Summary:
Union General George Custer reports on fighting in the Valley done by his Third
Cavalry Division in December, 1864. Custer mentions movements near Staunton, the
availability of supplies in the area, and the advantage the Confederates derived
from the presence of a telegraph in the town.
Brevet Brig.-Gen. FORSYTH,
Chief of Staff, Middle
Military Division.
December 23, 1864.
In obedience to the instructions of the major-general commanding I submit the following report of the recent expedition of this division up the Valley:
Late on the evening of the 18th instant I received instructions from the chief of cavalry to move with my division up the Valley pike at an early hour on the morning of the 19th. A copy of my orders have already been forwarded to you. My command was supplied with three days' rations and forage for one day. At 7 a. m. on the 19th my command left camp and moved to Newtown, when it followed the pike. Upon arriving at Strasburg I learned that a force of about fifty of the enemy had passed through Strasburg up the valley, having come from the direction of Front Royal. When within about six miles of Woodstock two scouts of the enemy were discovered in front of the advance. Several attempts were made to effect their capture, but without success. They continued in sight of the column until the command had reached Woodstock, when, my impression is, they conveyed the intelligence of our approach to the force stationed near New Market, from which point the report was forwarded by telegraph to Staunton and Waynesborough. In Woodstock I learned there was no force of the enemy north of Staunton, except a picket force of three companies, which were posted so as to watch the three roads--pike, Middle and Back roads--the right of the line resting near Edenburg, the left extending to Little North Mountain.
At daylight on the morning of the 20th my command moved from Woodstock; a small force of the enemy continued to annoy my advance, but without causing any damage to be inflicted. My instructions from the chief of cavalry were evidently written under the impression that I would meet the enemy enforce at some point south of New Market, if not sooner. This is inferred from the amount of supplies ordered for my command by the chief of cavalry. From the information I derived along the line of my first day's march, which was confirmed by the report of scouts, that the enemy had retired all his forces beyond Staunton, I believed that if the enemy permitted my command to reach Staunton without serious opposition, I could, with reasonable hope of success, continue my movement to Lynchburg, trusting to the supplies in the country beyond Staunton upon which to subsist my command, and had it not been for the advantage the enemy derived from his telegraphic communication with New Market my impressions would have proven correct. As it was, Rosser, who, with his division, was camped between Staunton (sic), was informed of my presence at Woodstock before 10 p. m. of the 19th, and, as stated by prisoners, his command received orders at 1 a. m. of the 20th to get easy to move. My command, after leaving Woodstock at daylight, moved without serious molestation to Lacey's Springs, nine miles from Harrisonburg, where I encamped during the night. The encampment was at the junction of the road leading from the Keezletown road to the pike, and for the road from Timberville to the pike. Pennington's brigade encamped in front, and on the left of the pike, one regiment, the Third New Jersey, was posted one mile and a half in advance on the pike to picket in the direction of Harrisonburg. Another regiment of the same brigade, the First Connecticut, was sent out on the road leading to the Keezletown road and picketed the country to the left of the pike. The First New Hampshire, of general Chapman's brigade, was posted on the Timberville road to picket in the direction of the latter point. One battalion of the Fifteenth New York, about 200 strong, was ordered to its support. The Eighth New York picketed the country in front and between the Timberville road and the pike, while the two remaining battalions of the Fifteenth New York, numbering upward of 400 men, were posted on the pike about one mile and a half in rear of the camp of the division. It will thus be seen that of the nine regiments composing my command five were on picket.
