Summary:
Herman Haupt, Chief of Union Military Railroads, reports in September, 1862, to
General in Chief Henry Halleck on efforts to keep supplies flowing during the
Antietam campaign. Haupt mentions actions in the Chambersburg area on several
occasions.
Maj.-Gen. HALLECK:
WASHINGTON,
September 27, 1862.
SIR:
On Thursday, September 18, I was authorized and directed by Special Orders, No. 248, to do whatever I might deem expedient to facilitate the transportation of troops and supplies to aid the armies in the field in Virginia and Maryland. I immediately proceeded to Baltimore, where a conference was held with Gen. Wood, Quartermaster Belger, President Garrett and Superintendent Smith, of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This conference resulted in changing the route for several regiments then ordered to the front and in the establishment of the following rule for future operations:
Rule.--All troops and supplies sent from Baltimore and points south thereof to the army in Maryland shall be forwarded by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and all sent from points north of Baltimore by the York and Cumberland Railroad.
I was clearly of the opinion that it was expedient in general to operate the railroads used for military purposes by and through the regular officers and employees of said roads, using military authority only where necessary to render assistance to them in procuring rolling-stock or securing regularity in train movements. The efficiency of the management of the officers of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, their readiness to give Government supplies the preference over all other transportation, and the capacity of the road, which is greater than any ordinary or even extraordinary demands that may be made upon it, left nothing more to be desired except the prompt return of cars from the advanced terminus; and having concluded all necessary arrangements, I proceeded the same night to Harrisburg, arriving in that city on Friday morning, September 19, at 3.30 a. m. The arrangement of sending supplies from Baltimore and points south thereof over the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, relieving the Northern Central of its transportation of Government supplies northward, left no question as to the ability of this road to meet any anticipated demands upon it, and I therefore continued my journey at 7.30 a. m. over the York and Cumberland Railroad to Chambersburg, where, after many delays caused by passing trains, I arrive at 2.30 p. m. The amount of business on the York and Cumberland Railroad exceeded its capacity for prompt accommodation. About eighteen regiments of Pennsylvania militia had been sent forward and more were on the way, the Pennsylvania Railroad Company furnishing cars and engines and assisting, as I understood, in the management of the road. Under these circumstances the only action at that point which I considered expedient was to order that all private sidings should be vacated, and that all cars belonging to individuals and all others not required for military purposes should be either run off the tracks or sent to other stations where the sidings were not required for the use of the Government. I found a very efficient officer in charge of the depot and station at Chambersburg, Mr. J. D. Potts, formerly assistant superintendent on the Western Division of the Pennsylvania Railroad, to whom I gave such instructions as appeared to be necessary.
At Hagerstown the main track was blocked with cars. There was no adequate siding or warehouse accommodation, no competent person in charge, and much confusion existed. I found it necessary to assume military possession of the Trunk Line Railroad between Chambersburg and Hagerstown; attended personally to the duty of raising the blockade; cleared the track of some five or six trains that had accumulated at Hagerstown; placed Mr. Potts in charge as superintendent; directed him to procure a substitute in the Chambersburg office; left written instructions as to the future management, and also wrote to Gen. Kenly, the officer understood to be in command at Hagerstown, informing him of the existing arrangement for transportation, and giving the names of the officers in charge. On Saturday, September 20, I rode from Hagerstown to Sharpsburg, where, after a half hour's interview with Gen. McClellan, I repaired to Boonsborough and returned via Frederick City to Baltimore. At Monocacy I found about 200 loaded cars on the sidings, some of which had been standing nearly a week. Gen. Wool, at my request, sent an efficient officer of his staff to insist upon the unloading and return of cars. On Monday, September 22, I returned to Washington and made a verbal report to you of my doings. On Tuesday, September 23, having received information that the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company were embarrassed in their operation in consequence of the non-return of cars, I sent two of our most experienced train dispatchers from the Camden and Amboy Railroad over the Northern Central, Pennsylvania, and connecting roads to search for and return cars of Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, and of the U. S. military railroads. The same evening I started for Baltimore and Harper's Ferry to render such assistance as might be in my power in opening communications with that post. I arrived at Harper's Ferry about noon on Wednesday, September 24, and remained until Thursday afternoon, September 25. The supply of material being insufficient, and the force of mechanics for the railroad bridge very small, I telegraphed for the construction corps of the Camden and Amboy Railroad, which was promptly forwarded, together with about 150,000 feet of long, square timber, which we fortunately had on hand at Alexandria, and which could not elsewhere have been procured in time.
About six days will complete the railroad trestle bridge and secure connection by rail with Harper's Ferry, but a much longer time will be required to replace the permanent structure. The trestle bridge will be in danger of destruction from freshets. The most certain reliance for the supplies in the event of such a contingency will be the pontoon bridge which has been reconstructed. With proper management at Harper's Ferry and Sandy Hook, the supply question presents no difficulty, even in the case the trestle bridge should be swept away. These are: First. Sending supplies to the advanced terminus before they are required. Such supplies are not unloaded. They block the track, impede retreat, and are in danger of capture or destruction. Nothing should be sent to the extreme front until it is actually needed. A reasonable amount can be kept on some siding a few miles in the rear. Second. A second difficulty arises from the fact that cars are not promptly unloaded and returned. Sometimes only a single car will be unloaded at a time, when there should be force sufficient to discharge the contents of a whole train. Cars are often kept for weeks as store-houses. Third. A third difficulty arises from the practice of detaining trains beyond schedule time. Nothing more certainly throws the business of a line into confusion, especially if there be but a single track. Medical directors and officers should conform to the schedule time of trains, or if extras are required for sick, wounded, or for supplies, they should always be furnished when practicable, but when the hour fixed for starting has arrived the trains should be promptly dispatched. It has been the practice on most roads used for military purposes, under the influence of a pressure of business and the impatience of military officers, to abandon the schedule and resort to the use of the telegraph exclusively for running trains. This practice invariably leads to difficulty and in case of any derangement to the delicate mechanism of the telegraph, puts an end to all business and blocks every wheel upon the road. I believe that it is always possible, with good management, to run the trains by schedule, and the telegraph, although valuable as an auxiliary, should not be used as a principal. It is desirable that uniformity should be introduced in the management of all railroads used for military purposes.
Very respectfully submitted.
H. HAUPT,
Brig.-Gen., Chief of Construction and Transportation, U.
S. Military Railroads.
Bibliographic Information : Letter Reproduced from The War of The Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1, Volume 51, Serial No. 107, Pages 867-870, Broadfoot Publishing Company, Wilmington, NC, 1997.
