Summary:
Confederate Artillery Colonel John C. Pemberton writes Secretary of War James
Seddon regarding August, 1864, preparations for the defense of Richmond.
Pemberton mentions that only a limited number of mortars can be made available,
since the iron needed to make them can only be obtained from Staunton, VA.
Hon. J. A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War:
Richmond
August 7, 1864.
SIR:
His Excellency the President is, as you are aware, very desirous that the most effectual measures which our means will admit shall, with the least delay, be employed in an effort to dislodge the enemy from his intrenched position on the north side of James River, at Deep Bottom. The President is also naturally very anxious that the navigation of James River by the enemy should be made as difficult and as dangerous as possible. To effect these objects, I have proposed, with the sanction of the President, Gen. R. E. Lee, and Lieut.-Gen. Ewell, to locate mortar batteries, and if found practicable, to employ several 8-inch siege howitzers as auxiliaries, the trails to be sunk to give the necessary elevation. Unfortunately there are within this department but two 10-inch mortars, and Col. Gorgas informs me that, for want of the proper iron, which can only be obtained from Staunton, several weeks must elapse before even a single additional mortar can be furnished. The President has been made acquainted with these facts, and although the means at my disposal may prove inadequate to the end proposed (i. e., dislodging the enemy by rendering his pontoon bridge useless to him), he nevertheless desires the experiment to be tried. From the character of the enemy's position, which is such as to enable him to use his gun-boats with great effect in connection with his land batteries, and in view of the strength of his fortifications, which can only be approached over an open plain, I am satisfied that an attempt to take his works by assault would result in failure, unless he can be so demoralized by alarming his communications and depriving him of the hope of assistance by the bridge as to render his resistance to an assault less determined than it is likely otherwise to be.
It is proposed to use the two mortars and auxiliary howitzers to enfilade the bridge, while a cross-fire from Tilghman's Gate with rifled field-pieces shall also be maintained. This appears to me to be the only practicable plan of dislodging the enemy from the threatening position he has so long held. It may prove a failure because of the insufficient number of our mortars to keep up a continuous fire; with a battery of six instead of two of these pieces, I am confident he could be compelled to withdraw by their fire alone. The difficulty with the howitzers will be to occupy a position near enough to the bridge to render their comparative short range effective, and this may prove to be impracticable. It is important to open fire as soon as possible, and I had made my arrangements to get everything under way to-day, but on applying for sling carts to transport the mortars, I am officially informed that one of the only two in this department has been ordered to Gen. Lee's army near Petersburg, where it will probably be detained at least a week, and that the axle of the other is broken and unserviceable. This will cause great delay, unless arrangements can be made to give me the use of the cart before it is sent to Gen. Lee's army.
I have always regarded it as all important to a successful use of field artillery against the enemy's gun-boats and transports that he should be compelled to abandon his position at Deep Bottom. The reasons for this are too obvious to need explanation, but whether he maintains this position or not, our operations with field artillery can, I am confident, be made greatly more effective than they have hitherto been, by assigning this service to a special organization, whose exclusive charge it shall be to harass and damage the enemy on his river communications. This will require that the utmost possible mobility be given to the artillery that a sufficient number of guns adapted to the purpose be always ready for this service without endangering other equally or more important interests by withdrawing them too far from our defensive lines, and, if possible, an adequate support of the most reliable cavalry we can get, whose exclusive duty it shall be to aid and protect the operations of the artillery. I propose, then, that three batteries of four pieces, each under the command of an energetic and competent field officer, be at once thoroughly equipped as horse artillery. This will require that, in addition to the usual six draft horses to each piece and caisson, a sufficient number of horses be furnished to mount all the cannoneers; this is indispensable to the efficient service of the batteries. Two extra horses without harness will be necessary to each piece to meet casual-ties, and two for horse holders to each detachment. A battery of four pieces thus equipped will require fifty-six additional horses, and three batteries will require 168. I propose to place these three batteries under the immediate command of Maj. A. W. Stank, in every respect a most competent officer. He now commands two batteries of four napoleons each, thoroughly equipped in all respects except the additional horses and their accouterments. But I also require a battery of four 10-pounder Parrotts; this I have not got. Unless such a battery can be supplied already prepared for this service from some other command, it will be necessary to equip one throughout. If the requisite number of horses can be obtained, all the rest can be accomplished without difficulty and with very little delay. I have already taken the necessary measures for that end, if it should become necessary, and I have also an organized and well-instructed company, the Louisiana Guard Artillery, under Capt. C. A. Green, now dismounted, ready to take the battery at once. This arrangement, however, will require sixty-two more horses to be supplied than would be necessary if a battery already equipped should be assigned, making the whole number of horses to be furnished 230 instead of 168.
I will add that in my judgment the supporting cavalry force should not be less than 1,500 men, commanded by an officer of experience and of approved ability in that arm of service.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. C. PEMBERTON,
Lieut.-Col., Artillery.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 42, Serial No. 88, Pages 1164-1165, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