In the orders sent to brigade commanders, soon after reaching camp, reveille was ordered at 4 o'clock and the command was to move promptly at 6.30, Chapman's brigade taking the advance. In conformity with these instructions, Gen. Chapman called in his pickets at the proper time and the Eighth New York, the regiment farthest in advance in the direction of the Middle road, having formed in columns of squadrons and mounted, had begun to move off by fours when a brigade of the enemy (Payne's) which, under cover of the darkness and the withdrawal of our pickets, had advanced to within a very short distance of the regiment, charged in the direction of the camp-ground of the Second Brigade. The attack was heard by the entire command, and although Pennington's brigade was the rear in the order of march, it was at once mounted and placed in position receive the enemy. The Eighth New York, although somewhat astounded by this attack, behaved well under the circumstances and opened an effective fire upon the enemy. At the same time an attack was made upon the First New Hampshire, which regiment was mounted and had a line of skirmishers in advance. The enemy did not attempt to engage either of the regiments with determination, but acted as if the intention was to surprise a sleeping camp. Charging past the Eighth New York and First New Hampshire, they moved at the top of their speed in the direction of the pike and to our rear. Gen. Chapman had, at the first attack, moved the First Vermont and Twenty-second New York from the left of the pike, and when the column of the enemy advanced near enough attacked with the First Vermont. The enemy, after his first attack upon the Eighth New York his only object was to get safely away. He did not attempt to engage any of my troops, although by the cheering kept up by my command be could early have determined their locality. One regiment, the Sixth Virginia Cavalry, charged Pennington's brigade, but was met by one of his regiments which was already advancing and repulsed, with little or no fighting, in which Pennington suffered no loss, while the enemy suffered a loss of several in killed, wounded, and missing. Ten of the enemy were left dead on the ground. Chapman attacked the enemy wherever he could be found, and with one regiment, the First Vermont, drove him over a mile in the direction from which the attack had come. The division was in position to give or receive battle, and waited until after daylight, but the enemy made no further demonstrations at that point.
My loss in prisoners, although not officially reported to me yet, will not, I think, reach twenty. I have thirty-two of the enemy taken in the fight. My loss in wounded is twenty-two; most, if not all, are saber cuts, as the enemy had orders to charge with the saber. As my men used the carbine alone, and at short range, I am confident, from the number of dead left on the ground by the enemy, and from the verbal reports of brigade and regimental commanders, that the enemy's loss in wounded was more than treble my own. I do not think that more then one or two of my command were killed.
From prisoners I learned that the enemy had left their camps, five miles beyond Staunton, at 10 a. m. the day previous, marched until 10 p. m., then halted two miles beyond Harrisonburg until 1 a. m., when the march was resumed in the direction of New Market. At Harrisonburg Payne's brigade marched on the Middle road; Rosser's old brigade and Wickham's moved on the Back road. Payne's brigade attacked the Eighth New York and First New Hampshire immediately upon arriving in front of them. The prisoners reported that the halt did not last over five minutes, and that the enemy was under the impression that reveille had not been sounded yet in my camp, and that by charging upon us the men would be asleep and taken by surprise. Instead of this they found the command in the saddle, and they became the surprised party. I do not think the entire loss of the enemy will fall short of 100.
I was confident of my ability to defeat Rosser, although he had three brigades; and although some of the prisoners stated that division of infantry was expected to follow them, I knew that infantry could not march to that point from Waynesborough in time to be of any assistance to Rosser, but I was influenced by the following reasons: My command would exhaust their rations that night and no opportunity would be afforded to procure any short of two days. Another and stronger reason was my unprepared state to take charge of a large body of wounded, particularly under the inclement state of the weather. In addition, I was convinced that if it was decided to return, the sooner my return was accomplished the better it would be for my command. Accordingly, my command began the return march soon after daylight and reached their present encampment yesterday p. m.
As the object of your communication yesterday seemed to be to obtain an explanation as to "how it happened that" my "camp was charge by the enemy," I have gone into the details of that affair more than I otherwise should, particularly as my previous dispatches contained all the information which I deemed of value or interest. I will forward a list of casualties as soon as obtained from brigade commanders.
Respectfully, submitted.
G. P. CUSTER,
Brevet Maj.-Gen., Cmdg. Third Division.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 43, Serial No. 90, Pages 674-677, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
