Summary:
Union General Franz Sigel writes General Grant concerning General Crook's May,
1864, plans for the Valley. The plans involve a demonstration at Staunton, where
the Confederates threaten to concentrate troops.
Lieut. Gen. U. S. GRANT:
WINCHESTER,
May 2, 1864
The following telegram was received from Gen. Crook:
CHARLESTON, April 30,
1864.
Not having a sufficient mounted infantry force to make two demonstrations (columns). I shall only make a demonstration toward Lewisburg, so as to keep the enemy from leaving there, while I will march with the main body from Fayetteville on the bridge of New River. Gen. Averell, with 2,000 mounted men, will go through Logan County (Court-House) to the vicinity of Saltville, and if circumstances will not justify his attacking that place, to destroy the railroad from that place toward the bridge, so as to prevent troops (re-enforcements) from Tennessee. Should I be successful in taking the bridge, I shall cross the bridge (river) and move toward Lynchburg, destroying the road as far as I deem it prudent, then fall back on Lewisburg. The officer who commands on the Lewisburg line is instructed to watch the enemy's movements well, and if he retreats, to advance, occupy Lewisburg, and collect the supplies of the country. On the contrary, if the enemy should attack him, for him to retreat, delaying the enemy all he can by contesting strong points, blockading the roads, &c.
This plan of Gen. Crook's may prove successful and may have very important results, but it is not in accordance with my views, because it brings Gen. Averell too far west and out of reach of Gen. Crook. His cavalry will be used up, and therefore cannot assist Gen. Crook in future operations. Secondly, because this movement will allow the enemy to concentrate nearly all his forces which are between Staunton and Lewisburg at Staunton. Thirdly, because it makes all co-operation of forces here with those of Gen. Crook impossible. My understanding was that all the forces of Gen. Crook should operate between the James and New Rivers, and that the movements should end with the demonstration against Staunton with all the forces under Crook, the cavalry included; but I may be wrong and it is too late to interfere. I will therefore say nothing to Gen. Crook, but wish him success, which he so well deserves, as he has done all in his power to be prepared and to act.
As for me, I would very much like to know what your expectations are. I understand that I am to occupy the line at Cedar Creek, and to advance up the Shenandoah Valley, if circumstances will allow me to do so. To advance beyond Strasburg with my present force is hardly possible, if I cannot at the same time leave a pretty strong force opposite Front Royal to prevent the enemy from marching into my rear or cutting off my line of communication with cavalry. I have only a very vague idea about the position of the Army of the Potomac, and do not know whether there is any force of ours at or near Luray. If I am expected to make energetic and decisive movements, I should have at least 5,000 more of good infantry, with which I could march up the Shenandoah Valley. The country here is an open country, in which 50,000 men can maneuver. I would submit that under all circumstances a strong corps of observation should be formed here to maneuver upon the enemy's left flank.
I do not, however, ask for more troops, but simply state how things are and appear to me. The few troops I have here are excellent, with the exception of the cavalry, but they are too weak and too near the main body of the enemy to be able to venture much, especially as long as nothing is decided in regard to his movement. I also take leave to inform you that by the concentration of nearly all the troops of this department in the Kanawha and Shenandoah Valleys the interior of the State of West Virginia is laid open to guerrillas and bands of raiders. Cannot the States of Pennsylvania and Ohio send a few regiments of militia to the assistance of the people who have sent nearly every available man into the field, and those who are left are too poor and dependent upon their daily labor to organize and defend themselves. I bring this subject to your knowledge because I do not know what military resources the Government has at present and what the people of West Virginia may expect.
FRANZ SIGEL,
Maj.-Gen.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 37, Serial No. 70, Pages 368-369, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
