Hancock that between Gen. Kelly's forces and my own he would be captured. Nothing but an iron-clad car and a company of National Guards appeared, which were driven away by the enemy's artillery. My artillery controlling the ford prevented his crossing, but with my small and worn-out command I could not prevent his escape by the Cumberland pike, upon which he kept up his flight during the night, felling trees and burning bridges in his rear, rendering pursuit with any chance of success impossible. I sent a messenger to Great Cacapon with a telegram to Gen. Kelley, informing him of the course taken by the enemy, and requesting that a train of cars be sent to take up my command dismounted to Green Spring Run or Cumberland to assist in case of need, to which I receive the reply that my command was not needed.
I remained at this point for the following reasons:
First. The impassibility of the road taken by the enemy and the impracticability of the Old Town road.
Second. The inability of my command to move, owing to the worn-out condition of my horses, and their want of shoes. The enemy was mounted upon good horses with which he had recently supplied himself. During the entire pursuit to this place, not a horse of the enemy had been abandoned, except when his rider had been killed or wounded, while 300 of mine had been left ten miles behind from utter exhaustion. When the head of my column attacked the enemy at this place, the enemy numbered about 3,000; I had but 1,000, and although I drove him, killing and wounding 15, I could not capture him without the assistance I had expected. I am not permitted to take horses, and I have not received a fresh supply. The enemy, clearing the country in his front, left nothing for me in his rear. Had the road been open, I could have gone no farther without rendering the pursuit ruinous to my command and fruitless.
Third. Until it was known to me what course the enemy had taken after encountering Gen. Kelley's forces this was the best point for me to occupy. If he defeated Gen. Kelley, and continued westward by taking the Bedford turnpike and impressing horses, I could again reach him upon his right flank. If he turned southward, either from defeat or success, he would probably move in the direction of Winchester, when I would have a chance of intercepting him after resting here.
Fourth. In my attack at McConnellsburg, a portion of the enemy--from 200 to 500--were cut off and scattered, and are now endeavoring to reach the river. The available force of one of my brigades has been and is engaged in trying to intercept them.
I have detailed the most prominent rebel sympathizers in this country, and send them under guard to cut out the blockade and rebuild the bridges on the Cumberland pike. Telegraphic communication with Gen. Kelley has been interrupted. Since yesterday at 11 a. m. I have sent couriers, patrols, a hand car, and a locomotive to obtain information of the operations near Cumberland, and the direction taken by the enemy, if he has escaped. The latest intelligence I have received is that he is coming down the river.
I have the honor to request that you will lay the above report, with the inclosed dispatches, before the major-general commanding the department, and that they be sent to the War Department, together with my report of yesterday. I cannot believe that they are fully informed of the condition of my command at Washington, if they expect me to overtake and capture a force double my own and better mounted. If such is their expectation, it is impossible that they can know that this command has marched 1,400 miles since the 1st of May, without a remount, and without a half sufficiently long to set the shoes on my horses.
Respectfully,
WM. W. AVERELL,
Brig.-Gen.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 37, Serial No. 70, Pages 329-330, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
